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Abstract 
Navigation is the area of spatial cognition related to how people move through space. Agents 
represent this space using reference frames fixed relative to the agent (egocentric) or the 
environment (allocentric). 
Research into how reference frames are used and interact has revealed many variables that can 
affect navigation. The thesis aim was to assess some of these variables and observe the 
important, modulatory roles of environment structure and complexity. For this a virtual Morris 
water maze analogue was designed to flexibly assess allocentric, intrinsic information-based and 
sequential response-based navigation. 
This research focussed on four facets of the interaction between environment and navigation: 1) 
How different reference systems knowledge develops over time in an environment; 2) What 
information drives improvements in navigation; 3) How reference systems interact when they 
suggest competing responses; 4) The relationship between the preceding points and 
environmental complexity. 
The results showed successful allocentric navigation after little training. Successful self-
referential knowledge took longer to develop. Allocentric knowledge was centred on landmarks, 
overshadowing other cues, while egocentric knowledge was idiothetic. Conflict tests showed a 
strong preference for allocentric navigation that related to training maze complexity. A simpler 
training maze produced more egocentric navigators with relatively accurate route knowledge. 
These results provide further evidence for the multiple types of spatial navigation information 
that can be acquired and utilised, and demonstrate the importance of consideration of 
environment design for navigation research. The strong correspondence between these results 
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and the real world navigation of human and non-human animals also suggest this virtual reality 
setup as a promising way to assess navigation in future. 
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Introduction 
The study of spatial cognition involves research into how humans and other animals 
represent, perceive and interact with the space around them. As it is an area of cognition that is 
defined by its relating to these contents of thought spatial cognition can, under different 
circumstances, be seen to involve a great many psychological processes (Waller & Nadel, 2013). 
These include, but are not limited to, how mental representations of space are constructed and 
utilised, how spatial features of an environment are encoded in, and retrieved from, memory and 
how agents move through space. This last process, commonly referred to as spatial navigation, is 
the subdomain of spatial cognition that is of most interest to the research undertaken here. Spatial 
reference frames are a key part of many aspects of spatial cognition, including navigation. They 
involve how space is represented by an agent and is centred upon a referent of some type, where 
within a reference frame the features of an environment are defined spatially by their position 
with respect to the referent (Waller & Nadel, 2013). Different reference frames are identified by 
what, and what type, of referent they use. Broadly, reference frames centred on the agent or parts 
of the agent’s body are referred to as egocentric, while reference frames entirely independent of 
the agent are referred to as allocentric. While navigation depends on the spatial reference 
systems used by a navigator on a given task, how space is represented is not the major area of 
focus. This distinguishes navigation research from research into spatial updating, which involves 
updating the positions of environmental features in accordance with movement of the navigator 
(Chrastil & Warren, 2012). In humans, tests of spatial updating generally involve placing 
participants in the centre of an environment where all members of a small set of objects can be 
view simultaneously so that the spatial relationships between them can be easily observed. 
Navigation research by contrast typically takes place in a much larger environment where 
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observers are exposed to features sequentially (Chrastil & Warren, 2012). What will be looked at 
in the work to follow is how navigation can be observed to change depending on the different 
spatial reference frames employed by a navigator. 
Navigation is an ability that involves the interaction of multiple, distinct neural and 
cognitive systems and types of knowledge and memory. A great deal of research has been 
undertaken to study these many different features; however, as a result of this there exist many 
different definitions for the same key terms. Problems can therefore occur in cases where 
relationships between these features are potentially incorrectly posited as a result of different 
groups applying the same terms in different ways. The core focus of the research that will be 
described here is the distinction between the allocentric and the egocentric. This is a distinction 
that here pertains to both the types of spatial reference frames developed and utilised by 
navigators and the types of knowledge that are acquired. Therefore before proceeding to look at 
what is currently known about how human and non-human animals navigate, how these two 
areas will be conceptualised and used here will be clearly defined. 
The knowledge that underpins navigation through an environment can be classified 
simply into three distinct types: route, survey and graph (Chrastil, 2013). Survey and graph 
knowledge inform the construction of allocentric reference frames while route knowledge is 
egocentric. Survey knowledge is generally conceived of as involving a map-like, observer 
independent representation and involves the learning of distances and angles between 
environmental features (Chrastil, 2013). Methods of navigation that utilise observer-independent 
reference frames are commonly referred to as allocentric strategies. Survey knowledge is 
generally thought to store metric distance information between environmental features and one 
of the key contributors to the acquisition of this information is locomotion (Chrastil & Warren, 
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2013). The information derived from the motor commands that control, and the proprioceptive 
feedback from, locomotion is referred to as podokinetic information. Graph knowledge is 
thought to play the intermediary role between survey and route knowledge, representing the 
environment as a network of edge-connected location nodes (Chrastil, 2013). Node connections 
do not contain any distance or angle information, instead serving to facilitate the construction of 
novel paths through the environment. This distinction between knowledge types can potentially 
cause confusion when attempting to draw conclusions from results. Given the multiple different 
definitions of terms in the literature, it is important to keep their use distinct and consistent when 
referring to them. 
Underpinning these knowledge types are distinct categories of learning. These categories 
are divided by the features of the environment they involve and differences observed in the 
circumstances and rate of their acquisition. Place learning, which is the process of acquiring the 
ability to recognise and situate a location in the environment, is one of the most important of 
these categories as it is a necessary, but not sufficient, component of survey knowledge (Chrastil, 
2013). Chrastil (2013) suggests that survey maps are likely composed of multiple instances of 
this type of learning. Landmarks play an important role in place learning, serving as distal 
environmental cues that provide navigators with relational information about their position 
relative to other features of the environment (Vorhees & Williams, 2014). There are a variety of 
different aspects of an environmental stimulus that might see it adopted for use as a landmark. 
Contrast in the appearance of an environmental feature plays a role in this process, as the more 
visually unique an object is relative to its environment the more likely it is to be used as a 
landmark (Chan, Baumann, Bellgrove, & Mattingley, 2012). This perceptual salience can come 
as a result of the landmark’s features or its relative spatial position (Caduff & Timpf, 2008). For 
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spatial position, objects at important decision points are more likely to be used as landmarks 
(Chan et al., 2012). Other important factors include the stability of the object, which affects how 
reliable it is perceived to be. The salience of a landmark appears to be the result of the 
combination of the properties of the feature, the surrounding environment and the point of view, 
and cognitive processing, of the observer (Caduff & Timpf, 2008). Prior experience of a 
navigator with an environment also plays a role in what features are used to make decisions. In 
general therefore it appears that whether an object is used as a landmark depends on the context 
in which it is encountered and the goals of the navigator. 
Features of an environment can also serve as beacons, and are used as such when they are 
highly reliable predictors of an important location. Following a beacon involves the utilisation of 
a minimal allocentric reference frame where the navigator’s focus is only on their position 
relative to the beacon. Landmarks that come to be used as beacons differ from those that are 
instead used as proximal environmental cues in that they are exclusively associated with a given 
location, while proximal cues serve as providers of associational information, for example where 
to turn on a route, and are generally less reliable due to their typically been transient in nature 
(Chan et al., 2012). 
Spatial integration is another, less common allocentric learning process observed in many 
species which involves the combination of multiple learned landmark relationships. In the 
simplest cases the navigator learns a pair of associations, one between two landmarks, A and B, 
and the other between landmark A and the goal, after which they are able to use their landmark-
landmark association to compute the probable location of the goal when only landmark B is 
present (Leising & Blaisdell, 2009). Theoretically, since vectors can be learned between 
landmarks and locations using associative processes, it may be possible for navigators to use 
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spatial integration to build more complex spatial representations by combining these lower-level 
landmark-goal associations. However it is not currently clear when or if this occurs. 
While survey and graph knowledge are the two key components of allocentric navigation, 
route knowledge, which involves the procedural learning of an ordered, circumstance-specific 
(Kallai, Makany, Karadi, & Jacobs, 2005) sequence of turns that are represented via a ground-
level perspective (Chrastil, 2013), is the key area of interest for egocentric navigation as it will 
be looked at here. Like survey knowledge, route knowledge has its own category of learning that 
serves as a key component of its development. Response learning is generally thought of in 
contrast to place learning and involves the navigator acquiring the correct behavioural response 
to make when exposed to a particular feature of the environment (Chrastil, 2013). Response 
learning is the less flexible of the two as it cannot be used to build an understanding of the larger 
spatial layout. Instead learned response behaviours are typically, when necessary, chained 
together to construct a route that can be followed to a known location (Chrastil, 2013). 
Path integration, also sometimes referred to here as dead reckoning, is one of the most 
fundamental learning mechanisms that support navigation and is another major component of 
egocentric navigation. It is observed in vertebrates and invertebrates (Biegler, 2000), and 
involves an animal recording the direction and distance it has travelled relative to some prior 
reference point (Collett & Graham, 2004). Different animals can gauge their travelled distance in 
different ways; bees appear to use optic flow (Cheng, 2000; Srinivasan, Zhang, Berry, Cheng, & 
Zhu, 1999), ants use proprioception (Wohlgemuth, Ronacher, & Wehner, 2001), while dogs, 
hamsters and humans use idiothetic information (Etienne & Jeffery, 2004). Mammalian 
idiothetic information is provided by the visual, vestibular and proprioceptive systems (Etienne 
& Jeffery, 2004). The salient features visible while navigating in a familiar environment can also 
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be used by animals to reset their internal path integrator (Collett & Graham, 2004). This is 
important as evidence across multiple species suggests that the systems for the distance and 
direction calculations used for path integration have an internal source of error that accumulates 
as the animal travels. In non-human animals path integration is usually studied using homing in 
the context of foraging; however, it appears to only play an important role in cases where it can 
be combined with other learned strategies and with familiar spatial cues in the environment. 
More generally, research that aims to test path integration needs to be careful to ensure that no 
external frame of reference is in use, a process that typically includes removing all possible 
extrinsic cues from the environment (Etienne & Jeffery, 2004). Complicating this process, non-
human animals can use a wide variety of environmental cues in order to orient themselves in an 
environment including the earth’s magnetic field (Chan et al., 2012).  
In general, tests that aim to measure the exclusive use of either an egocentric or 
allocentric strategy need to be designed to minimise or exclude cues that could facilitate 
navigation that utilises an undesired strategy type. On tests for egocentric navigation this means 
distal cues are removed while allocentric tests remove proximal cues. As the separable 
employment of allocentric and egocentric strategies is a key area of focus of the work that it is to 
follow the design of these sorts of tests is an important consideration. One very fruitful way to 
gain an understanding of how to separate different types of strategies is to look at the many ways 
these strategies have been observed to be developed and utilised in both humans and non-human 
animals. 
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Non-human navigation 
Within the broad field of spatial navigation there are three key avenues of study that are 
very informative about the aspects of human navigation that are of interest here. Whether 
navigation can be generally considered to involve the use of simple or complex cognitive 
mechanisms is one of the most common questions within the field of spatial navigation research. 
Framing this debate within the consideration of allocentric and egocentric strategy use, 
egocentric navigation, which depends on relatively simple reference frames and follows more 
universally observed rules of associative learning, is representative of these simpler mechanisms. 
The degree to which more complex allocentric reference frames are necessary to explain how 
navigation has been observed to proceed is the crux of the issue, with some arguing that theories 
based around the development of external, or in some cases map-like, spatial representations 
depend on observations that themselves can be explained by simpler cognitive processes. Related 
to this discussion is the consideration of to what extent the acquisition of the information that 
underpins navigation follows the rules of associative learning that are observed in many other 
areas of cognition. One of the most common ways to assess how different learned strategies and 
environmental features compete and interact during navigation is to test for evidence of blocking 
between them. Blocking is observed when a novel stimulus is trained in the presence of a 
previously learned stimulus that can, to some variable extent, predict the location of the goal of 
interest (Kelly & Gibson, 2007). In these cases, much less is learned about the novel stimulus 
than would have been if the familiar, predictive stimulus were absent (Kelly & Gibson, 2007). 
Another similar behavioural phenomenon is overshadowing. To test for overshadowing a 
participant is trained in the presence of multiple stimuli, and it is observed when testing their 
navigation that the stimuli that are relatively less salient, where salience is task-dependent, are 
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less effective at guiding behaviour than the more salient stimuli and less effective than they 
would have been if the participant had been trained with the less salient stimuli alone (Kelly & 
Gibson, 2007). Both blocking and overshadowing are examples of cue competition and are 
fundamental principles of associative learning. The final, and most relevant to the work 
undertaken here, avenue of interest looks at how different navigation systems interact to guide 
navigation and the acquisition of spatial information. This area can be seen to combine 
considerations from the previous two, most commonly when looking at how the rules of 
associative learning are manifested in environments where both allocentric and egocentric 
navigation strategies are acquired and utilised. 
Before considering how people learn and utilise different navigation strategies, it can be 
very informative to look at what has been observed in research into the navigation abilities of 
non-human animals. Many aspects of non-human animals’ spatial navigation have been found to 
be very informative and predictive about human navigation, from the most common rodent 
studies to the strategies observed in invertebrate honeybees and ants (Wang & Spelke, 2002). 
The flexibility of non-human animal navigation research has also allowed researchers to 
manipulate and more closely examine the neural underpinnings of different systems of 
navigation. This can be seen in research in to the role played by the hippocampus in navigation, 
with O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) most famously utilising extensive research into many different 
species of non-human animals to construct their theory of the hippocampus as the home of the 
cognitive map.  
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Pigeons. 
Pigeons are one of the most common species of animal studied in psychology. One of the 
key areas of interests in this research is how pigeons use landmarks to delineate locations and 
navigate. Pigeons appear to use a vector-sum model to encode a target location relative to a 
landmark (Cheng, Spetch, Kelly, & Bingman, 2006). This involves learning a distance and 
direction vector from the landmark to the goal. Learning according to this model weights 
proximal cues more heavily when multiple landmarks are present, such that movement of a 
proximal cue produces a greater shift in search location than does equivalent change of a distal 
cue. This vector sum model has been observed in a variety of species, including rats, humans, 
pigeons and insects (Leising & Blaisdell, 2009). 
Pigeons’ spatial cognition has also been observed to follow some of the rules of 
associative learning when acquiring information about landmarks in an environment (Cheng et 
al., 2006) including showing spatial blocking and overshadowing effects (Leising & Blaisdell, 
2009; Spetch, 1995). This landmark overshadowing can, in both pigeons and humans, be 
dependent upon both the absolute position of a landmark and the positions of other associated 
landmarks in the environment (Spetch, 1995). Pigeons have also been shown to be capable of 
reasoning about the location of a target using spatial integration between landmarks (Leising & 
Blaisdell, 2009). A similar ability has been observed in rats (Chamizo, Roderigo, & Mackintosh, 
2006). 
Unlike humans, pigeons are not able to demonstrate a transfer of learning about spatial 
relationships between novel feature arrays. That is, pigeons trained with multiple different 
landmark arrays that share the same arrangement and the same relationship to a target location 
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do not show preferential search according to this repeating relationship when tested on a novel 
array (Spetch, Cheng, & MacDonald, 1996). Pigeons and humans also differ in the way that 
array manipulation controls search. When the landmarks in an array have their positions 
expanded or contracted people adjust their search to maintain relative spatial relationships, while 
pigeons search in positions that maintain the absolute distances to individual landmarks (Spetch 
et al., 1996). When searching for a target location they appear to use all landmarks in an array 
equally to guide their behaviour (Cheng et al., 2006). 
Touch-screens are sometimes used for landmark tests in pigeons as they allow for the 
automatic manipulation of the presented landmarks and highly accurate recording of search 
behaviour. As touch screen tests also present a 2-dimensional, small scale environment and have 
the requirement that locations be selected rather than navigated to, they can be used to assess the 
generality of pigeons’ spatial cognitive processes. There are, for example, some landmark search 
results on touch-screens that show pigeons producing the same search patterns as observed in 
open-field experiments (Cheng et al., 2006). 
Insects. 
Unlike with pigeons the search patterns seen in honeybees as a result of manipulations of 
landmark arrays are more similar to those observed in humans, although honeybees appear to 
achieve the same results by matching the perceived size of the array on their retina with the size 
that had been experienced previously (Spetch et al., 1996). While bees are capable of learning a 
target location with reference to a landmark array and utilising the angles between the 
component landmarks when searching, they appear to give more weight to one preferred 
landmark, such that they preferentially search for the target in locations their favoured landmark 
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suggests (Capaldi, Robinson, & Fahrbach, 1999; Cheng, 1999a, 2000; Collett, 1996). They can 
also, when necessary, learn the position of a target with reference to the gap between landmarks 
in an array (Cheng, 1999b).  
Generally bees use vector or route following to navigate to a target location, while the 
sun and other major landmarks in the environment are used to determine their direction of travel. 
These landmarks are typically recognised by colour and are beaconed in to when located, while 
distance travelled is measured by the visual flow of objects on the bee’s retina (Cheng, 2000; 
Srinivasan et al., 1999; Srinivasan, 2014). When a location has been arrived at but the target has 
not been found, bees utilise landmark matching which involves flying in a particular direction 
attempting to arrange nearby landmarks in to a familiar position on their retina. The distance and 
direction information to these landmarks are computed separately (Cheng & Spetch, 1998). 
These processes of attempting to match a current scene to a remembered view of the 
environment are together known as snapshot matching, which is a method of navigation utilised 
by honeybees and many other species of insect (Cheng & Graham, 2013). As bees are required to 
navigate over relatively large distances, their matching process is thought to likely rely on large 
environmental features. Together these results support the idea that bees are capable of 
navigating allocentrically; however, there is still no agreement on whether honeybees can or do 
navigate using cognitive maps (Cheeseman et al., 2014a; Cheeseman et al., 2014b; Cheung et al., 
2014). 
Similar to honeybees there are many species of ant that also make use of the snapshots 
when searching for a familiar location. However, while honeybees are capable of adjusting their 
search in response to positional changes in a landmark array, ants’ search becomes random 
unless changes to the array are matched by changes to the landmark’s size. When this condition 
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is met, search centres on the location from which the view of the array on the retina matches the 
view previously experienced, regardless of the fact that the distances to the landmarks have 
changed (Cheng & Graham, 2013). Ants also appear to make use of the way distal environmental 
features are arranged against the sky as a visual, directional cue to guide navigation to and from 
their nests (Graham & Cheng, 2009). 
In general, how ants use distal environmental features can depend on the system of 
navigation they are employing. When ants are attempting to navigate using a familiar route they 
are observed to move in a way that positions landmarks in a previously experienced arrangement 
relative to their current heading direction but do not attend to the retinal size of the landmark as 
they do when using snapshot matching (Cheng & Graham, 2013). These differences support the 
more general idea that ants use their spatial knowledge on a more case-by-case basis, using 
landmarks and the like as cues that inform them when to perform a particular response (Wehner, 
2003). 
Path integration is another primary method of navigation for ants, as it is for many other 
species. A common way it is observed is in the ability of ants to take direct paths back to familiar 
locations following a circuitous, and often random, journey to their current position (Wang & 
Spelke, 2002).  This involves the construction of a global vector that incorporates information 
across the entirety of the ant’s journey. Ants also make use of a local vector system, where larger 
routes are composed of smaller segments that are selectively initiated in response to the ants’ 
experience with a particular visual landmark. These distinct systems, global path integration and 
local, landmark associated response vectors, are differentially engaged based on the information 
available in the environment at a given point on the journey (M. Collett, Collett, Bisch, & 
Wehner, 1998) . This method of use is in contrast to the idea that ant spatial knowledge is 
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combined to create a more allocentric representation, an idea for which there appears to be no 
convincing evidence (Cheng & Graham, 2013; Wehner, 2003). 
Non-human Primates.  
While non-human primates are very close to humans evolutionarily they are, as in many 
other areas of psychological research, not typically the focus of attempts to use animal models to 
understand human navigation. This is in part due to the dual observations that many of the brain 
areas that underpin navigation have their function conserved between mammalian species, 
meaning informative research can be undertaken in more flexible model animals such as rodents, 
and that many of the spatial abilities of humans can be seen in, and predicted from, other species. 
However, the research that has been undertaken has shown many similarities between humans 
and non-human primates in the ways that they navigate. Bonobos, like humans, are able to use 
both egocentric and allocentric spatial representations (Rosati, 2015). When tested on a plus 
maze equivalent, bonobos also preferentially navigate to the allocentric location. Chimpanzees 
also appear able to form allocentric representations of space, demonstrating that they can make 
use of novel shortcuts between learned foraging locations (Rosati, 2015). Capuchin monkeys are 
also capable of learning to take detours through virtual mazes as a spatial strategy when trained 
under circumstances that punish the taking of direct paths through the environment. This ability 
to learn detours was taken as evidence that capuchin monkeys preferentially employed 
navigation strategies instead of learning multiple separate routes for each maze (Pan et al., 2011). 
Non-human primates also, like humans and other mammals, have their navigation 
through an environment affected by their familiarity with it (Dolins, Klimowicz, Kelley, & 
Menzel, 2014). Non-human primates have been observed to utilise short and direct routes when 
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navigating to familiar feeding locations for example (Di Fiore & Suarez, 2007). However, Di 
Fiore and Suarez (2007) found when examining the long-term navigation behaviour of spider 
and woolly monkeys that novel paths are rarely taken between familiar locations. Instead travel 
was usually observed along a network of repeatedly utilised routes. The study of navigation in 
non-human primates also runs across some of the same difficulties that can occur in real-world 
experiments into human spatial abilities. Studies that attempt to look at primate navigation in 
more free-ranging environments can come across difficulty determining which features of the 
world are playing an important role in the animal’s navigation (Dolins et al., 2014). On the other 
hand smaller scale studies in captive primates are often constrained in what they can say about 
how navigation proceeds in their wild counterparts. Primate researchers have been able to 
circumvent these concerns to an extent using virtual reality software, an approach that is also 
often utilised in human research. Chimpanzees tested in virtual environments were observed to 
be able to utilise landmarks as both positive and negative cues, where features in the latter group 
are taken as indicators that a wrong decision has been made while navigating. In general, Dolins 
et al. (2014) observed that chimpanzees and humans appear to show the same learning and 
behavioural responses when navigating in virtual environments. 
Rodents. 
Two of the most common animal species studied in spatial navigation research are mice 
and rats. This can be seen to be related to the belief that there exists a great deal of overlap 
between mammalian species in how shared brain areas function (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978). As a 
result of this expectation of shared function between mammals, rodents immediately suggest 
themselves as a convenient model for navigation study for the same conveniences that sees them 
utilised in many other areas of psychological research. The idea that mammalian navigation is 
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underpinned by an allocentric cognitive map based in the hippocampus motivated researchers for 
decades after it was first posited (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978), a trend that also served to motivate 
research using rodents as they allow for neural manipulations of this shared brain structure that 
are either not possible or more difficult in other animals. Shared hippocampal function between 
rodents and humans can then be combined to construct theories about how navigation proceeds 
in humans (Redish & Ekstrom, 2013). 
As a result of the large number of studies making use of them, there is a great deal of 
evidence regarding how rodents utilise both allocentric and egocentric reference frames to 
navigate. These navigation behaviours can be, depending on the timing and circumstances, either 
flexible or very habitual. Observations of these habitual responses include rats running into walls 
when traversing familiar paths that have been shortened or have had barriers placed along them 
(Leising & Blaisdell, 2009). Rats have also been observed to ignore food placed along a well-
traversed path as result of their habitual execution of the response behaviour to travel the path in 
its entirety. Rats are also capable of flexible, goal-oriented behaviour as evidenced by their 
successful performance in T and Y mazes and when navigating in large enclosures. In general it 
appears that whether a rat uses a more flexible place or a habitual response strategy depends on 
the information available at and around the goal location and how much training has taken place 
(Leising & Blaisdell, 2009). Rodents are generally thought to show a shift from an early 
preference for utilising an allocentric reference frame to employing a more habitual response 
strategy as they become more familiar with an environment. This pattern of behaviour is most 
simply demonstrated when training rodents on a T-maze and testing the relationship between 
environment familiarity and their strategy preference using a conflict test. Navigators are first 
trained to find a target location that can be travelled to using either an allocentric strategy 
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involving determining the correct arm of the maze with reference to the arrangement of the 
surrounding room cues, or an egocentric strategy involving learning the correct turn behaviour 
when arriving at the intersection. During a conflict test rodents are started from the opposite side 
of the maze, a change which means the two different strategies now suggest opposite arms as the 
correct choice. Which arm is chosen under these circumstances can then be used as a measure of 
which strategy the navigator prefers to use. On the T-maze rodents show the shift described 
earlier, changing from preferring the place arm to choosing the response arm as they become 
more experienced navigating the maze (Packard & McGaugh, 1996).This shift represents the 
generally accepted progression from a more deliberate, effortful strategy to a habitually executed 
response that occurs as animals become more familiar with the environment they are navigating. 
The Morris water maze (MWM) is one of the most popular tests of spatial navigation in 
rodent research, allowing researchers to look at both allocentric and egocentric navigation. It 
involves placing a rodent in pools of variable sizes filled with opaque water and observing how it 
learns to find its’ way to a hidden platform that allows it to escape the water (Morris, 1984). This 
platform location can be learned in a variety of different ways at the discretion of the 
experimenter. A rodent’s spatial learning and preferential navigation strategy can then be probed 
by placing them in the pool from a familiar or unfamiliar location, and potentially with particular 
manipulations of the available information, and observing where they search for the platform. 
One of the key benefits of using a pool as a space for navigation is that it allows for the removal 
of proximal cues that may serve as confounds when attempting to assess allocentric navigation 
(Vorhees & Williams, 2014). A major motivator for the development of the MWM was the 
removal of proximal cues, including olfactory information left from previous trials, which 
become available to a rat when they enter a corridor on the radial arm maze (RAM). There are 
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many other benefits to the use of the MWM including the relatively little training required to 
observe learning, the removal of food deprivation as a motivator for behaviour, the ease of 
testing and the rapid and reliable learning that is observed (Vorhees & Williams, 2014). 
In order to assess what has been learned during MWM training probe test trials are 
conducted. These involve removing the platform from the pool and observing where the rodent 
preferentially searches for it. When analysing the data acquired from a MWM task there are four 
common measures of probe test performance. These are, in no particular order, the amount of 
time spent in each of the pool’s quadrants, the amount of time spent in a target zone centred on 
the platform’s location, how close the rodent was to the platform averaged over the whole trial 
and the number of times the platform’s location was swum over (Maei, Zaslavsky, Teixeira, & 
Frankland, 2009). Attempting to assess the sensitivity of these different measures, Maei et al. 
(2009) looked at how well each one could distinguish different populations of rodents with 
distinct genetic, pharmacological and neuroanatomical manipulations based on their MWM 
performance and found that mean proximity to the platform was the best able to differentiate the 
different conditions. Reversal learning is also a common feature of MWM testing with rodents 
trained to locate a platform location in the quadrant opposite to the one in which it had originally 
been positioned (Vorhees & Williams, 2006). Mice show an initial preference for swimming to 
the original location on training trials which suggests an inability to completely extinguish their 
prior learning. Rats on the other hand rapidly switch strategies to the new location, with a 
complete switch commonly observed within four training trials. The double-reversal task, where 
the platform is moved back to its original position following reversal learning is also used to 
reveal very subtle differences in performance between groups and to uncover hard-to-observe 
cognitive deficits (Vorhees & Williams, 2006). 
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Rats show a typical pattern of progression in their search behaviour on the MWM, 
moving from navigating using a thigmotaxis strategy, which involves searching while remaining 
in constant contact with the wall, to a pattern of weaving and circling while swimming some 
distance from the wall, a strategy that is usually successful (Vorhees & Williams, 2014). 
However, they are also capable of learning a variety of other spatial strategies, depending on the 
environmental variations used, that utilise both internal and external information. Rats appear to 
acquire these different strategies based in part on the availability of distal cues in the 
environment, choosing for example a simpler, beacon-based response in cases where only one 
navigable cue was available (Harvey, Brant, & Commins, 2009). Rodents also appear to estimate 
distance and direction in similar ways to people on the MWM (Koppen et al., 2013). 
There are potential methodological concerns that need to be addressed depending on how 
an experimenter wants to use the MWM. Pool size is an obvious one as it is an important 
variable that affects the slope of the observed learning curve. Larger pools produce shallower 
curves that allow time for evidence of deficits in performance to be revealed while smaller pools 
produce steeper curves which, in some cases, allow rodents to solve the task without the use of 
any spatial cues. However, pools that are too large can run in to the opposite problem of being 
too difficult for rodents to show any learning on. The size of the platform relative to the size of 
the pool is also an important consideration, wherein the larger this ratio the more difficult the 
task (Vorhees & Williams, 2014). There are conventions for how the pool and platform should 
be sized, however depending on the goals of the experimenter they can be variables that need to 
be given consideration. Where rodents are started in the maze also often needs to be considered. 
Multiple start locations are often used to stop rodents learning an egocentric strategy; however, 
this can cause problems. Using different quadrant-based locations raises the problem of some 
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locations potentially being closer to the platform than others (Vorhees & Williams, 2006). 
Attempting to avoid this concern by restricting the possible start quadrants can also run the risk 
of allowing rodents to circumvent the acquisition of allocentric strategies in favour of different 
egocentric responses for different start points (Vorhees & Williams, 2006). Another facet of 
MWM environment design that does not perhaps get as much attention as it deserves is the 
number and arrangement of the distal environmental cues, with the possibilities ranging from a 
single cue on each wall (Hamilton, Driscoll, & Sutherland, 2002) to unique arrangements of 
distinct wall textures and landmarks (Jacobs, Laurance, & Thomas, 1997). In general according 
to Vorhees and Williams (2006) many of the commonly perceived flaws of the MWM result 
from the use of inappropriately small mazes, poorly designed protocols that do not assess 
learning or poor control tests that measure non-spatial explanations of the observed results. 
The RAM is another of the more popular rodent tests of navigation. The maze is 
composed of a variable number of arms that radiate out from a central hub. The variability in the 
number of arms allows for the construction of tests that assess different types of memory 
(Vorhees & Williams, 2014). The standard RAM uses eight arms and assesses working memory. 
The arms of the maze are baited and the rodents are required to visit each arm only once, with 
revisits counted as evidence of their failure to recall prior search behaviour. This task therefore 
tests working memory, which involves the brief retention of acquired information in order to 
guide relatively immediate behaviour, as the arms are rebaited between trials. Experiments that 
vary this number of arms typically aim to assess working and reference memory, which refers to 
information that is acquired and kept across multiple trials, in combination. During tests in these 
experiments only some of the arms are baited, and this is consistent between trials, so visits to 
unbaited arms are considered reference memory errors while revisiting an arm is still a working 
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memory error (Vorhees & Williams, 2014). Rats are able to recall the arms they have visited on 
a RAM task using both intrinsic information, which includes vestibular and kinaesthetic 
information, and extrinsic information, such as the visual cues in the environment. These 
different types of information appear to be integrated such that disagreement between them in the 
spatial arrangement they suggest produces erroneous behaviour (Brown & Moore, 1997). 
Pigeons have been observed to perform similarly to rats when tested on a bird-equivalent version 
of the radial arm maze and in many situations have been found to utilise similar mechanisms to 
solve navigation tasks (Leising & Blaisdell, 2009). 
Labyrinthine mazes are another test type that can be employed to assess egocentric 
learning in rodents as they allow for the complete removal of distal cues when used in the dark 
(Vorhees & Williams, 2014). The star maze is another, more complicated, rodent maze that 
allows for the assessment of their ability to navigate using either allocentric information or a 
sequential egocentric strategy that encodes an ordered sequence of choice point behaviours 
(Fouquet et al., 2013). 
Environmental landmarks, as an integral component of place learning, play a key role in 
how rodents acquire and utilise allocentric navigation strategies. How rodents utilise these 
landmarks is variable, depending on a variety of different environmental factors. The distance of 
a given landmark to the navigation target and its relationship to the other landmarks in the 
environment are two such factors. Rats trained with a landmark array on the MWM with one 
landmark either closer or further from the platform than the others showed more accuracy in the 
closer group than the further one when tested with only the variable landmark present, but poorer 
performance in the closer group when tested on configurations composed of only the remaining 
landmarks (Chamizo, Manteiga, Rodrigo, & Mackintosh, 2006). Here it can be seen that the 
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position of a landmark can affect both what is learned about it and about other landmarks nearby, 
an example of landmark learning following the associative principle of overshadowing.  More 
generally, on the MWM rats appear to be able to better delineate the platform’s location relative 
to a landmark when it is nearer the platform than when it is further away (Chamizo & Rodrigo, 
2004). Landmark use is also affected by perceived reliability, where rats trained on the MWM 
with static landmark and platform positions show less accurate search than those trained with the 
landmark and platform changing position between training sessions but remaining in the same 
spatial relationship (Roberts & Pearce, 1998). Here the uncertainty of the platform’s location 
relative to everything else in the environment but the landmark grants a stronger associative 
power to the unstable landmark than is acquired in the stable condition. Research in rats also 
suggests that the geometric stability of a landmark relative to other environmental features plays 
an important role in determining whether any given landmark will be used to guide navigation 
(Biegler & Morris, 1996). Landmark arrays can also be relatively insensitive to loss of 
information, an effect typically achieved by the removal of some number of array members. For 
example rats trained on the MWM with four distinct landmarks present could still accurately 
locate the platform on probe tests when half of them were removed (Prados & Trobalon, 1998). 
Landmark arrangements in rats also appear to be learned in relation to other environmental cues. 
When rats are trained on an arrangement of landmarks that are clustered near to or far from the 
pool on a MWM task only changes to the nearer configuration impair their performance; 
however, when a salient directional cue is included during training the same rearrangements 
result in no observable quadrant search preference (Civile, Chamizo, Mackintosh, & McLaren, 
2014). Civile et al. (2014) suggest this is a result of the added directional cue providing 
orientation information that is used in conjunction with the other landmarks, such that if the 
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landmarks no longer align with the orientation cue they lose their connection to the information 
learned during training and are therefore no longer used to guide navigation. 
How well rodent spatial navigation adheres to the principles of associative learning can 
also be seen when looking at extrinsic cues more generally. For example rats learning to navigate 
through a maze containing both intra and extra maze cues can have their learning about the latter 
overshadowed by the presence of the former (March, Chamizo, & Mackintosh, 1992). A similar 
effect is observed in the MWM, where training rats with a beacon attached to the platform 
overshadows rat learning about the other cues in the room (Roberts & Pearce, 1999). In some 
cases a navigational cue can, by its nature, be considered so much more salient than other 
features of a new environment that it is preferentially attended to and learned about, even when 
its unreliability produces worse performance than would result without it. This was observed in 
rats trained on a water maze task in the presence of a prominent light cue which was either stable 
or moved between trials, where this movement meant it was not predictive of the target location 
(Martin, Walker, & Skinner, 2003).  The unstable light was observed to produce significantly 
worse performance than the stable condition, which itself produced equivalent performance to a 
no light group (Martin et al., 2003). It has also been observed that vector-based learning and 
place learning can, in some cases, function as learning systems that are both cooperative and also 
associatively competitive (Kosaki, Poulter, Austen, & McGregor, 2015). Kosaki et al. (2015) 
trained rats on a variation of the MWM where both intra and extra maze cues were present but 
the platform and the intramaze cues were moved between training sessions such that they 
maintained the same relationship. Under these conditions it was found that rats were able to 
rapidly learn and re-learn each new inter-session relationship between the platform and the distal 
cues. This was in spite of the fact that the intramaze landmarks already perfectly predict the 
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platform location, but was only observed when the extramaze cues were salient. When the distal 
cues were not salient the intramaze landmarks overshadowed their learning (Kosaki et al., 2015). 
Hence it can be seen that the two systems can be both cooperative and competitive. Rats trained 
in a triangular MWM pool with a pair of proximal cues in the base and distal cues around the 
room are also perfectly able to learn the platform location with reference to both while also 
possessing the ability to successfully locate the platform when only one type of cue was 
available (McGregor, Good, & Pearce, 2004). The addition of a beacon to the same environment 
during training also had no effect on the rats’ ability to locate the target when they were tested 
with only the proximal cues present, and these results together suggest a lack of an 
overshadowing interaction between the different cue types. Therefore while it can be seen that 
rodent navigation is consistent in many ways with associative learning mechanisms (Chamizo, 
2003) the relationship between them is far from simple.  
There is, however, debate around whether what is typically considered navigation driven 
by place learning is not instead the employment of a directional strategy. Directional navigation 
differs from place navigation in that movement is not directed to a particular location delineated 
by the arrangement of external cues but rather in the direction of a feature or features of the 
environment. Typically the two are separated in testing by shifting the navigable environment 
along a single axis when wanting to test strategy use. After the shift the absolute location 
remains the same but the direction strategy, which for example may involve heading towards the 
area of the environment nearest a given cue, leads to a different position. Looking at this 
difference on an open field maze it was found that rats forced to use one of the three response, 
direction and place strategies could acquire only the first two, and showed no evidence of place 
navigation even after three hundred training trials (Skinner et al., 2003). Experiments that 
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separate out direction and place strategies tend to produce results that suggest the ability of rats 
to show place navigation is dependent upon their having distinct starting points and initial 
heading directions when tested from different maze positions (Skinner et al., 2003; Whyte, 
Martin, & Skinner, 2009). However, it may also be the case that rats are not learning place 
navigation under these conditions. Rather, they could be using the different directions of 
movement that result from these different positions to guide their search, in essence learning that 
different start positions necessitate different behaviour instead of constructing a proper 
allocentric representation of space (Skinner, Horne, Murphy, & Martin, 2010). 
These concerns extend to the MWM task suggesting that, as it is typically implemented, 
it is unlikely to actually serve as a test of pure place navigation in rodents. Attempting to separate 
place and directional navigation by shifting the pool position found the same preference for 
directional responding as has been observed in various other mazes (Hamilton, Akers, Weisend, 
& Sutherland, 2007). Multiple experiments attempting to find evidence of place navigation by 
varying different procedural parameters, including the length of the training period (Hamilton et 
al., 2008; Hamilton et al., 2007), the variability of the platform location and the position of the 
pool, observed true place strategy use only when the different pool positions varied along 
multiple axes while the platform location was invariant (Hamilton et al., 2008). When the 
platform’s location varied as the position of the pool did, directional navigation was observed, as 
it was as a result of all the other manipulations. Rats using directional navigation also learn the 
platform location faster than place navigators, a finding that Hamilton et al. (2008) interpret as 
indicating that directional behaviours are the more readily learned. Alongside the position of the 
pool, the presence of the pool wall also appears to be an important determiner of whether place 
navigation is observed on the MWM. The typical design of the MWM fills the pool only part 
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way meaning that alongside the external distal cues introduced by the experimenter the bare 
walls above the pool can also serve as navigational cues. Removing the walls as cues has also 
been found to produce place navigation (Hamilton et al., 2008), where in such cases rats show a 
progressive shift in preferential strategy use from place navigation early in training, to an equal 
division of place and directional navigation to preferring the directional response (Hamilton, 
Akers, et al., 2009). Together these results suggest that on the standard MWM rats learn to 
navigate to a particular region of the pool relative to the distal cues, with the pool wall serving as 
an important provider of distance information (Hamilton et al., 2008). 
However, there also exist procedural concerns that further complicate how rodent 
allocentric navigation is understood. For example rats appear to be unable to solve a plus-maze 
with reference to the distal environmental cues when there are multiple start locations that they 
are unable to differentiate between (Horne, Martin, Harley, & Skinner, 2007). Horne et al. (2007) 
suggest this is a result of discernibly different start locations improving the rat’s sensitivity to 
distal cues. Task complexity can also play an important role in how rats are observed to navigate. 
Rats trained from a fixed starting point to look in multiple search locations for a reward in an 
open-field maze tend to show place navigation, whereas training on a simpler, 4-arm-plus maze 
produces predominantly directional behaviour (Ruprecht, Taylor, Wolf, & Leising, 2014). In the 
open-field maze, which was designed to serve as an appetitive version of the MWM, rats 
continued to show preferential place navigation after extended training and reaching asymptotic 
performance, an observation that the authors take as evidence that the test variation used was 
quite complex (Ruprecht et al., 2014).  
The complex interactions between place and directional strategies serve as an informative 
example of how different methods of allocentric navigation can interact, with their differential 
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engagement dependent upon the constraints and opportunities provided by the environment. 
These interactions can also be seen in rodents at the level of allocentric and egocentric spatial 
reference systems. When rats are trained to find a target location that is delineated by a fixed 
spatial reference to distal cues and a constant behavioural response, both place and response 
learning are observed to occur (Gibson & Shettleworth, 2005; Packard & McGaugh, 1996). 
These results suggest that the place and response systems do not overshadow each other in such 
environments, although they do compete on conflict tests. Rodents can, however, show blocking 
between strategies, with rats trained to preferentially use a response strategy not developing an 
allocentric strategy at a later time when it is possible to do so (Gibson & Shettleworth, 2005). 
Together this evidence supports the idea that navigators can acquire information about the 
environment that underpins multiple different strategies. This runs contrary to the associative 
idea that only one type of learning should occur. However, that is not to say that there is no 
inhibitory interaction occurring. It has been observed that lesioning the region of the brain that 
underpins one reference system leads to better observed performance on the undamaged one 
(Packard & Goodman, 2013). Consolidation of one system’s learning can also be improved by 
the inhibition of the other system after training. The differential engagement of these systems can 
also depend on the spacing of training trials, with longer inter-trial intervals encouraging 
preferential response navigation while shorter intervals encourage place navigation (Packard & 
Goodman, 2013). These two systems also show evidence of cue competition, with rats learning 
less on a learning task that facilitates both strategy types when the response behaviour to-be-
learned matched a response behaviour they had been taught previously (Gibson & Shettleworth, 
2005).  
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While strategy types are often transitioned between as rodents become more familiar with 
an environment that is not to say that one replaces the other. Rats trained to a response behaviour 
on an environment are still able to utilise an allocentric strategy when the maze is shifted in 
space in such a way as to make it obvious the rats position has changed either immediately upon 
entering the maze or after first attempting the incorrect response strategy, an observation that 
supports the idea that the two strategies co-exist and can be conditionally employed (Cassel, 
Kelche, Lecourtier, & Cassel, 2012). These different types of behaviour can also interact in ways 
that affect a rat’s navigation behaviour within the same journey. Rats trained on a foraging task 
where route and landmark cue information are available were able to return to the learned target 
location when only cue type was available and when both were available (Tamara & Timberlake, 
2011). In cases where the two cue types were put in conflict, initial heading followed the 
egocentric strategy while subsequent search was based on locations suggested by the allocentric 
cues. However this pattern of behaviour was dependent on the starting position used for the test 
trial, with novel positions producing the allocentric preference, while familiar ones produced no 
preference for either.  Research in mice also suggests that the distance travelled during 
navigation can play a role in how these two strategy types interact. Mice that have been trained 
to navigate to and from a particular nest location and then tested on their ability to return to the 
nest when it has been moved to a novel location show different patterns of strategy use based on 
how far they needed to travel, with longer distances producing a shift from early self-referential 
navigation to utilising distal cues when they got closer to the nest (Alyan & Jander, 1997). When 
only a short distance needed to be travelled mice instead only used an egocentric strategy. This 
distance relationship is also evident in rats tested on the MWM (Tamara, Leffel, & Timberlake, 
2010). Looking at their strategic preference when required to navigate to a familiar location from 
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a novel start point, Tamara et al. (2010) observed that rats searched equally at the locations 
suggested by both strategies when they had been trained to find a shorter distance platform but 
predominantly used allocentric information when trained with a longer distance platform. The 
rats could learn to use self-referential cues to find the long distance platform when trained 
without any landmarks present; however, adding landmarks that were not predictive of the 
platform’s location impaired this learning, a result the authors take as suggesting that rats have a 
tendency to use landmark information when navigating long distances (Tamara et al., 2010). 
When navigating in the water maze with a beacon attached to the platform rats also appear to 
show a pattern of alternately and independently employing allocentric and egocentric strategies. 
On such a water maze rats’ navigation behaviour is separated into two distinct parts. The first is 
an initial swim behaviour the trajectory of which is directed by the distal cues surrounding the 
pool. This is followed by a homing behaviour that is directed towards the beacon associated with 
the platform. The independence of these stages is suggested by the observation that altering the 
distal cues only impairs the initial trajectory part of their navigation while removing the beacon 
cue disrupts the homing behaviour only (Hamilton, Rosenfelt, & Whishaw, 2004). 
Similar to the observations made by researchers looking into place learning the 
understanding of how allocentric and egocentric strategies interact is also complicated by 
procedural concerns. Making part of a maze task more complex by requiring rats to solve a 
spatial working memory dependent problem at one point in a maze results in their persevering 
with place navigation at other stages where it is not necessary (Gardner et al., 2013). There is 
also evidence to suggest that whether a training environment uses escape or reward as motivation 
can affect strategy preference. When rats were trained to solve a water T-maze task, they showed 
a shift from preferential response to preferential direction strategy use over the training period, a 
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change opposite to the one typically observed on appetitive tests (Whyte et al., 2009). When 
these two different motivation types were directly compared on a plus maze, it was observed that 
they resulted in opposite linear changes in strategy preference with rats on the submerged 
environment shifting from a response to a direction preference while land maze rats showed the 
opposite trend (Asem & Holland, 2013). In general it is likely to be the case that which of these 
two strategies is better for a rat to use when solving a maze will depend on a variety of factors, 
including the experimental conditions (Cole, Clipperton, & Walt, 2007). 
Human navigation research 
Taking these observations about the navigation abilities of different non-human animals 
together it can be seen that there is a great deal of variety in the behavioural manifestations of 
navigation and how it proceeds. These many different behaviours are in turn underpinned by 
cognitive systems that are generally well conserved between species. This conservation allows 
researchers to construct predictions and theories about how those aspects of human navigation 
that are currently not well understood might function. The research that will be described here 
was undertaken in an attempt to do just that, utilising prior human and rodent research together 
to look more closely at how people acquire and utilise different spatial navigation strategies.  
Consistent with the patterns of navigation behaviour observed in rodents, humans appear 
to acquire and make use of information that is centred on both allocentric and egocentric 
reference frames. This can be seen when looking at the neural activation of the basal ganglia and 
the hippocampus, the regions of the brain thought to underpin response and place learning 
respectively (Iaria, Petrides, Dagher, Pike, & Bohbot, 2003). As people learn their way around 
and then are required to navigate through an environment there looks to be a balanced 
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engagement of both systems, with stable biases within individuals for one system or the other 
which were observed to be predictive of their navigation behaviours (Furman, Clements-
Stephens, Marchette, & Shelton, 2014). The authors take these results as suggesting that both 
systems are present in parallel during human navigation, facilitating a variety of navigational 
behaviours, where the biases indicate preferences for, rather than unilateral dominance by, a 
particular system (Furman et al., 2014). 
However, while there is a great deal of research that shows patterns and trends in the 
ways that people, on average, learn and prefer to navigate it also appears to be the case that the 
rates at which different types of spatial information are acquired can vary dramatically between 
individuals. People tested on their ability to acquire metric knowledge of a novel route over 
several learning trials were observed to mostly either develop this knowledge after one training 
session or to never come to acquire it (Ishikawa & Montello, 2006). Only a minority of the 
participants showed a gradual development of knowledge consistently with exposure to the 
route. While how well these results can be said to generalise to other types of spatial knowledge 
acquired under different learning circumstances is not known it can be useful to keep in mind 
this variability within people in how navigation may proceed. These differences can be also be 
seen in the results of Furman et al. (2014) discussed earlier, with different navigation biases 
between individuals reflected in differential activation of the hippocampus and basal ganglia. 
As has been mentioned previously there is a great deal of overlap between the navigation 
behaviours observed in rodents and those observed in humans. The overlap in how these two 
groups navigate allocentrically is of particular interest here in part due to the difficulties 
separating place and directional navigation that are found in rodent research. There is for 
example evidence to suggest that at least some aspects of the rodent preference for directional 
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navigation are observed in humans. When comparing directional and place navigation on a 
virtual MWM task, it has been observed that people showed the same preference for directional 
responding as is observed in rats on the same task (Hamilton, Johnson, Redhead, & Verney, 
2009). Similar to the rat results completely removing the pool wall was again able to shift the 
navigator’s preferences to place navigation; however, participants appeared to show more 
difficulty solving this variant of the task, another observation in line with prior research. This 
increased difficulty manifested as fewer participants showing a direct trajectory when moving to 
the platform location on a probe test, which the authors take as evidence supporting the more 
complex nature of place navigation (Hamilton, Johnson, et al., 2009). However, as was observed 
in the rodent literature, it can be difficult to draw conclusions about the difficulty of 
implementing a particular strategy that extend beyond the particular circumstances of the 
environment used to observe navigation. 
When people have learned a location by its’ relationship to an array of environmental 
landmarks they appear to act in such a way as to preserve this learned relationship by adjusting 
their search distances from the landmarks when the array expands or contracts (Spetch et al., 
1996). How much information an array of landmarks provides to people navigating an 
environment has been observed to scale with the number of them available, depending on the 
circumstances. This was observed in an experiment looking at the boundary superiority effect, 
which refers to the preference navigators show for learning key locations with reference to the 
boundary of the surrounding environment. In an experiment by Mou and Zhou (2013) people 
were trained to find objects in a virtual environment with a circular boundary and a variable 
number of landmarks present as potential cues. In this environment the effect of removing the 
boundary on performance was negatively correlated with the number of landmarks, such that the 
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more landmarks available the more information they provided together and therefore the less 
important the boundary became for localisation (Mou & Zhou, 2013).  The number of landmarks 
available in an environment also appears to have a positive correlation with the willingness of 
people to utilise them for navigation (Andersen, Dahmani, Konishi, & Bohbot, 2012). There 
exist many different types of information that can be acquired about a landmark array, with 
relative distance and angular information of most interest here. These two features are generally 
assigned different levels of importance. People appear to make more use of distance information, 
which is defined as the distance ratios between the landmarks in the array, but distance and 
direction information can also interact, with the degree of the angles formed between salient 
locations in the environment and the landmarks also affecting learning (Waller, Loomis, 
Golledge, & Beall, 2000).  Similar to honeybees people can in some cases also show a selective 
accuracy for the location of particular landmarks based on their preference for some aspect of the 
landmark’s identity (Smith, 1984). People are also capable of learning complex spatial 
relationships between locations and features of the environment when they are necessary to solve 
spatial problems. Participants that were trained to locate a target amongst a number of possible 
locations in an environment with a pair of landmarks present were able to learn to solve test trials 
where one of the landmarks was removed (Sturz, Cooke, & Bodily, 2011). To do this, 
participants had to use the observed spatial relationships between the different landmarks and 
vector algebra to infer the location of the missing landmark and from this the location of the 
goal.  
However, while people are capable of learning about and utilising the spatial 
relationships between members of a landmark array, there is evidence to suggest that they have 
difficulty constructing a coherent, consistent representation of the spatial environment they 
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inhabit without experience navigating through and to its multiple constituent parts. For example, 
Hamilton et al. (2002) trained people in a virtual MWM (vMWM) task to find a platform that 
was located in one half of the pool (region 1) while being granted different degrees of access to 
the other half (region 2). When asked to find the platform from a starting point in region 2, their 
success was dependent on whether they had had the opportunity to experience moving to the 
target from this region. Here the ability to observe the environmental cues from within region 2, 
or to move within the region but without the opportunity to move from one region to the other, 
were not enough to make up for the absence of the apparently key experience of moving between 
regions.  These results match those seen in rats, who were observed to require unrestricted 
viewing and swimming access to the non-platform half of the pool in order to successfully find 
the platform when started from within that region (Sutherland, Chew, Baker, & Linggard, 1987). 
Human use of egocentric navigation systems can be seen to relate even more strongly to 
the behaviours observed in rodents and other non-human animals. This is not particularly 
surprising as the most common methods of egocentric navigation, path integration and stimulus-
response learning, are both fairly ubiquitous. Route learning, which involves the chaining 
together of many of these stimulus-response behaviours, is of particular interest here. People are 
able to construct these navigation routes in environments that are completely independent of any 
distinguishing external features. However this is a process that requires some cognitive effort. 
People trained to learn a route through a series of rooms where access to the next room in the 
sequence was dependent upon choosing the correct door from the two presented were able to 
solve this task even when there were no visual cues to identify the rooms; however, the inclusion 
of a backcounting task during training blocked their ability to do so (Tlauka & Wilson, 1994). 
Visual features that help distinguish the different rooms, or both the rooms and the correct door 
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do, however, lead to better performance than is observed by pure route learning alone, at least 
over short training periods (Waller & Lippa, 2007).  
People, similar to rats, also show an interaction between their experience with an 
environment and their preferred navigation strategy. This similarity includes humans showing 
the same typical shift from allocentric to egocentric navigation as a result of increasing 
environment familiarity (Iaria et al., 2003; Schmitzer-Torbert, 2007). However, this shift is 
dependent on the environment being complex enough for a human that there is a period during 
training wherein participants do not yet have enough experience to develop an adequate response 
strategy (Schmitzer-Torbert, 2007). Relatively successful navigation, where success is relative 
here due to the fact that the paths from a start to a target location are not yet stable, during this 
period appears to be driven by the use of place navigation (Schmitzer-Torbert, 2007).  However, 
it needs to be noted that the design of Schmitzer-Torbert’s (2007) environment, where 
environmental features are presented as textures on the wall of a labyrinthine maze, differs from 
the presentation of more open environments where all allocentric cues are visible at all times. 
The similar shift from allocentric to egocentric navigation under these different circumstances 
supports the generality of this relationship between environment familiarity and strategy use. 
People tested on a virtual version of the RAM also show approximately the same pattern of 
transition in their use of navigation strategies with an approximately half-half split between 
allocentric and egocentric navigators observed at the start of training ending up with a majority 
of response navigators by the end of the experiment (Andersen et al., 2012; Iaria et al., 2003). 
Evidence for the ability of people to acquire both types of knowledge within the same 
environment can be seen in participants who were trained to learn a route through a virtual 
environment and were able to by the end of training solve both repeat tests that required simple 
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recapitulation of the route and retrace tests that required correctly navigating the learned route in 
reverse (Wiener, Kmecova, & de Condappa, 2012). As repeat tests are thought to depend on 
egocentric knowledge while retrace tests rely on allocentric knowledge, Wiener et al. (2012) 
concluded that participants were able to acquire both during the same training period.  
The ability of rats to flexibly utilise egocentric and allocentric frames of reference when 
solving navigation tasks due to their apparent coexistence is also one they share with humans. 
While people tend to show a preference for the adoption of one strategy or the other when both 
are equally viable (Furman et al., 2014) they are easily able to utilise their non-preferred frame 
when instructed to and without impairment in their spatial abilities, even in cases when switching 
was unpredictable or required from trial to trial (Gramann, Muller, Eick, & Schonebeck, 2005). 
However, in some cases people can also have a preferred strategy that they employ regardless of 
how well it fits with the demands of the task at hand (Etchamendy & Bohbot, 2007). Comparing 
how well participants performed on a RAM test to a wayfinding task, Etchamendy and Bohbot 
(2007) observed that some people would spontaneously and inflexibly develop a preferred 
strategy that would be sub-optimal on one of the two tests. Only a subset of people showed the 
willingness or ability to flexibly switch between optimal strategies although the members of this 
set were also the most efficient navigators on both tests. 
Looking at the behaviour of people on navigation tasks where the optimal strategy is not 
immediately apparent it has been found that there is tendency for navigators to default to 
utilising the simplest of the many strategies they may have acquired. When attempting to find the 
correct path at an intersection people were observed to navigate via simpler response strategies 
when they were available, despite their maladaptivity (Condappa & Wiener, 2014; Wiener, de 
Condappa, Harris, & Wolbers, 2013). A shift to a more cognitively demanding allocentric 
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strategy was only observed after the inadequacy of their first choice became apparent via 
environmental feedback. This may suggest a more general pattern of preferring to utilise the least 
demanding strategy that is generally observed to be accurate. Considering human navigation in 
this way it might be expected that the described shift moves from an easier egocentric to a more 
demanding allocentric strategy (Condappa & Wiener, 2014; Wiener et al., 2013) and that which 
is more demanding may also vary as a function of familiarity with the environment and the 
constraints it imposes on navigation. 
However, the observation that spatial learning involves the acquisition of multiple, 
redundant sources of information in parallel conflicts with the predictions of associative theory 
where cues are expected to compete for associative strength (Gibson & Shettleworth, 2005). 
There is evidence to suggest that spatial learning is unique in how, and to what extent, these 
common rules of learning are followed. That these rules are not always observed to be followed 
in spatial learning is one of the clearest demonstrations of this. For example beacon learning, 
which is commonly observed to result in less learning about distal environmental cues, does not 
overshadow the learning of an environment’s geometry, a result that suggests there are unique 
components, or interactions, of spatial learning that operate under their own unique conditions 
(Gibson & Shettleworth, 2005). It has also been observed that participants tested on a vMWM 
show no evidence of blocking occurring when they are explicitly instructed to explore the 
environment (Hardt, Hupbach, & Nadel, 2009). When Hardt et al. (2009) attempted to replicate a 
study that showed blocking in human participants (Hamilton & Sutherland, 1999) the addition of 
instructions encouraging exploration of the environment also attenuated blocking effects. While 
performance on the traditional MWM probe trial was mixed, performance on the location 
accuracy probe (LAP) test showed a clear lack of blocking (Hardt et al., 2009). The aim of using 
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the LAP is to remove the contamination of spatial strategy and test performance from the 
assessment of spatial knowledge by informing participants of the missing platform on test trials 
and asking them to go the location they believed it would be if it were present (Hardt et al., 
2009). Hardt et al. (2009) point out that it can be potentially difficult to tell what exactly the 
traditional probe trial is measuring, with possibilities including spatial strategy, spatial 
knowledge and potentially pathological perseverance. However, when considering how different 
types of knowledge interact it is important to distinguish between interactions observed during 
learning and those observed during performance. Under this distinction blocking and 
overshadowing can be seen as good measures of strategy interaction that occurs during learning 
(Gibson & Shettleworth, 2005). 
The information that underpins the use of these multiple different strategies can also 
interact in a time-dependent manner, such that earlier knowledge can in some cases modulate 
what is acquired later. Prior allocentric learning can, for example, interact with egocentric 
information that is acquired after it. In an experiment demonstrating this phenomenon people 
were first shown a regular or distorted map of an environment. They were then walked through 
the environment blindfolded so that only egocentric information was acquired (Lafon, Vidal, & 
Berthoz, 2009). The path participants reproduced when asked to do so was consistent with the 
map they had been shown, such that those who saw the regular map drew the correct path while 
those who saw the distorted map drew a path that was distorted in the same manner. Participants 
who were not shown a map beforehand also reproduced the correct path. Distorted map 
participants also showed more inaccuracy when asked to point from later points in the learned 
path to the origin while walking through the environment. As distorted map participants could 
point correctly to the origin when closer to it the authors suggest this distance dependent effect is 
38 
 
evidence of a shift from using kinaesthetic to allocentric information to update position as 
navigation proceeds (Lafon et al., 2009).  
It is also important to consider when attempting to look at navigation strategy use the 
distinction between tasks that involve different strategies that produce their own distinct 
behavioural responses and tasks where the different strategies produce congruent output (Kosaki 
et al., 2015). The rodent T-maze provides a clear example of the first group, as the allocentric 
strategy of moving to the arm suggested by the room cues and the egocentric strategy of 
producing a learned turn response at the intersection are entirely independent and involved in the 
execution of separate behaviours. An example of the second system can be seen in the beacon 
version of the MWM where correctly navigating to the platform is a behaviour that results from 
the combination of an initial movement trajectory based on the distal room cues and a homing 
response towards the beacon (Hamilton et al., 2004). It might be expected in cases where 
different strategies with separate outputs are put in conflict that degraded learning of one 
knowledge system should produce improved performance in the other. When different strategies 
produce congruent output, the question changes to whether the presence of other strategies might 
affect the strength of learning acquired for any given system (Kosaki et al., 2015). 
Taken altogether these results paint a complicated picture of the way that allocentric and 
egocentric navigation strategies are acquired and interact in humans. The aim of this study was to 
attempt to look more closely at these interactions utilising an experimental paradigm that also 
allowed comparisons to be drawn directly to the wealth of non-human animal research that has 
been conducted. With this aim in mind the MWM immediately suggests itself as one of the few 
rat spatial navigation tests that can be ported with little to no alteration for use in humans (Jacobs 
et al., 1997). Typically people appear to use three key search behaviours on a vMWM; a pattern 
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of approach-withdraw exploration near the platform, thigmotaxis, and visual scan, where a 
participant stops moving and rotates around to scan the environment (Kallai et al., 2005). This 
pattern of search behaviour is quite similar to that employed by rats in the analogue water maze. 
Successful navigators preferentially employ the visual scan, while poor navigators prefer to use 
thigmotaxis (Vorhees & Williams, 2014). One of the key considerations when designing a 
navigation test and interpreting the observed behaviour is the spatial scale of the environment in 
which navigation takes place. For most navigation research the two relevant spatial scales are 
vista and environmental (Wolbers & Wiener, 2014). Vista scale spaces are environments where 
all relevant spatial features can be fully understood from one location without moving, while 
environmental scale spaces require movement to fully experience. Examples of vista spaces 
would be T and Y mazes and the MWM while examples of environmental spaces are multi-floor 
buildings and towns. Navigating environmental spaces typically involves travel through multiple, 
distinct vista spaces and the integration of information across time and space. Target locations 
are also positioned so as to be located beyond a participant’s sensory horizon when they enter the 
environment (Wolbers & Wiener, 2014). The most important point to draw from this distinction 
is the importance of keeping the scale of the environment in mind when attempting to assess a 
particular facet of navigation and when attempting to relate observations from different findings 
together.  
Another important point of consideration for the design of a new spatial test is the 
complexity of the presented environment. As was discussed previously the design of the MWM 
that is now generally considered standard resulted from different experimenters varying the size 
of the pool and pool to platform size ratio and observing the resultant learning curves and 
navigation behaviours (Vorhees & Williams, 2014). While there are many mazes and test types 
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administered to non-human animals that could be used to assess human spatial navigation it is 
important to ensure that human versions of these tasks are made complex enough to motivate the 
spatial learning that is hypothesised. The rodent star maze provides an example of the problems 
that can arise when these concerns are not considered, with people trained on it appearing to be 
able reach asymptotic performance within an average of three training trials (Igloi, Zaoui, 
Berthoz, & Rondi-Reig, 2009). As Igloi et al. (2009) were aiming to assess parallel learning of 
allocentric and egocentric information, but only administered their first test trial long after 
participants had reached asymptotic performance, it may very well have been the case that 
information was acquired sequentially but within the relatively large training window before 
testing. As has been shown in the MWM more complex environments that produce shallower 
learning curves provide an experimenter with more time to observe changes in behaviour and 
strategy use (Vorhees & Williams, 2014). When considering what navigation behaviours or 
strategies can be employed on a task it can also be important to have some idea of what types of 
knowledge about the goal location, the navigated environment, and the paths through it, can be 
acquired. What behaviours and strategies the chosen task constrains the participant from 
applying is also important to consider (Wiener, Büchner, & Hölscher, 2009).  
Using virtual reality to study human navigation: methodological constraints. 
Another fundamental question that needs to be considered when designing an experiment 
to look at spatial navigation is how the environment will be presented to participants. For modern 
researchers to answer this question often the first issue that needs to be addressed is whether to 
make use of a real world space or to construct a virtual environment. While real world 
environments might generally be expected to produce patterns of behaviour that better reflect 
how people navigate on a daily basis there are a variety of possible benefits that come from 
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investigating navigation using virtual reality. Virtual environments can in some cases better 
facilitate the isolation of the different processes that come together to produce navigation 
(Loomis, Blascovich, & Beall, 1999). They also allow for the easy manipulation of 
environmental features, large and small, that might be utilised for navigation. This allows virtual 
reality to address one of the key arguments against the use of real-world environments, which is 
that can be difficult or impossible to remove or modify large features (Kelly & Gibson, 2007). It 
can also be the case in some more impaired populations that real-world navigation tasks may be 
too demanding to be utilised (Kelly & Gibson, 2007), or it may be that such tasks are too 
difficult for them to perform adequately on. Most spatial navigation research focuses on 
participants acquiring information about a novel environment over a single experimental session; 
however, virtual representations of real-world spaces can also allow researchers the ability to 
flexibly look at how people navigate through environments they have become familiar with over 
very long timescales. One such experiment looking at how residents of the city of Tubingen 
performed on route and survey navigation tests administered in a virtual 3D model of their city 
(Meilinger, Frankenstein, & Bulthoff, 2013). The authors found that tests of different navigation 
abilities in this environment showed no systematic relationship between them in the performance 
and types of error they produced (Meilinger et al., 2013). They take these results as evidence that 
when navigating or reasoning spatially about familiar environments people make use of many 
different and independent spatial reference frames  (Meilinger et al., 2013). Virtual environments 
have also been used to study spatial navigation in non-human animals, allowing for tests of 
behaviour that would not be possible with real-world tasks (Kelly & Gibson, 2007). 
The mechanism by which people search through space appears to be much the same in 
virtual environments as in real ones, an observation that further supports the idea that the spatial 
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mechanisms used in both environments are similar (Sturz, Bodily, Katz, & Kelly, 2009). The 
ability of virtual environments to produce the same behaviour as observed in the real world has 
also been found to extend beyond the standard populations of university students and young 
adults. Volunteer participants aged 40 years and older were tested on their ability to flexibly 
navigate a virtual recreation of a real-world, complex building through which they had 
previously learned a fixed route (Koenig, Crucian, Dalrymple-Alford, & Dunser, 2011). These 
participants showed an optimality in the paths they took that did not differ from those who were 
required to navigate from the same novel locations within the real-world building (Koenig et al., 
2011). Further support for the idea that tests in virtual environments can produce real-world 
patterns of behaviour comes from looking at the relationship between rat and human spatial 
navigation research. Virtual environments testing humans on virtual versions of rodent mazes 
have been shown to produce learning curves similar to those observed in rodents (Shore, 
Stanford, MacInnes, Klein, & Brown, 2001). Similar observations have also been made by 
researchers using the vMWM (Hamilton, Johnson, et al., 2009), a result that is of particular 
relevance here. 
One of the common concerns that crops up in the literature regarding experiments that 
deviate from the real world experience of walking through an environment involves the potential 
importance of active navigation on human spatial ability. When considering this interaction there 
are typically two types of navigation that are delineated. Active navigation is generally defined 
as having both physical and cognitive components. Podokinetic information, and vestibular 
information from head movement makeup the physical component and are together commonly 
referred to as idiothetic information. The cognitive component refers to the decision making 
involved in navigating and to what extent attention is allocated to the spatial properties of the 
43 
 
environment (Chrastil & Warren, 2012, 2013). In contrast passive navigation involves providing 
participants with only visual information about movement through an environment (Chrastil & 
Warren, 2013). Podokinetic information is one of the primary sources of information 
underpinning the acquisition of metric survey knowledge, with people tested on their ability to 
find a novel shortcut between familiar locations performing best when the environment had been 
learned by having the participant walk through it (Chrastil & Warren, 2013). Participants trained 
to learn a route through a real or virtual environment were able to recapitulate that route on a 
later real-world test equally well when the virtual group controlled their view and movement 
through the world using their bodies, with translation information provided via a treadmill and 
movement direction by head rotation (Larrue et al., 2014). However, participants trained on the 
virtual environment with no body-based control, or with only translational information 
performed more poorly on the route recapitulation test, but not on pointing tests to within-route 
locations, suggesting that it was only on tests of allocentric knowledge that idiothetic information 
was important (Larrue et al., 2014).  
Idiothetic information is also thought to help people keep track of their position in space 
and with the acquisition of spatial relationships and accurate path integration. The evidence also 
suggests that idiothetic information builds up over time and tends to reveal its importance more 
when looking at performance in more complex environments (Chrastil & Warren, 2012). 
Idiothetic information from locomotion also provides better distance approximations (A. R. 
Richardson & Waller, 2007) . This distance information can also aid the formation and 
recapitulation of route knowledge, facilitating correct turning responses in cases where distance 
varies between the sections of the route by creating a more accurate representation of the length 
of different route segments (Ruddle, Volkova, Mohler, & Bulthoff, 2011). That this 
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improvement observed by Ruddle et al. (2011) was relative to performance where participants 
could make use of rotational, but not translational, body movement further supports the 
important role idiothetic information provided by locomotion plays in many forms of navigation. 
Taken together these observations would appear to stress the importance of matching the 
vehicle of virtual movement to real world locomotion as closely as possible, and researchers 
have come up with many ways to do just that. There is evidence to suggest for example that this 
idiothetic information, and its associated improvement in navigation performance, can be 
acquired by having participants walk in place, with the inferred pace of their steps used to drive 
movement in the virtual environment (Williams, Bailey, Narasimham, Li, & Bodenheimer, 
2011). Williams et al. (2011) achieved this using a Wii-Fit balance board. Real walking within a 
constrained physical space can also be achieved using redirected walking, where participants are 
induced to veer imperceptibly as they move so as to stay within the confines of the designated 
area (Hodgson, Bachmann, & Waller, 2011). However, it is important to consider both the 
physical and cognitive components of active navigation and, more importantly, how different 
types of knowledge interact with these components and can complicate the idea that locomotion 
is always necessary to observe perfectly accurate navigation performance in a virtual 
environment. The most relevant example for the work that is to follow involves how people 
appear to acquire graph knowledge. Unlike survey knowledge, graph knowledge (Chrastil & 
Warren, 2013), is improved by allowing people to make decisions about where they navigate in 
the environment (Chrastil & Warren, 2015). Chrastil and Warren (2015) speculate this result 
may have been the result of decision making encouraging people to attend to the relevant spatial 
features of an environment and to develop predictions about the results of their choices. The 
success or failure of these predictions could then be used to progressively update people’s 
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representation of graph space (Chrastil & Warren, 2015). A similar mechanism is thought to 
underpin some the improvement active navigation has on the development of route knowledge 
(Chrastil & Warren, 2012). However, for route knowledge it is more likely that active attention 
to the environment is important as opposed to specific attention to the spatial properties (Chrastil 
& Warren, 2012). All of this is not to say, however, that more accurate metric information cannot 
affect the route and graph knowledge acquired, as local metric information can for example help 
people determine the length of possible paths between locations (Chrastil & Warren, 2015). 
Looking more generally it appears to be the case that the benefits of active exploration are 
observed in cases where the environment and the navigation tasks encourage or depend on the 
acquisition of the information active navigation provides (Dalgarno, Bennett, & Harper, 2010). 
Therefore, it can be seen that consideration of active navigation further stresses the importance 
of correctly matching experimental methodology to the navigation strategy or strategies under 
observation.  
How immersed a person feels by the virtual environment is another variable that has been 
observed to play an important role in people’s navigation behaviour. Participants tested on their 
navigation ability in the same environment presented in either 2 or 3 dimensions showed better 
performance on the latter, alongside higher subjective ratings of presence and dedication of 
cortical resources to the navigation task, as measured by EEG (Slobounov, Ray, Johnson, 
Slobounov, & Newell, 2015). The visual fidelity of a virtual environment can also affect the 
level of real world correspondence observed in a person’s behaviour and performance, with 
higher fidelity improving correspondence regardless of whether navigation is active or passive 
(Wallet et al., 2011). The virtual environment’s visual realism also plays an important role in 
how well observed behaviour matches that seen in the real world, and how well participants 
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perform on tests of navigational ability more generally (Meijer, Geudeke, & van den Broek, 
2009). People have also been observed to improve their spatial updating ability when asked to 
navigate through more visually rich, naturalistic environments (Riecke, Sigurdarson, & Milne, 
2012). The visual detail provided in the environment used here was motivated at least in part by 
these observations of the effect that immersion can have on navigation behaviour. 
When using a virtual environment consideration also needs to be given to how the 
environment will be experienced by participants. The standard method is to have participants sit 
in front of a desktop computer monitor and navigate through the environment using keyboard or 
joystick controls if the experimenters are testing active navigation. However, this method 
presents a relatively limited and artificial field of view to participants, where the artificiality 
comes as a result of the lack of environmental constancy. That the view of the virtual world this 
type of arrangement provides is completely independent of the rotation of the participant’s head 
provides a clear example of this disconnect. It is possible that limiting the field of view of the 
presented environment can affect navigation performance, however, this may not be a factor 
except in cases where the view is extremely constrained (A. E. Richardson & Collaer, 2011).  
One possible way to address these concerns is to construct a panoramic display that surrounds 
the participant with multiple monitors rendering the virtual environment and providing a more 
naturalistic presentation. Typically, participants tested in such a set-up will be seated in an 
interactive chair with rotation sensors so they can update their view and movement direction 
using the position of their bodies. Such set-ups tend to produce better performance on tests of 
spatial cognition than the standard desktop system, with participant results also better correlating 
with other measures of spatial orientation ability (Meng, Zhang, & Yang, 2014). Researchers 
have also looked at the effects of different monitor display types and sizes. Larger displays and 
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stereoscopic presentation using 3D displays and 3D glasses do not improve performance on 
survey knowledge dependent tasks, while large screens can in some cases increase the likelihood 
of participants developing simulator sickness (Dahmani, Ledoux, Boyer, & Bohbot, 2012). 
However, larger displays have also been observed to improve navigation performance when 
compared to smaller monitors where the perceived size of the projected image, the resolution and 
the refresh rate are matched between them (Tan, Gergle, Scupelli, & Pausch, 2006). This effect 
of display size was also independent of the degree of the environment’s immersiveness. 
Many of these more complicated display set-ups, however, can be prohibitively 
expensive and are also not very portable. This lack of portability is limiting in that it does not 
allow tests to be taken to people that cannot visit the premises in which these setups are housed, 
a group that often includes clinical populations. To address this portability concern some 
researchers utilise head-mounted displays (HMDs), which involve presenting a virtual 
environment to a participant with stereoscopic depth using a relatively lightweight and portable 
headset. Modern setups using HMDs require only the headset and a laptop, which can be carried 
around by the participant in a backpack if locomotion is used as the method of movement, to 
present the environment (Hodgson et al., 2015). The evidence regarding whether or not there is 
added utility to the use of HMDs to present virtual environments in a more realistic manner, 
where head rotation controls the participants’ view of the world, is not currently conclusive. 
Research into the benefits of HMDs when their development was still in its relative infancy 
found no improvement in navigation performance as a result of the added proprioceptive 
information the headsets provided (Ruddle & Peruch, 2004). However, there exists the 
possibility that any benefits would have been disguised by the headset’s relatively low resolution 
compared to the desktop monitor used as a point of comparison.  The degree of the field of view 
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(FOV) presented may have also played a role. For virtual environments there are two distinct 
types of FOV to be considered. The display FOV is the angle subtended from the eye to the left 
and right edges of the display and depends on the size of the display and its distance from the 
user. The other is the geometric FOV, which is the horizontal angle of the visible part of the 
environment presented to the participant. In general it can be harmful to deviate from a 1:1 to 
ratio between these two FOVs, while increasing both together can improve participants 
performance on spatial navigation tasks (Tan, Czerwinsk, & Robertson, 2006). The relatively 
recent development of HMDs with higher visual fidelity and larger FOV has allowed researchers 
to construct highly immersive virtual environments that allow for the testing of navigation 
behaviours in a wide-variety of locations with little to no external infrastructure required 
(Hodgson et al., 2015). In order to maximise the possible circumstances under which the 
experimental methodology described here could be utilised, and as a consequence of the modern 
development of many relatively inexpensive, high fidelity headsets, a HMD was used here as the 
vehicle of presentation of the virtual environment. 
Aims 
The aim of this research was to look at how spatial navigation strategies are acquired in 
humans, how this acquisition interacts with the development of environmental familiarity, how 
people, on average, prefer to employ the strategies they have acquired and how strategy 
preference relates to environment complexity. In order to allow for a relatively simple 
connection between this work and the behavioural data observed in rodents the vMWM was 
decided upon as an ideal environment to look into these areas of interest. This necessitated 
looking at navigation within a vista scale space which, combined with the freeform movement 
allowed by the use of a water maze, would have put an unwanted limit on the types of egocentric 
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strategies that participants could develop. To circumvent this while adhering to the requirements 
of a vista scale space a large, complex maze was used with the aim of maintaining the freedom 
of movement offered by the traditional MWM while also allowing for the potential development 
of sequential egocentric strategies. Taking in to consideration the potential importance of 
decision making on the development of particular types of spatial knowledge, participants in the 
experiments employed here were always entirely free to navigate however they preferred within 
the confines of this maze. The paths of the maze were composed of planks in order to keep all of 
the distal environmental cues visible at all times. These landmarks were expected to serve as 
cues that would have their salience delineated by their distinct features and contrast with the 
environment. As the maze was composed of interconnecting planks of uniform length the issue 
of participants’ acquisition of metric distance information was not expected to be a concern as, if 
a map or graph-like representation of the maze was constructed by participants, the shortest paths 
could be found with perfect accuracy by simply counting the number of planks that would need 
to be traversed. Therefore, it was not expected for locomotion to be a necessary inclusion in the 
experimental design. Following these experimental specifications the research undertaken here 
was motivated by three key aims; to observe whether and how participants acquired allocentric 
and egocentric navigation strategies, to look more closely at what sources of information came to 
underpin these strategies, and to assess whether the information people acquired, and the 
complexity of the navigated environment, might interact to affect how navigation was 
preferentially undertaken. 
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Empirical Chapter 1 
Experiment 1 
The following experiments were designed to look at the nature and development of 
allocentric and egocentric navigation strategies in a novel virtual environment. This environment 
was designed to imitate the open, complex space of the MWM while also constraining the paths 
participants could take in order to potentially facilitate the development of a route-based strategy. 
A similar training structure to that used for the MWM was also utilised for these experiments, 
with participants trained to navigate from a fixed starting location to a fixed target location 
across multiple training trials.  
A virtual training environment was designed so that participants could learn allocentric, 
egocentric or both, strategies to navigate. The environment resembled the standard water maze 
set up, with the addition of a hexagonal grid maze of planks positioned above the water. This 
maze was included to allow participants to potentially develop complex egocentric strategies as 
well as, or in place of methods of navigation based on distal environmental cues. Participants 
began each training trial in the maze from a fixed location and heading and were required to find 
a hidden treasure chest. The fixed nature of the starting position meant participants could learn a 
specific route across the plank system to the target location. Allocentric strategies could be 
learned by attending to the multiple landmarks arrayed beyond the boundary of the pool. 
Participants could learn to use the relationships between them as well as their individual 
identities. A fixed sky was also included that could serve as a crude orientation cue.  
In order to test whether participants were capable of navigating with these strategies 
independently test environments were constructed as variations of the training trial environment 
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that contained features relevant to navigation by only one knowledge type. For the allocentric 
tests, the plank maze was removed and the starting position changed, as any egocentric strategies 
that developed were expected to be dependent upon the relationship between the start and the 
target. For the egocentric tests the landmarks and sky were removed as distal environmental 
features. These tests measuring the efficacy of participants’ unimodal navigation were 
administered multiple times as participants were trained in the virtual maze. 
The aim of this experiment was to observe the acquisition of allocentric and egocentric 
navigation strategies by people learning to navigate in a virtual maze environment. As training 
progressed, it was predicted that participants would become more efficient in navigating from the 
start to the target location. It was hypothesised that this would manifest first as a decrease in the 
time (latency) to find the target location, second as a decrease in the distance travelled, third as a 
decrease over training in the area of the maze participants searched, and fourth as a shift towards 
participants preferentially navigating via the same regions of the maze over multiple trials. In 
order to separably measure the acquisition of allocentric and egocentric information, participants 
were also tested on how well they could navigate entirely via reference to one strategy or the 
other. Here it was hypothesised that the ability to solve these tasks, or at least perform 
proficiently on them, would emerge with training.   
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-nine undergraduates from the University of Sydney participated in this 
experiment in exchange for course credit. Potential participants older than the age of sixty-five or 
who had any prior history of schizophrenia were excluded from this study. Eight of the 
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participants were excluded from the analyses, five as a result of their developing simulator 
sickness. The other three failed to complete the experiment within the allocated one and a half 
hour time limit. 
Materials 
The virtual environments used in this experiment were scripted in, and generated by, 
Unity 3D software (Unity Technologies, Version 5.3.1). To flexibly construct different virtual 
environments a bespoke maze designer software was used (VR Maze Designer developed by 
Stephen J Rogers at the School of Psychology, University of Sydney, used with permission). The 
world was presented stereoscopically to participants using the Oculus Rift Development Kit 2 
(DK2) (Oculus VR, Irvine, CA), a head-mounted virtual reality display. The DK2 tracked 
participants’ head movements, and these were used to determine what part of the environment 
the view was oriented towards with an update rate of 1000 Hz. Participants controlled their 
virtual avatar using a Bluetooth controller (Samsung El-GP20HNBEGWW Gamepad). The 
joystick of the controller was used to allow participants movement in their desired direction. The 
direction the participant was facing when tilting the joystick was used as the reference point for 
movement, such that tilting the joystick up moved the participant in the direction their head was 
pointing in the 2D plane. Participants were required to be standing for the duration of the 
experiment. 
Design 
This experiment made use of a within-subjects design. There were three within-subjects 
independent variables used here; training trials, allocentric test trials, and egocentric test trials. 
There were fifteen training trials. Distance travelled and latency to the target were recorded as 
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dependent variables per trial, while between trial route variability was recorded for the first and 
last blocks of five trials. There were three allocentric test trials, with each participant tested after 
five, ten and fifteen training trials. Participants’ ability to approximate the target location on a 
test trial was recorded as the dependent variable. Three egocentric test trials were conducted at 
the same time as the allocentric test trials, with both test types administered in a counter-
balanced order. 
Procedure 
Pre-training 
Before the experiment proper began, participants were fitted for the headset and then 
placed into a virtual practice environment, which was identical to the training environment 
except that there was not a target location. Participants were instructed on the correct way to 
control the movement of their virtual avatar and on the relationship between their head 
orientation and their view of the environment. They were then told to practice moving freely 
around this environment within the constraints of the plank system to become familiarised with 
manoeuvring using the DK2 and the Bluetooth controller in sync. Once participants reported 
themselves to be sufficiently familiar with the controls, the program running the practice 
environment was terminated. 
Training 
The design of the training environment, visualized in Figure 1, was motivated by the 
Morris water maze. The pool was bounded by a grass terrain and surrounded by two concentric 
rings of eight landmarks each. The landmark layout can be seen in Figure 1, with each landmark 
in the distal ring positioned so as to be visible in the space between a pair of neighbouring 
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landmarks in the proximal ring. The landmarks were included to serve as precise, allocentric 
cues for participants to use to orient themselves and delineate locations within the maze. A static 
sky was also included above the terrain to provide a crude but stable orientation cue, with the sun 
clearly positioned in the NE quadrant and multiple clouds scattered in fixed positions above and 
around the maze. To constrain navigation within the pool and create the opportunity for 
egocentric paths to be learned a plank maze in the shape of a hexagonal grid was included above 
the pool, as can be seen in Figure 1. A variety of different grid sizes were tested during a pilot 
study. Similar criteria to those used for choosing the pool size in MWM experiments were used 
here with the maze size chosen that best balanced learnability with difficulty. To prevent the 
participants from using the hexagonal grid system as a visual orienting cue, only the planks 
connected to the last intersection that had been visited were made visible at any given time. 
Figure 1. Schematic survey view of the training environment utilised in Experiment 1. 
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Participants were informed that they would be completing a set number of training trials, 
where in each trial they would be required to navigate through the environment from a starting 
location to a target location, where both locations were fixed and unchanging for the entirety of 
the training process. They were then told they would only have four minutes per trial to do this. 
If successful they would move on to the next trial and have to repeat the process. If unsuccessful 
they would be first teleported to the target location and given ten seconds to familiarise 
themselves with it before the next trial was begun. Finally, they were informed there would be 
test trials that would be used to measure their knowledge of the target location about which they 
would receive instruction later.   
The start and target positions, along with the direction participants started out facing, 
were fixed and invariant. The start location was in the NW quadrant and the goal location was in 
the SW quadrant. As there was a time gap of approximately one second between the end of one 
trial and the beginning of another, participants needed to avoid any noticeable head movements 
to ensure that the direction they were facing at the start of each trial was fixed and constant 
within and between individuals. To ensure this did not cause any problems, participants were 
instructed to face their head to the floor of the room at the end of each training trial and to only 
lift it and begin the trial after receiving the instruction from the experimenter to do so. 
The target was located on a plank intersection and was delineated by the appearance of a 
chest object during training. Participants were informed that a chest would appear to signify they 
had discovered the target location. They were also told that all movement of the joystick would 
need to cease at the end of a trial. The chest was programmed to not reveal itself until the 
participant had traversed more than halfway down one of the planks leading to it. The chest’s 
appearance was accompanied by a short audio cue to indicate the successful completion of a 
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trial. The end of an unsuccessful trial was accompanied by a different audio cue. Teleportation to 
the target location at the end of an unsuccessful trial followed this cue once participants had 
released the joystick. This teleportation process was instantaneous, which meant participants 
were not given the opportunity to view any possible path between their last location and the 
target. 
Allocentric test 
The allocentric test environment was based on the training environment, with the 
difference that the plank maze, and the accompanying restrictions it placed on participants’ 
movement, had been removed (see Figure 2). Thus, the only cues available to locate the target 
position by were the distal cues outside of the water pool. Moreover, the starting location for the 
allocentric test trials was different to the one used during training. Participants were instead 
started from one of three new start locations that were chosen on the basis that they fulfil two 
criteria: they needed to be the same distance to the target as the training start location, and they 
needed to be in one of the two pool quadrants that did not house either the start or the target 
location during training. A different starting location was used for each test time, with each only 
used once.  
Participants were informed before the start of each test trial of the new environment 
conditions and that, with the absence of any cues delineating the target location, they would 
instead be expected to navigate to whatever location they believed the target to be given the 
available information, and to inform the experimenter when they had done so. As the allocentric 
test environment had no plank maze, they were further informed that the restrictions on their 
movement had been removed and that any apparent decrease in movement speed they 
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experienced was the result of the removal of the planks as an immediate frame of reference for 
their motion. 
Once the participant had informed the experimenter they believed they had completed the trial 
the maze program was instructed to record their current position. This location was recorded as 
their approximation of the target’s position and used to calculate the dependent variable used in 
the statistical analyses of test performance. 
Figure 2. Schematic survey view of the allocentric test environment utilised in Experiment 1. For each 
participant all three test start locations were used once, one for each test trial time. 
 
Egocentric test 
For the egocentric tests, the boundary of the pool, the sky, and both rings of landmarks 
from the training environment were removed (see Figure 3). The plank maze system that was 
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available during training was present in these tests. Participants had to try to recall the route 
across the plank system from the start location to the hidden target location. The participants 
were informed before the start of each test trial of the new environment conditions, and that they 
would be expected to navigate to whatever location they believed to be the target location given 
the available information, and to inform the experimenter when they had done so. They were 
also informed that they would start these test trials in the same location and facing the same 
direction as they had done during training. 
Once the participant had informed the experimenter they believed they had completed the 
trial the maze program was instructed to record their current position. This location was recorded 
as their approximation of the target’s position and used to calculate the dependent variable used 
in the statistical analyses of test performance. 
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Figure 3. Schematic survey view of the egocentric test environment utilised in Experiment 1. 
Statistics 
Training 
To assess learning about the environment across training the distance travelled and the 
latency to find the target location per participant per training trial were both recorded as 
dependent variables. Latency was recorded as the time from when participants were informed 
that they could begin the trial to the time that the cues delineating the discovery of the target 
location were triggered. Any trial where the participant failed to find the target was automatically 
given a latency score of four minutes, the time limit of the training trials. Distance travelled was 
recorded as the length of the path taken by a participant from the start to the end of a trial, with 
no modifications as a result of the trial ending due to the time limit or to finding the target 
60 
 
location. Both measures of learning were submitted to One Way Within-Subjects ANOVAs, with 
training trial number as the independent variable. 
To measure the variability of the paths participants took during training all of the 
intersections traversed by each participant within a single block of training trials (where a block 
was defined as an unbroken sequence of five training trials) were recorded. For each trial every 
intersection was marked as visited or unvisited. Therefore, within a block each intersection was 
assigned to a frequency bin based on the number of trials it was visited on, ranging from zero 
visits to a maximum of five. Two blocks of interest (trials 1-5 and 11-15) were used for analysis. 
The number of intersections with zero visits was compared between blocks using a paired 
samples t-test. For each participant the scores of the non-zero bins were summed together 
creating a total score that represented the number of intersections visited by that participant one 
or more times during a training block. The non-zero bins for each participant were then assigned 
a percentage score by dividing each bin’s frequency by the individual’s total score. These 
percentages were then compared between blocks using a 2 (training block) x 5 (bins 1-5) Within-
Subjects ANOVA. Alpha was set at p = 0.05. 
Test 
For egocentric and allocentric test trials, the accuracy of participants’ approximations of 
the target location was calculated using the distance formula. These distance scores were used as 
the test trial dependent variables, and were calculated relative to the actual target location, and 
three other dummy locations. Each dummy location was located within the centre of one of the 
three, non-target pool quadrants (the target location was positioned so as to be in the centre of its 
own quadrant). These dummy locations were used to test whether the approximated target 
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locations were closer to the actual target than to other parts of the pool. For the allocentric tests, 
the distance scores from the target approximations were calculated with respect to the actual 
target location with respect to the distal cues outside the pool. For the egocentric tests, distance 
scores were calculated between the participants’ approximation of the target location and where 
the target location would be in the hexagonal plank maze during training with respect to the start 
location. 
The distance scores for the egocentric and allocentric test trials were analysed separately 
using a 3 (test time) x 4 (quadrant) Within-Subjects ANOVA to compare quadrant preference 
across the three test trials. In addition, a One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA was used to test 
whether there were changes in the distance scores to the target location specifically across the 
three trials. Planned contrasts were also used. First, distance scores to the target location were 
compared against the combined average scores for the remaining three locations. These 
difference scores were then separately calculated for each test time and were used for 
comparisons between the three times. Time 1’s score was compared against the combined 
average of times 2 and 3, and time 2 was compared against time 3. Alpha was set at p = 0.05.  
Results 
Training 
Visualised in Figure 4a it can be seen that participants, on average, showed a clear 
decrease in distance travelled per trial with more training. This observation is supported by 
statistical analysis, with a One-Way Within-Subjects ANOVA revealing a significant effect, 
F(14, 280)  = 13.67, p < .001, of training trial number on distance travelled. 
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A similar trend can be observed in participants’ time taken to find the target (see Figure 
4b), with latency also decreasing with training trial number. This was supported statistically, 
with a One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA showing a significant effect, F(14, 280) = 13.11, p < 
.001, of trial number on latency. 
Figure 4c-d visualizes the measure of variability in the areas of the maze participants 
traversed during training. Here it can be seen that the repetition of the use of particular unique 
intersections per participant increased from the start (trials 1-5) to the end (trials 11-15) of 
training, and that the number non-visited intersections increased from the first block to the last. 
Comparing the number of intersections with no visits between the two blocks using a paired-
samples t-test revealed a significant, t(20) = -7.87, p < .001, increase by block 3. Looking at the 
percentage scores with a 2 (training block) x 5 (unique visits) Within-Subjects ANOVA, a 
significant, F(4, 80) = 46.98, p < .001, main effect of unique visits was found that was modulated 
by a significant, F(4, 80) = 16.39, p < .001, interaction effect. It can be seen in Figure 4d that the 
source of this interaction was likely the decrease in frequency of single intersection visits and an 
increase in the number visited four or five times. 
Allocentric tests 
Figure 4e shows the distance scores calculated with reference to the target location and 
the three other dummy quadrant locations, sorted by test time. Here it can be seen that 
participants appeared to show, from the first test time, a preference for approximating the target 
near the target location which was unchanged over training. This lack of change was 
demonstrated with a One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA using the distance scores to the target 
location as the dependent variable, which showed the effect of test time was not significant, p > 
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.05.  A 3 (test time) x 4 (quadrant) Within-Subjects ANOVA did reveal a significant, F(3, 60) = 
90.94, p < .001, main effect of quadrant but no main effect of test time and no interaction (p’s > 
.05). Planned contrasts compared target location distance scores to the combined distance scores 
for the other three pool quadrants, and revealed a significant, F(1, 20) = 122.35, p < .001, 
preference for the target location. There was no evidence of a relationship between test time and 
degree of preference for the target location (p’s > .05). 
Egocentric tests 
The distance scores for the egocentric test trials at each test time are shown in Figure 4f. 
They appear to show that participants developed a preference for approximating the target 
location closer to the actual target as a result of more training. A One Way Within-Subjects 
ANOVA looking at target location distance scores as a function of test time supported this 
interpretation, revealing a significant, F(2, 40) = 9.77, p < .001, effect of test time. A 3 x 4 
Within-Subjects ANOVA revealed a significant, F(3, 60) =  8.51, p < .001, main effect of 
quadrant and no main effect of test time (p > .05). The interaction between test time and quadrant 
was significant, F(6, 120) = 4.97, p < .001. Planned contrasts comparing the target location 
distance scores to the combined distance scores for the other three locations showed a 
significant, F(1, 20) = 11.02, p = .003, preference for the target location. Further, they revealed 
that participants target location preference was significantly, F(1, 20) = 7.91, p = .011, stronger 
for the last two test times combined when compared to test time 1. There was also a 
significantly, F(1, 20) = 9.63, p = .006, stronger preference for the target location at time 3 
compared to time 2. 
 
c) e) 
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Figure 4. Training (a-d) and test (e-f) data collected from participants during Experiment 1. (a-b) 
Relationship between number of training trials completed and average distance travelled (a) or time spent 
(b) searching for the target location. (c) Number of trials, divided into frequency bins of 0-5, each 
intersection in the plank maze was visited during the first (trials 1-5) and last (trials 11-15) blocks of 
training trials. (d) To calculate percentage scores the frequency counts for each non-zero bin (1-5) were 
divided by the total number of intersections visited at least once in a block. Percentage scores were 
calculated for the first and last training blocks. (e-f) Average distance of participants’ approximations of 
the target location from the actual target location (Target) and the centres of the remaining pool quadrants 
(NW, NE, SE) on the allocentric (e) and egocentric (f) test trials at each test time, calculated using the 
distance formula. Test 1=after 5 training trials; Test 2=after 10 training trials; Test 3=after 15 training 
trials. All error bars are ± SEM. 
a) b) 
c) 
f) 
c) 
e) 
d) 
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Discussion 
The results observed in Experiment 1 were consistent with the outcomes hypothesised. 
The decreases in latency to the target and the distance travelled through the maze during training 
provide clear evidence that participants were learning some sort of navigation strategy that could 
facilitate their successful movement to the target location. The area of the maze participants 
would search for the target also decreased over the training period while the number of 
intersections that were reused between trials while navigating increased. Together these results 
support the idea that participants learned to refine their approximations of the target location with 
training while also coming to prefer taking the same familiar paths while navigating. These 
observations provide clear support for the hypothesis that participants would be able to become 
more efficient navigators of the novel environment used here with training. 
It was also found that participants were able to estimate a target location using two 
separable methods. Participants appear to acquire enough information to navigate with exclusive 
reference to the allocentric features of the environment by the end of the first training block, 
while egocentric knowledge takes until the end of training to develop such that it can guide 
relatively successful navigation. These trends match those observed in prior research, where 
people tend to show a shift in preferential strategy use from allocentric to egocentric with 
training (Andersen et al., 2012; Iaria et al., 2003; Schmitzer-Torbert, 2007). Participants, 
however, did not appear to be acquiring more precise allocentric information across training. 
This may have been a consequence of competition from the egocentric learning that the results 
suggest is taking place across the length of training or it may have been that the allocentric 
information provided by the environment was not sufficient to facilitate a more precise 
approximation of the target location. More information about what features specifically 
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underpinned participants’ allocentric navigation would be necessary to potentially decide 
between these possibilities. The allocentric test results of Experiment 1 show that participants are 
at least able to navigate to the correct quadrant of the pool. However, it is not known how this 
was achieved. For instance, a similar level of performance could have been achieved by 
navigating with reference to the landmark array, to a single landmark or to the virtual sky which 
could serve as a crude orienting cue. 
The question of what specifically participants are acquiring information about can also be 
applied to the egocentric test results which showed improvement over training but never a degree 
of precision that would suggest a precise route had been learned. It may have been the case that 
participants acquired the beginnings of a route that could not be completed before the end of 
training, a possibility that is supported by the decrease in path variability during the last five 
training trials. This would suggest that their egocentric knowledge was dependent upon the 
presence of the plank maze. Participants may also have solved the test without any use of a route, 
instead learning the approximate distance from the start to the target location and a direction of 
bearing relative to their heading position at the beginning of each training trial, which was fixed. 
This distance and bearing information could, unlike a route, be entirely self-referential and 
therefore independent of the presence of the plank maze, with participants using the time spent 
moving as a proxy for distance travelled. Distance information could also be maze-dependent 
and encoded as an approximation of the number of planks usually travelled from the start to the 
target location. 
 
 
67 
 
Experiment 2 
This experiment aimed to understand more about the nature of the cues that the 
participants used while navigating in the allocentric and egocentric tests. The participants were 
tested on allocentric tests in the same manner as in Experiment 1. However, in this experiment 
they also received a second test in which the distal landmark cues around the maze were spatially 
randomised. The aim here was to test whether participants were attending to the spatial 
arrangement of the landmarks, whether they were learning to associate the target location with a 
single proximate landmark or if they were, in some capacity, utilising the arrangement of the sky 
as a crude orientation cue. If participants were relying on the spatial configuration of multiple 
cues to locate the target location, it was expected that randomising landmark position would 
randomise test performance, such that they would show no preference for approximating the 
target near its actual location. However, if participants were relying on a single proximate 
landmark to the target location, then they should show a clear preference for the quadrant in front 
of that landmark. Finally, if participants continued to preferentially approximate the target in the 
correct quadrant this would suggest some use was being made of the sky arrangement. 
Two new egocentric tests were used in Experiment 2. The first test modified the version 
used in Experiment 1. However, in this test the length of the planks was doubled. This was 
changed to examine what system participants were using to approximate the distance that needed 
to be travelled across the plank system to locate the target. This distance could be measured in 
time or the number of planks taken to travel to the target. Therefore, with the planks lengthened 
there were two potential locations that participants would be expected to approximate the target. 
One location would be based on the number of planks that the participants would expect to need 
to traverse before they would reach the target location. This could be compared against an 
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alternative target location which would be the intersection that is the same metric distance and 
direction from the start to the target location as was the case during training. 
The second egocentric test examined whether participants could rely on a system 
equivalent to dead reckoning to successfully guide navigation to the target location using only 
information about bearing from the start location and distance travelled. In this test all external 
cues (planks, landmarks, sky) were removed except the water surface, which could be used to 
provide visual information about velocity. This forced participants to use entirely self-referential 
information about the approximate distance and angle of bearing from the start to the target. 
These new test types were motivated by several hypotheses about the results observed in 
Experiment 1. For the allocentric tests it was hypothesised that participants were making use of 
the specific arrangement of landmarks presented during training and would therefore produce 
random performance when tested with a randomised landmark array. However, if participants 
were selectively navigating with reference to a single landmark it was further hypothesised that 
they would prefer to approximate the target in the pool quadrant delineated by the cue that was 
previously closest to the target. The apparent lack of route learning that was observed in 
Experiment 1 led to the hypothesis that participants could be solving the egocentric test using 
entirely self-referential information. On the egocentric plank test used for this experiment this 
would be evident by a preference for approximating distance using travel time, which would 
mean target approximations would be closer to the time-based location. As participants would be 
expected to be using the same dead reckoning system on both egocentric tests it was further 
hypothesised that there would be no difference in the distance scores to the time-based location 
on the plank test and the target location on the no plank test. 
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Method 
Participants 
Thirty-four undergraduates from the University of Sydney participated in this experiment 
in exchange for course credit. Exclusion criteria were the same as Experiment 1. Twenty 
participants were excluded from the analyses, thirteen due to a lack of learning, and seven as a 
result of simulator sickness. The criteria for a participant not showing learning were the same as 
Experiment 1. 
Materials 
The materials used here were the same as those described in Experiment 1. 
Design 
This experiment used the same basic within-subjects design as that employed in 
Experiment 1; however, there were now two allocentric and two egocentric test types. Due to 
this increase in the number of tests the testing process for this experiment was modified, with the 
number of test phases reduced to two. Once a testing phase was begun, the four tests were 
administered in pairs, with a single training trial included to separate the two pairs. There were 
therefore 17 training trials, with test phases occurring after the first 5 trials and after the 17
th
 trial. 
In each pair of tests, there was always one allocentric and one egocentric test. However, the 
order of the tests was counterbalanced within a pair, and between the test type pairs. 
Performance in the normal allocentric test maze (now allocentric-n) was compared against the 
randomised allocentric test maze (allocentric-r). Performance in the expanded plank egocentric 
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test (now egocentric-p) was compared against the egocentric with no plank maze test 
(egocentric-np). 
Procedure 
Pre-training 
The pre-training process was the same as that described in Experiment 1. 
Training 
The training environment used in Experiment 2, which can be seen in Figure 5, was 
essentially the same as that used in Experiment 1 but with the variation that the boundary of the 
pool was now stretched beyond the horizon of the virtual environment. This was done to remove 
the ability of participants to potentially navigate with reference to the pool edge. In this 
experiment the start position was changed. To simplify potential route acquisition an extra plank 
was added to the edge of the maze and used as the starting position for training and egocentric 
test trials. The start location was in the NW quadrant and the target location was in the SW 
quadrant. 
All other aspects of the training process were the same as that described in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 5. Schematic survey view of the training environment utilised in Experiment 2. a-h delineate the 
unique identity of each proximal landmark; 1-8 delineate the unique identity of each distal landmark. 
 
Allocentric test 
The allocentric-n test environment was the same as that used in Experiment 1; however, 
the pool boundary now extended beyond the horizon in the same manner as the training 
environment (see Figure 6a). 
For the allocentric-r environment, the allocentric-n environment was used with the 
landmark locations changed according to a set of criteria: First, a landmark could only be moved 
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to a location within the ring (proximal or distal) it was originally a part of; Second, every 
landmark had to be moved to a new location; Third, a landmark had to have different immediate 
neighbours at its new location (and this applied to neighbours in both rings). The difference 
between the two landmark arrays can be seen by comparing Figures 6a and 6b. One important 
feature of this test is that the landmark that was closest to the target location during training, the 
statue of Christ the Redeemer, was now in the SE quadrant. 
Both the allocentric-n and allocentric-r test trials had participants start in the middle of 
the pool. This new starting position was used to situate participants at a location equidistant to all 
four of the pool quadrants. For each participant the initial direction they were facing varied 
between test times, with the heading at the second test time determined by rotating the heading 
from the first test time 180
o
. 
All other features of the allocentric test trials were the same as those described for 
Experiment 1. 
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Figure 6. Schematic survey views of the allocentric normal (a) and randomised (b) testing environments 
utilised in Experiment 2. a-h delineate the unique identity of each proximal landmark; 1-8 delineate the 
unique identity of each distal landmark.  All test trials were started at the test start location. 
 
Egocentric test 
For the egocentric-p test trials the environment differed from that used in Experiment 1 in 
that the size of the plank maze was increased relative to the one used in the training trials. The 
egocentric-p maze was therefore increased in the number of hexes per edge, as seen in Figure 7a. 
This change in maze size was done with the aim of removing the edge of the pool maze as a 
possible cue by which participants could navigate. The length of the planks was also doubled 
relative to those used in the training environment. 
As can be seen in Figure 7b, the test environment for the egocentric-np test trials 
removed the plank maze altogether. Due to the removal of the plank maze in this test 
a) b) 
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environment, participants were informed before each trial that the restrictions on their movement 
had been removed and that any apparent decrease in movement speed they experienced was the 
result of the removal of the planks as an immediate frame of reference for their motion. They 
were further informed that changes in the perception of the movement of water beneath their feet 
could be used as a cue to indicate whether or not they were moving if necessary.  
The basic aims and instructions for these experiments, as well as the trial starting 
positions, were the same as those used in Experiment 1. 
 
Figure 7. Schematic survey views of the egocentric plank (a) and no-plank (b) test environments used in 
Experiment 2. The black boundary in (a) delineates the extent and position of the training environment 
maze. 
Statistics 
Training 
The dependent variables recorded and the analyses employed were the same as those 
described for Experiment 1. 
a) b) 
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Allocentric Tests 
In addition to the analyses and variables described for Experiment 1, a 2 (test type) x 2 
(test time) Within-Subjects ANOVA was also used to compare distance scores to the target 
location between the new and original test trials. The same planned contrasts from Experiment 1 
were employed separately for both allocentric test types with the variation that, as there were 
only two test times, the difference scores were only compared between times 1 and 2. For the 
allocentric-r test another contrast was added that calculated the distance scores for the SE 
quadrant and compared this against the combined average scores for the remaining three 
locations. These difference scores were then calculated separately for each test time and used to 
look for a difference in these difference scores as a function of time. To compensate for the 
addition of a second contrast a Bonferroni correction was applied to the significance level, giving 
an alpha of p = 0.025. 
Egocentric Tests 
For the egocentric-p test trials, two distance scores were calculated using the distance 
formula. To calculate the time-based location the distance and angular deviation between the 
start and target locations during training were first calculated. The time-based location for the 
egocentric-p test was then set as the point in the new test environment that was the same distance 
and rotation from the new starting position that resulted from lengthening the maze planks. The 
plank-based location was set as the new location of the intersection to which the target was 
attached during training. These two distance score types were compared using a 2 (location) x 2 
(test time) Within-Subjects ANOVA to compare location preference across the two test trials. 
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The same 2 x 4 Within-Subjects ANOVA, One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA and planned 
contrasts from the allocentric-n test were also used to analyse the egocentric-np distance scores. 
The egocentric-p and np tests were compared using a 2 (test type) x 2 (test time) Within-
Subjects ANOVA using the time-based distance scores for the egocentric-p tests and the target 
location based distance scores for the egocentric-np test.  
Results 
Training 
Visualised in Figure 8a it can be seen that participants, on average, showed a clear 
decrease in distance travelled per trial with more training. This observation is supported by 
statistical analysis, with a One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA revealing a significant effect, 
F(14, 182)  = 4.22, p < .001, of training trial number on distance travelled. 
A similar trend can be observed in participants’ latency to find the target (see Figure 8b), 
with latency also decreasing with training trial number. This was supported statistically, with a 
One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA showing a significant effect, F(14, 182) = 5.28, p < .001, of 
trial number on latency. 
Figures 8c-d visualise the measures of variability in the areas of the maze participants traversed 
during training. Here it can be seen that the repetition of the use of particular unique intersections 
increased per participant from the start (trials 1-5) to the end (trials 11-15) of training, and that 
the number of intersections that were never visited by the participants increased from the first 
block to the last. Comparing the number of intersections with no visits between the two blocks 
using a paired-samples t-test revealed a significant, t(13) = -7.68, p < .001, increase by block 3. 
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Looking at the percentage scores with a 2 (training block) x 5 (unique visits) Within-Subjects 
ANOVA, a significant, F(4, 52) = 36.21, p < .001, main effect of unique visits was found that 
was modulated by a significant, F(4, 52) = 4.65, p = .003, interaction effect. It can be seen in 
Figure 8d that the source of this interaction is likely the decrease in frequency of single 
intersection visits and an increase in the number visited four or five times. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Training data collected from participants during Experiment 2. (a-b) Relationship between 
number of training trials completed and average distance travelled (a) or time spent (b) searching for the 
target location. (c) Number of trials, divided into frequency bins of 0-5, each intersection in the plank 
maze was visited during the first (trials 1-5) and last (trials 11-15) blocks of training trials. (d) To 
calculate percentage scores the frequency counts for each non-zero bin (1-5) were divided by the total 
number of intersections visited at least once in a block. Percentage scores were calculated for the first and 
last training blocks. All error bars are ± SEM. 
 
 
a) b) 
c) 
c) d) 
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Allocentric tests 
Looking at the distance score data for the allocentric-n test in Figure 9a participants 
appear to be showing a preference for approximating the target near the target location that is not 
related to test time. A 2 (test time) x 4 (quadrant) Within-Subjects ANOVA supported this 
apparent target location preference, finding a significant, F(3, 39) = 104.02, p < .001, effect of 
quadrant, but not of test time and no interaction between the two (p’s > .05). Planned contrasts 
revealed a significant, F(1, 13) = 212.63, p < .001, preference for the target location, but no 
interactions with test time. Comparing just the target location distance scores between the two 
test times using a One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA also showed that test time did not appear 
to be having an effect on this preference (p > .05). 
The distance scores for the allocentric-r test trials, displayed in Figure 9b, appear to differ 
from those of the allocentric-n tests, showing no preference for the target location relative to the 
other quadrants. The results in Figure 9b also do not appear to show any preference for the SE 
quadrant. The 2 x 4 Within-Subjects ANOVA here revealed a significant, F(3, 39) = 30.78, p < 
.001, effect of test time, but no effect of quadrant and no interaction (p’s > .05). Planned 
contrasts found no significant preference for the target quadrant when compared to the combined 
distance scores for the other three locations, with no effect of test time (p’s > .025).  There was 
also no preference for the SE quadrant and no interaction between this preference and test time 
(p’s > .025). A One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA comparing the target location distance scores 
across the test times also found no difference (p > .05). 
Comparing the distance scores to the target location for the allocentric-n trials (see Figure 
9a) with the allocentric-r trials (see Figure 9b), participants appeared to guess closer to the target 
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on the former compared to the latter regardless of test time, suggesting that they were 
preferentially making use of the landmark array when navigating. A 2 (test time) x 2 (test type) 
Within-Subjects ANOVA supported these observations, with a significant effect of test type, 
F(1, 13) = 32.82, p < .001, but no effect of test time and no interaction (p’s > .05).  
Egocentric tests 
The distance scores for the egocentric-p test, as shown in Figure 9c, appear to show 
participants were preferentially approximating their travel distance using time travelled. 
However, they do not appear to improve in their accuracy with training. A 2 (location) x 2 (test 
time) Within-Subjects ANOVA supports this observation revealing a significant, F(1, 13) = 
37.54, p < .001, effect of location type but no interaction and no effect of test time (p’s > .05).  
The data from the egocentric-np tests visualised in Figure 9d does not show any 
improvement in the target approximation accuracy with training. The 2 x 4 Within-Subjects 
ANOVA found the effect of quadrant was significant, F(3, 39) = 9.81, p < .001; however, there 
was no effect of test time found and the interaction was also not significant (p’s > .05). The 
planned contrasts also found no significant effects (p’s > .05), and a One Way Within-Subjects 
ANOVA also found no difference in the target location distance scores between test times (p > 
.05). 
Comparing the egocentric-p and egocentric-np (see Figure 9c) results it can be seen that 
the average distance score to the target location on the egocentric-np test matched the distance 
scores to the time-based location on the egocentric-np test. A 2 (test type) x 2 (test time) Within-
Subjects ANOVA supported this observation, finding no significant differences for test type or 
test time and no interaction (p’s > .05). 
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Figure 9. Test data collected from participants during Experiment 2. (a) Average distance of participants’ 
approximations of the target location from the actual target location (Target) and the centres of the 
remaining pool quadrants (NW, NE, SE) calculated using the distance formula (distance score) at each 
allocentric-normal test time. (b) Average distance scores for the allocentric-random test relative to the 
target location and the centres of the remaining pool quadrants. (c) Average distance scores calculated for 
the egocentric plank (ego-p) and egocentric no-plank (ego-np) tests at each test time. On the ego-p test 
distance scores were calculated relative to two locations determined by expectations of where target 
approximations would be localised if participants were recording their travel distance using the number of 
planks traversed [ego-p (plank)] or time spent moving [ego-p (time)]. The ego-np (target) distance scores 
here are relative to the actual target location. (d) Average distance scores for the egocentric no-plank test 
relative to the target location and the centres of the remaining pool quadrants. Test 1=after 5 training 
trials; Test 2=after 15 training trials. All error bars are ± SEM. 
 
a) b) 
c) 
d) 
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Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 appeared to suggest that either participants were not 
acquiring egocentric information from the modified training environment with training or that 
the new tests used were too difficult to solve, at least given the training time provided here. The 
distance scores relative to the two distance locations on the egocentric-p test show that 
participants look to be using time travelled as a way to encode the distance between the start and 
the target. This conclusion is further supported by the lack of any difference in results between 
the two egocentric results, which suggests they were solved using the same information. 
Together these results are consistent with the hypothesis that participants are acquiring dead 
reckoning-like information that was utilised in both tests; however, the lack of improvement with 
training is contrary to the results from Experiment 1.  
The allocentric test results better fit expectations with participants showing an 
approximate understanding of the target location that did not become more refined with training. 
The results of the allocentric-r test suggest that participants make use of the relationships 
between landmarks when navigating allocentrically, an observation that was consistent with the 
initial hypotheses as randomising the landmark positions produced essentially random target 
approximations. This random preference behaviour does not fit with the idea that participants 
were selectively attending to only the landmark nearest the target. The lack of change on the 
allocentric-r test between test times further suggests that training had no effect on this 
preference, with participants using the same allocentric strategy for the duration of the 
experiment. 
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There were a large number of variables changed from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2. 
These included both the changes to the test environment, the testing structure and the testing 
environments. Therefore one possible explanation for the lack of improvement on the egocentric 
tests that will be pursued in the next experiment is that some aspects of learning became more 
difficult as a consequence of some unexpected interaction between the many changes made to 
the methodology of Experiment 1. 
 
Experiment 3 
As the results of Experiment 2 may have been the unintended consequence of 
methodological changes from Experiment 1 this experiment aimed to retest most of the key 
hypotheses of Experiment 2 while keeping as much consistency as possible between it and the 
successful methodology of Experiment 1. While the allocentric tests and hypotheses were kept 
the same as a result of the similarity in test performance between Experiments 1 and 2, the 
egocentric test structure was modified to focus only on assessing whether participants acquire 
and use plank maze independent, self-referential information to solve the egocentric tests. The 
egocentric test results from Experiment 2 support this idea, showing that participants are likely 
approximating distance travelled using some internal representation of time spent navigating. 
However, the lack of evidence for improvement on the egocentric tests complicates the 
interpretation of the results. For this experiment the plank length on the egocentric-p test was 
returned to that used in the training environment. By simplifying this test it was expected that 
one possible complication of Experiment 2, that participants were confused by the new maze 
structure, could be removed. The simpler environment also meant the two egocentric tests 
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differed only on the presence or absence of the plank maze. Therefore any observed differences 
between them would necessarily be due to some role, either complementary or inhibitory, played 
by the maze. The hypothesis that the plank maze does not provide any extra navigable 
information during the egocentric tests was continued for this experiment. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-six undergraduates from the University of Sydney participated in this experiment 
in exchange for course credit. Exclusion criteria were the same as Experiment 1. Thirteen of the 
participants were excluded from the analyses, eight as a result of simulator sickness, and five due 
to a lack of learning. The criteria for a participant not showing any learning were the same as 
Experiment 1. 
Materials 
The materials used here were the same as those described for Experiment 1. 
Design 
This experiment used the same basic within-subjects design as that employed in 
Experiment 2. 
Procedure 
Pre-training 
The pre-training process was the same as that described in Experiment 1. 
84 
 
Training 
The training environment used in Experiment 3 was essentially the same as that used in 
Experiment 2 but with the variation that the starting position was changed to the one used in 
Experiment 1. The plank added for the new start position in Experiment 2 was removed. 
All other aspects of the training process were the same as that described in Experiment 1. 
Allocentric test 
The allocentric-n and allocentric-r test trials were the same as those described in 
Experiment 2. The environment designs with the start positions changed can be seen in Figure 
10a-b. 
Egocentric test 
For the egocentric-p test trials the environment differed from that used in Experiment 2 in 
that the length of the planks was the same as that used in the training trials. This change in plank 
length was done with the aim of simplifying the egocentric-p test in case the increased lengths 
had made the task too difficult to solve. The new variations of the egocentric tests can be seen in 
Figure 10c-d. 
All other features of the egocentric test trials were the same as Experiment 2. 
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Figure 10. Schematic survey views of the four test environments, allocentric normal (a) and randomised 
(b), egocentric plank (c) and no-plank (d), used in Experiment 3. All test trials were started at the test start 
location. (c) Black boundary delineates the extent and position of the training environment maze. 
 
 
 
a) b) 
c) d) 
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Statistics 
Training 
The dependent variables recorded and the analyses employed were the same as those 
described for Experiment 1. 
Test 
The analyses for the egocentric test results were changed to be more in line with those 
used for the allocentric tests in Experiment 2. For both egocentric tests the distance scores were 
analysed separately using a 2 (test time) x 4 (quadrant) Within-Subjects ANOVA to compare 
quadrant preference between the two test times. A One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA was also 
used to specifically compare the target quadrant distance scores between test times. A 2 (test 
type) x 2 (test time) Within-Subjects ANOVA was also added to compare distance scores to the 
target location between the two egocentric test types. Planned contrasts comparing target 
location distance scores to the averaged scores for the remaining quadrants were also used for 
both test types, as was the test for the interaction between this difference and test time.  
The rest of the dependent variables recorded and the analyses employed were the same as 
those described for Experiment 2. 
Results 
Training 
Figure 11a shows a clear decrease in distance travelled per trial as training progressed. A 
One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA revealed that the relationship between training trial number 
and distance travelled is significant, F(14, 168) = 4.57, p < .001.  
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Latency to the target, seen in Figure 11b, shows the same improvement with training. 
This relationship was also found to be significant, F(14, 168) = 4.62, p < .001, using a One Way 
Within-Subjects ANOVA. 
Training path variability is visualised in Figure 11c-d, showing an increase in 
intersections repeatedly visited at the end of training (trials 11-15) compared to at the start of it 
(trials 1-5). The number of unvisited intersections, as measured with a paired samples t-test, 
increased significantly, t(12) = -6.56, p < .001, from the first block to the last, supporting this 
observation. A 2 (training block) x 5 (unique visits) Within-Subjects ANOVA comparing 
percentage scores revealed a significant, F(4, 48) = 25.25, p < .001, main effect of unique visits 
and a significant, F(4, 48) = 9.66, p < .001, interaction between the independent variables that is 
likely a result of a relative increase in intersections with four or five visits  (see Figure 11d). 
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Figure 11. Training data collected from participants during Experiment 3. (a-b) Relationship between 
number of training trials completed and average distance travelled (a) or time spent (b) searching for the 
target location. (c) Number of trials, divided into frequency bins of 0-5, each intersection in the plank 
maze was visited during the first (trials 1-5) and last (trials 11-15) blocks of training trials. (d) To 
calculate percentage scores the frequency counts for each non-zero bin (1-5) were divided by the total 
number of intersections visited at least once in a block. Percentage scores were calculated for the first and 
last training blocks. All error bars are ± SEM. 
 
Allocentric tests 
Visualizing the allocentric-n test distance scores in Figure 12a, the results show 
participants approximate the target near the target location but do not improve in their accuracy 
with more training. This target location preference was shown by a 2 (test time) x 4 (quadrant) 
Within-Subjects ANOVA with a significant, F(3, 36) = 36.92, p < .001, effect of quadrant and 
a) b) 
c) d) 
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no effect test time and no interaction (p’s > .05). A significant, F(1, 12) = 83.88, p < .001, 
preference for the target location compared to the other three quadrants, with no relationship to 
test time (p > .05) was revealed by planned contrasts. Comparing just the target location distance 
scores between the two test times using a One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA also showed that 
test time did not appear to be having an effect on this preference (p > .05). 
The distance scores for the allocentric-r test trials, displayed in Figure 12b, show no 
preference for the target location relative to the other quadrants; however, a preference for the SE 
quadrant appears to develop by the end of training. A significant, F(3, 36) = 3.42, p = .027, effect 
of quadrant was observed with the 2 x 4 Within-Subjects ANOVA alongside a significant, F(3, 
36) = 7.68,  p < .001, interaction, but no effect of test time (p > .05). No significant preference 
for the target quadrant, when compared to the combined distance scores for the other three 
locations, was found via analysis with planned contrasts and there was no effect of test time (p’s 
> .025). However, contrasts did reveal a significant, F(1, 12) = 13.45, p = .003, preference for 
the SE quadrant when compared to the combined distance scores for the other three quadrants. A 
significant, F(1, 12) = 10.96, p = .006, interaction between this preference and test time was also 
found. A One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA found no difference in target location distance 
scores between the test times (p > .05). 
Comparing the results show in Figure 12a to those in Figure 12b, it can be seen that 
participants look to be approximating the target closer to its actual location on the allocentric-n 
test trials. This observation was supported by a significant, F(1, 12) = 20.20, p = .001, effect of 
test type when comparing the two on a 2 (test time) x 2 (test type) Within-Subjects ANOVA. 
There was no effect of test time and no interaction (p’s > .05).  
90 
 
Egocentric tests 
The distance scores for the egocentric-p test, as visualized in Figure 12c, show 
participants developing a preference for the target location over the training period. A 2 (test 
time) x 4 (quadrant) Within-Subjects ANOVA revealed a significant, F(3, 36) = 16.24, p < .001, 
effect of quadrant and a significant, F(3, 36) = 4.05, p = .014, interaction but no effect of test 
time. Planned contrasts comparing target location distance scores to the combined scores for the 
other three quadrants found a significant, F(1, 12) = 12.29, p = .004, preference for the target 
location and a significant, F(1, 12) = 7.88, p = .016, interaction between this preference and test 
time, with a stronger preference at test time 2 compared to time 1. A One Way Within-Subjects 
ANOVA looking at target location distance scores as a function of test time also showed the 
same significant, F(1, 12) = 6.16, p = .029, improvement at test time 2 as that seen in Experiment 
1. 
The data from the egocentric-np tests shown in Figure 12d also shows target 
approximation improving with more training. The 2 x 4 Within Subjects ANOVA found a 
significant, F(3, 36) = 23.75, p < .001, effect of quadrant and a significant, F(3, 36) = 4.19, p = 
.012, interaction between quadrant and test time, but no effect of test time (p = . 059). The 
planned contrasts showed a significant, F(1, 12) = 15.47, p = .002, preference for the target 
location compared to the other three quadrants, but no test time interaction (p = 0.073) The One-
Way Within Subjects ANOVA looking at the difference between distance scores to the target 
location as a result of different test times, however, did also find a significant, F(1, 12) = 7.73, p 
= .017, difference with test time 2 showing a smaller scores than time 1. 
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Comparing these two tests on their target location distance scores, the pattern of change 
as a function of test time seen in Figures 12c (for egocentric-p) and Figure 12d (for egocentric-
np) looks to be the same for both of them, a result that would suggest that the information 
underpinning egocentric navigation on this experiment is mostly plank maze independent. A 2 
(test time) x 2 (test type) Within-Subjects ANOVA supported this, finding a significant, F(1, 12) 
= 17.50, p = .001, effect of test time but not of test type, and no interaction (p’s > .05). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Test data collected from participants during Experiment 3. (a-d) Average distance of 
participants’ approximations of the target location from the actual target location (Target) and the centres 
of the remaining pool quadrants (NW, NE, SE) on the allocentric normal (a) and randomised (b), and 
egocentric plank (c) and no-plank (d) test trials at each test time, calculated using the distance formula. 
Test 1=after 5 training trials; Test 2=after 15 training trials. All error bars are ± SEM. 
 
a) b) 
c) 
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General Discussion 
The results of these experiments help to answer questions about how familiarity with an 
environment affects the different strategies that people can employ to guide their navigation and 
what information it is that underpins these methods. Across all three experiments it was clear 
from the data on participants’ travel time, path length and search variability that information 
supporting progressively more precise and reliable navigation was acquired over the training 
period. In Experiment 1 it was observed that participants were able to learn to estimate the 
location of a target using separable allocentric and egocentric methods. These methods had 
different rates of acquisition, with the allocentric available by the time of the first test trial while 
the egocentric appeared to take until the end of training to be able to guide navigation. 
Experiment 2 looked at the possible sources of information that underpinned these separate 
methods. Allocentric tests showed that participants were likely using some relationship between 
multiple landmarks in the environment. The egocentric tests appeared to show that the distance 
between the start and the target was likely recorded by participants as the time taken to travel 
between the two. Experiment 3 aimed to simplify and retest the key hypotheses of Experiment 2. 
The allocentric results suggested, contrary to those of Experiment 2, that participants were, at 
least by the end of training, selectively navigating with reference to only a single landmark. The 
egocentric tests focussed on measuring whether the information participants acquired was 
entirely self-referential or was to some extent dependent upon the presence of the plank maze. 
The results revealed that participants did not appear to be acquiring any maze dependent 
information. 
Together the allocentric test results from these three experiments show that people 
rapidly acquire a representation of the location of the target location that is accurate to at least 
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the correct quadrant and is, at least at the first test time, dependent upon a relationship between 
multiple landmarks. All three experiments also consistently show that participants do not 
improve on their approximations of the target location over the training period, a result that 
suggests that there is no more allocentric information acquired after the first training block. 
There are multiple possible explanations for this lack of improvement. The limited precision of 
the allocentric estimates may have been the result of participants only requiring fairly broad 
knowledge to narrow the search space to an area that could be searched within the time limit. 
The array of landmarks may also have been insufficient to allow for any more learning than was 
demonstrated here. It may have also been the case that the egocentric learning that is observed to 
proceed across the entire training period modulated how much allocentric information 
participants acquired. Finally, it might have been that allocentric learning proceeded along a 
decelerated curve, with the bulk of the learning occurring in the first five training trials. If this 
were the case then any later learning that did take place might have been too weak to detect 
statistically. 
The results from the allocentric-r tests in Experiments 2 and 3 put forward competing 
explanations about what allocentric information participants are using to guide navigation. In 
Experiment 2 there is no evidence for a preference to approximate the target in any particular 
quadrant and this randomised performance as a result of randomising the position of the 
landmarks suggests some aspect of the relationship between these features is important for 
navigation. In Experiment 3 participants developed with training a systematic bias towards 
approximating the target location in the quadrant delineated by the landmark nearest the target. 
This result suggests that a preference for navigating with reference to a single landmark was 
developed. It is difficult to say conclusively why this pattern of behaviour developed only in 
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Experiment 3. However, it may relate to the more general concern that some combination of the 
changes made to the protocol of Experiment 2 increased the complexity of the task. This 
increased complexity may have in turn affected learning and strategy use, a result that is 
observed in rats where the typical preference for directional strategy use when navigating is not 
shown when they are trained in a complex environment (Gardner et al., 2013; Ruprecht et al., 
2014). That the changes to the methodology for Experiment 3 resulted in participants showing 
evidence of egocentric learning supports this idea that the difficulty of the training environment 
may have affected information acquisition. That participants in both experiments failed to show a 
preference for the target quadrant strongly suggests that the sky was not made use of as an 
orienting cue. Due to the consistent design of the skybox attention to the position of the sun 
would allow participants to clearly distinguish at least one pool quadrant, after which the 
identities of the remaining regions could likely be determined by fairly simple inference. While 
participants appear to shift to a single landmark strategy across training they are still able to 
correctly approximate the target location using an array strategy and do not improve in their 
accuracy as a result of changing strategies. This suggests that the shift to the single landmark 
strategy is a result of its ability to maintain a relatively accurate approximation of the target 
while improving the simplicity of the navigator’s strategy, a result that fits with the observation 
that navigators across many species prefer to shift to a less cognitively demanding method of 
navigation as they become more familiar with an environment (Hamilton, Akers, et al., 2009; 
Iaria et al., 2003; Schmitzer-Torbert, 2007). Together these results show that landmarks are 
clearly the only source of information participants used to navigate allocentrically and that 
adequate and equivalent performance can be achieved attending to either a single landmark or to 
the relationships between them. 
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The egocentric test results from Experiments 1 and 3 show that participants improve in 
their ability to correctly approximate the target location using egocentric knowledge with 
training. The improvement observed by the end of training in Experiment 1 suggested that the 
knowledge participants were acquiring was not of a learned route from the start to the target. 
This was taken to suggest that participants were instead approximating the target by learning 
about the travel distance and the degree of angular deviation between the start and the target. 
Experiment 2 showed that time spent travelling, rather than the number of planks traversed, was 
the likely measure of distance. This supported the possibility that participants’ egocentric 
information was entirely self-referential and maze independent. The equivalent performance 
observed on the plank and no-plank tests in Experiment 3 appeared to confirm this hypothesis 
that participants were developing relatively accurate idiothetic knowledge across training. 
Together the results from these experiments show that people are capable of acquiring 
both allocentric and egocentric navigation strategies in the virtual environment utilised here. 
Allocentric strategies were landmark-based while egocentric strategies were more akin to dead 
reckoning behaviour. While it can be seen that these strategies are not mutually exclusive here no 
consideration was given to how they might be interacting during training or how they might 
interact when they suggest different behavioural responses.  
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Empirical Chapter 2 
Experiment 4 
Experiments 1-3 aimed to look at the availability of allocentric and egocentric navigation 
strategies on a constrained-path analogue of the MWM, how availability interacted with a 
person’s familiarity with an environment and what sources of information underpinned these 
strategies. Experiment 1 showed that participants were able to acquire both allocentric and 
egocentric strategies over the training period. In the virtual environment used here it was further 
observed that allocentric performance improved faster than did egocentric. The information that 
underpinned allocentric navigation was found to be landmark based, with participants appearing 
to shift to a simpler single-landmark strategy with more training. Egocentric information did not 
appear to be route-based but was instead more akin to dead reckoning, with participants able to 
learn to approximate the target location with same degree of success with or without the plank 
maze. However, it could not be determined from these experimental data which strategy 
participants were preferentially utilising in the training environment when the cues for both were 
available.  
One way to test this preference that will be looked at in the following experiments 
involves testing how participants respond when their learned strategies are put in conflict. A 
standard example of this conflict test protocol involves the T-maze used to train rats. The rats are 
first trained to navigate from a fixed starting arm of the maze to one of the two arms that can be 
chosen at a choice point where one arm is baited with a food reward. Due to the fixed starting 
point rats can solve this task either allocentrically, by navigating to the arm nearest a cue or cues 
in the surrounding room, or egocentrically, by learning to make a right or left hand turn at the 
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choice point. To put these two strategies in conflict the rats are started from the opposite side of 
the maze, and this novel starting point means the environmental cues and the learned turn 
behaviour suggest different arms of the maze. Preferential strategy use is then indexed by which 
arm the rat chooses. One of the most famous experiments that utilised such a conflict test was 
conducted by Packard and McGaugh (1996). They looked at how rats’ preferred navigation 
strategy changes as they become more familiar with an environment and found that there was a 
shift from a place to a response based strategy across training (Packard & McGaugh, 1996). The 
conflict test also helped demonstrate that these two strategies were underpinned by different 
areas of the brain, as selective inhibition of the hippocampus or basal ganglia impaired the rats’ 
ability to use a place or response strategy, respectively.  
Experiment 4 aimed to apply a conflict test to the complex training environment utilised 
for Experiments 1-3. The results observed in these prior experiments showed that participants’ 
egocentric knowledge was likely represented as a travel time and angular rotation relative to the 
fixed start location of the training trials. As the hex grid presented a more complex maze than a 
standard T-maze the conflict test was structured so that following the learned rotation from the 
test starting point would send participants to a different quadrant of the maze than the one 
delineated by the landmark array. The starting position was also chosen to keep any salient inter-
maze features, including the travel distances to different edges, constant. 
The focus of Experiments 1-3 was on the interaction between familiarity with an 
environment and the availability of different navigation strategies. To this end, the tests used to 
probe participant knowledge looked at these strategies separately. Experiment 4 served as an 
approximate test of how the different types of knowledge participants gained in Experiment 3 
(and to a lesser extent Experiments 1 and 2) interact. For rats on the T-maze, it is generally 
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observed that the preference for making an egocentric response during a conflict trial emerges as 
the turn behaviour executed during training becomes habitual. Therefore in addition to the 
allocentric and egocentric tests in Experiment 3 participants were also tested in an environment 
where both strategy types were supported but suggested different search locations in order to 
look at the distribution of strategy preference by the end of training. As prior research tends to 
show a shift with training from an allocentric to an egocentric preference it was hypothesised 
that most participants’ initial response on the test trial would be to employ an egocentric strategy. 
Participants’ confidence in their initial behaviour was also of interest and it was further 
hypothesised that confidence would be observable as time spent searching in each strategy 
suggested location, where more confidence would result in a stronger skew in favour of the 
strategy initially employed. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-three undergraduates from the University of Sydney participated in this experiment 
in exchange for course credit. Exclusion criteria were the same as Experiment 1. Twenty-four of 
the participants were excluded from the analyses, sixteen as a result of simulator sickness, and 
eight due to a lack of learning. The criteria for a participant not showing any learning were the 
same as Experiment 1. 
Materials 
The materials used here were the same as those described for Experiment 1. 
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Design 
This experiment used a within-subjects design, similar to that employed in Experiment 3. 
All participants received 15 training trials. There were two test times following the 5
th
 and 15
th
 
training trials. In order to avoid overloading participants with too many tests, of the four tests 
from Experiment 3 the allocentric-r test was removed for this experiment. In addition, all 
participants received one conflict test, which occurred after the 15
th
 training trial and before the 
last allocentric and egocentric tests. As only one conflict test was administered participants 
received one block of three test trials after 5 training trials and a second block of four test trials 
after 15 training trials. For the new conflict test the quadrant first entered by a participant was 
recorded as a measure of their preferred strategy. Time spent in each quadrant was also recorded 
as a measure of a participants’ search confidence. 
Procedure 
Pre-training 
The pre-training process was the same as that described in Experiment 1. 
Training 
The training process and environment were the same as that described in Experiment 3. 
Allocentric test 
Following the 5
th
 and 15
th
 training trials, all participants received the allocentric-n test 
used in Experiments 2 and 3. 
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Egocentric test 
After the 5
th
 and 15
th
 training trials, all participants received both egocentric tests used in 
Experiment 3. 
Conflict test 
In order to have both types of navigation cue available the conflict test trial used the same 
environment as the training trials. This similarity was also expected to reduce the chance that 
participants might determine that they were involved in a different type of trial. The aim of the 
conflict test was to put participants in a situation where both strategy types would appear equally 
viable and, given participants’ egocentric knowledge is theorised to be relative to the fixed 
training starting position, the conflict test’s starting point needed to appear similar enough to 
facilitate successful egocentric navigation. The way the chosen starting point and the training 
trial start point were matched can be seen in Figure 13. Both points are in the same relationship 
to their nearest edges of the maze, and the participant is oriented in both such that the initial view 
of the plank maze is matched with respect to the arrangement of the distal landmarks and such 
that the same behavioural response leads to an approximately identical region of the plank maze. 
Figure 13 also shows how the two strategies are separated, with different choices leading to the 
clearly distinct quadrants demarcated in the figure. 
The instructions given before the start of the conflict test were the same as those given 
before the start of each training trial in order to maintain the belief in participants that they were 
not being tested. Any questions raised by a participant regarding the change in start location were 
addressed with the reminder that all necessary instructions were imparted before each trial, and 
that the answers to any other questions should be determined at their own discretion. 
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The conflict test trial was programmed to have no visual or audio indicators of the 
discovery of the target location. For this test this was done to remove the possibility of errant 
strategy learning resulting from the novel start position. The four minute time limit for training 
trials was also used here to maintain the appearance of a regular training trial and to allow time 
to observe participants’ search behaviours. 
 
 
Figure 13. Schematic survey view of the conflict test environment used in Experiment 4. 
Conflict test trial was started at the test start location. Ego target represents the location in the 
maze participants utilising an optimal egocentric strategy would be expected to believe the target 
to be positioned. Allo target represents the location in the maze participants utilising an optimal 
allocentric strategy would be expected to believe the target to be positioned. 
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Statistics 
Training 
The dependent variables recorded and the analyses employed were the same as those 
described for Experiment 1. 
Test 
For the conflict test, the first non-start quadrant a participant entered was recorded as a 
measure of their initial navigation strategy. As no participants made the egocentric choice a 
binomial test was used to compare the observed proportion of allocentric navigators to the 
expected proportion of 0.5. Time spent in each pool quadrant across the test trial period was used 
to measure to what extent participants’ search was motivated by either strategy. Four quadrant 
percentage scores were generated based on how much of the total trial time was spent in each 
and these were compared using a One Way Between-Subjects ANOVA. A paired-samples t-test 
was employed to specifically compare the percentage scores between the allocentric and 
egocentric quadrants. 
For the allocentric test trials, the removal of the allocentric-r test type meant the analyses 
employed for the allocentric-n tests were the same as those used in Experiment 1. The distance 
scores to each quadrant at each test time were analysed together using a 2 (test time) x 4 
(quadrant) Within-Subjects ANOVA to compare quadrant preference between the two test times. 
A One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA was also used to assess whether there was any change in 
the target location distance scores between the two test times. The same planned contrasts were 
also used, first comparing the target location distance scores to the combined average scores for 
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the three dummy quadrants independent of test time and then testing whether any difference 
between these two groups was modulated by test time. 
The analyses and data collected for the egocentric tests were the same as those described 
for Experiment 3. The distance scores for both tests were analysed separately in a 2 (test time) x 
4 (quadrant) Within-Subjects ANOVA in order to look at quadrant preference and how it might 
relate to test time. A One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA was also utilised to compare the target 
location distance scores between the two test times. As two egocentric test types were used, 
potential differences in target location approximation between them were tested for using a 2 
(test type) x 2 (test time) Within-Subjects ANOVA. Planned contrasts were also used to compare 
the target location distance scores against the averaged scores for the remaining three quadrants 
and to see if this difference interacted with test time. 
Results 
Training 
It can be seen in Figure 14a that participants learned to take shorter paths to the target 
with more training. Using a One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA this apparent relationship 
between path length and training was found to be significant, F(14, 252) = 6.36, p < .001.  
Participants also became quicker to find the target with more training (see Figure 14b). 
This relationship was also significant, F(14, 252) = 5.37, p < .001, as measured by a One Way 
Within-Subjects ANOVA. 
As can be seen in Figure 14c-d, participants showed an increase in the repetition of the 
regions of the maze they visited from the start (trials 1-5) to the end (trials 11-15) of training. A 
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paired-samples t-test showed participants were visiting significantly, t(18) = -6.30, p < .001, 
fewer intersections by the last training block compared to the first. Comparing percentage scores 
with a 2 (training block) x 5 (unique visits) Within-Subjects ANOVA found a significant, F(4, 
72) = 158.55, p < .001, main effect of unique visits and a significant, F(4, 72) = 11.18, p < .001, 
interaction that, looking at Figure 14d, is likely a result of a decrease in the number of 
intersections with only one unique visit by the end of training. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Training data collected from participants during Experiment 4. (a-b) Relationship between 
number of training trials completed and average distance travelled (a) or time spent (b) searching for the 
target location. (c) Number of trials, divided into frequency bins of 0-5, each intersection in the plank 
maze was visited during the first (trials 1-5) and last (trials 11-15) blocks of training trials. (d) To 
calculate percentage scores the frequency counts for each non-zero bin (1-5) were divided by the total 
number of intersections visited at least once in a block. Percentage scores were calculated for the first and 
last training blocks. All error bars are ± SEM. 
 
a) b) 
c) d) 
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Allocentric tests 
The allocentric-n results, shown in Figure 15a, show an early preference for 
approximating the target location correctly that does not improve with training.  A 2 (test time) x 
4 (quadrant) Within Subjects ANOVA supported this observation, with a significant, F(3, 54) = 
237.40, p < .001, effect of quadrant but no effect test time and no interaction (p’s > .05). Planned 
contrasts comparing target location preference to the combined preference for the remaining 
locations found a significant, F(1, 18) = 374.27, p < .001, preference for the target location, with 
no effect of test time (p > .05). Comparing the test times on just the target location preference 
using a One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA also showed no effect of test time (p > .05). 
Egocentric tests 
Looking at the distance scores for the egocentric-p test in Figure 15b participants look to 
be developing a preference for approximating the target near the target location over the training 
period. A 2 (test time) x 4 (quadrant) Within-Subjects ANOVA found significant effects of 
quadrant, F(3, 54) = 29.47, p < .001, and test time, F(1, 18) = 5.09, p = .037, along with a 
significant, F(3, 54) = 3.78, p = .015, interaction. Comparing the target location distance scores 
to the combined scores for the other three quadrants using planned contrasts revealed a 
significant, F(1, 18) = 13,65, p = .002, preference for the target location but no interaction 
between this preference and test time (p = .068). Directly comparing the target location distance 
scores between test times with a One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA showed a significant, F(1, 
18) = 7.69, p = .013, improvement in approximating the target location by test time 2. 
Target approximation also looks to improve on the egocentric-np test with training, as 
can be seen in Figure 15c. A significant, F(3, 54) = 15.96, p < .001, effect of quadrant and a 
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significant, F(1, 18) = 5.98, p = .025, effect of test time were found with the 2 x 4 Within-
Subjects ANOVA; however, the interaction was not significant (p > .05). Looking at the target 
location preference compared to the other three quadrants using planned contrasts found a 
significant, F(1, 18) = 10.46, p = .005, preference for the target location, an effect that was not 
modulated by test time (p > .05). A One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA found a significant, F(1, 
18) = 6.41, p = .021, difference between test times when comparing them on target location 
distance scores. 
Comparing target location distance scores between test types looking at Figures 15b and 
15c reveals that both show the same change as a function of test time. This observation was 
supported by a 2 (test time) x 2 (test type) Within-Subjects ANOVA which reported a 
significant, F(1, 18) = 15.60, p = .001, effect of test time but not of test type, and no interaction 
(p’s > .05). 
Conflict test 
Looking at Figure 15d, there was a clear, overwhelming preference for participants to 
initially navigate with reference to the allocentric features of the environment and to search for 
the target in the quadrant these features delineate (as seen in Figure 15e). A binomial test 
comparing the proportion of observed allocentric navigators of 1.0 to the expected distribution of 
0.5 indicated that significantly, p < .001, more participants navigated allocentrically than was 
expected. A One Way Between-Subjects ANOVA comparing the percentages of total test time 
spent in each quadrant found a significant, F(3, 72) = 226.03, p < .001, difference between them. 
Comparing these percentages between the egocentric and allocentric delineated quadrants using 
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a paired-samples t-test revealed a significant, t(18) = 23.26, p < .001, preference for the 
allocentric quadrant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Test data collected from participants during Experiment 4. (a) Average distance of 
participants’ approximations of the target location from the actual target location (Target) and the centres 
of the remaining pool quadrants (NW, NE, SE) calculated using the distance formula (distance score) on 
the allocentric normal test at each test time. (b-c) average distance scores to the actual target location and 
the three pool quadrants for the egocentric-plank (b) and no-plank (c) test trials at each test time. Test 
1=after 5 training trials; Test 2=after 15 training trials. (d) Number of participants that initially employed 
an allocentric (allo choice), egocentric (ego choice) or other (NW) navigation strategy on the conflict test 
trial. (e) Participants’ search behaviour was indexed as the average fraction of the total conflict test trial 
time participants were recorded as been located in each of the four pool quadrants. Here quadrants were 
delineated as: suggested by an allocentric strategy (allo choice), suggested by an egocentric strategy (ego 
choice), the conflict test starting quadrant (SE) and the training trial starting quadrant (NW). All error bars 
are ± SEM. 
a) b) 
c) d) 
e) 
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Discussion 
The results of Experiment 4 suggest that participants overwhelmingly prefer to navigate 
allocentrically by the end of the training period. The distribution of where participants spent 
most of the time during the conflict test further supported this preference, with search focussed 
almost exclusively in the allocentric quadrant. Participants also appeared to have great 
confidence in their chosen strategy as it was persevered with by all participants for the duration 
of the conflict test trial despite the absence of the target. As participants did not know the 
delineators of the target location were absent it would be expected that, if they had doubts about 
their chosen strategy, their inability to find the target might encourage them to search according 
to a different one. This did not occur for any participants. However, it may have been the case 
that participants’ allocentric preference was a result of some bias introduced in the experimental 
methodology. This possibility is suggested by the ability of participants to solve the allocentric-n 
test after only five training trials. Looking at the pattern of results on the egocentric tests 
participants did not tend to show a preference for approximating the target near the correct 
location until the end of training.  Therefore it might be the case that training participants in an 
environment that facilitates the acquisition of more reliable egocentric knowledge affects the 
extent to which allocentric navigation is preferred. 
 
Experiment 5 
Experiment 5 was motivated by the overwhelming preference for allocentric navigation 
observed in the conflict test of Experiment 4. As was mentioned previously, this result may have 
been a consequence of participants not developing a more reliable egocentric response strategy. 
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One possible explanation for this complete absence of any egocentric strategy preference may be 
the complexity of the training environment used in Experiments 1-4. It may have been the case 
that the great variety in the number of possible search locations and in the number of paths that 
could be taken to reach the target location made the development of a reliable egocentric strategy 
too difficult, at least within the training time of earlier experiments. However, that is not to say 
that a more reliable egocentric strategy, if one could be developed, would necessarily produce 
less of an allocentric strategy preference. It may also be the case that the distal cues of the 
environment are too distinct to be ignored in the execution of any but the simplest egocentric 
responses such as those seen when solving a T-maze conflict test. Experiment 5 therefore aimed 
to test whether the complexity of the learned egocentric strategy had any effect on participants’ 
preferential navigation behaviour. 
In order to simplify the egocentric strategy that participants were likely to learn the maze 
in the training environment was made easier to navigate. The maze was therefore redesigned 
with the aim of encouraging the acquisition of route knowledge. This knowledge was expected to 
be easier to utilise while also being more accurate and less susceptible to error than the dead 
reckoning system participants appeared to be employing in Experiments 1-4. The key change 
made to the training maze was the removal of the hex grid design in order to remove the large 
amount of variability in the number and length of the possible paths from start to target. It was 
replaced with a maze with only one possible, fixed length path between the two locations. To 
keep this path simple enough to potentially learn a route through only a small number of choice 
points were included. It was hypothesised that, keeping the number of training trials constant, 
having participants learn to navigate this simpler maze would lead to their developing more 
accurate and reliable egocentric knowledge. It was hypothesised that this in turn would produce a 
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twofold effect, resulting in improved performance on the egocentric-p relative to the egocentric-
np test and in a more even split of allocentric and egocentric navigators on a conflict test. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-seven undergraduates from the University of Sydney participated in this 
experiment in exchange for course credit. Exclusion criteria were the same as Experiment 1. 
Nineteen of the participants were excluded from the analyses, eleven as a result of simulator 
sickness, and eight due to a lack of learning. The criteria for a participant not showing any 
learning were the same as Experiment 1. 
Materials 
The materials used here were the same as those described for Experiment 1. 
Design 
The test structure of this experiment was varied from the one used for Experiments 1-4, 
with test time removed as an independent variable. The same four test types as in Experiment 4 
were employed here but only at the end of the training period. The administration of this block of 
test trials followed the same protocol as Experiment 4. 
All other details of the experiment’s design were the same as those detailed for 
Experiment 4. 
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Procedure 
Pre-training 
The pre-training process was the same as that described in Experiment 1. 
Training 
The design of the training environment, visualized in Figure 16, was conceived with the 
aim of making the maze more conducive to the development of route-based egocentric 
knowledge. To achieve this, a simpler training environment was used where simplicity was 
considered to be related to the number of turns in the longest path from the start to the target 
location, the number of possible paths between the two points and the average length of dead-end 
paths. The hex grid design was replaced with a maze with only one possible, fixed length path 
with a set number of choice points between the start and target locations. In order to minimise 
the time taken to reveal a dead-end path the wrong choices at any intersection were only one 
plank long, meaning mistakes were made immediately apparent to participants. The maze also 
needed to not be so simple in its design that it could be solved trivially by the learning of a 
directional response from the start point. As can be seen in Figure 16 this problem was avoided 
by constructing a circuitous path that precluded the use of a simple directional bearing strategy 
as a result of the inclusion of several changes in the path’s direction of bearing. To allow for 
more flexibility in the design of this path sections of the maze that contained no choice points 
were included, with the expectation that the lack of choice points would mean these regions 
would have no effect on the overall difficulty of learning a route through the path. One dead-end 
path section that did not immediately reveal itself as such was included as the equivalent of the 
non-baited arm in a T-maze. This arm was necessary to allow the same maze to be used in both 
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training and the conflict test.  Therefore the two environments were matched in all aspects but 
the rotation of the maze. These arms were designed to be exact mirrors of each other, with the 
exception that only one contained the target location. This was to avoid participants potentially 
choosing the egocentric arm on the conflict test as a result of their association of a particular path 
structure with the incorrect option. As a result of this the paths from the start location to the ends 
of both arms were identical with the exception of the turn at the intersection from which they 
branch. 
The transitions between training trials were changed to remove the transferring of 
participants to the target location following the end of an unsuccessful trial. Instead new trials 
were begun immediately regardless of the previous trial’s outcome. This was to address the 
concern that moving participants to the target location after a failed trial might encourage a 
biased use of the allocentric cues. As a simplified training environment was used for this 
experiment the expectation was that most participants would be able to eventually discover the 
target location under their own power.  
All other environmental features and training protocols were the same as those described 
in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 16. Schematic survey view of the training environment used in Experiment 5. Of note are the 
greatly simplified design compared to Experiments 1-4 and the meandering nature of the path meant to 
throw off the learning of a simple directional bearing strategy. 
 
Allocentric test 
The allocentric test trial was the same as in Experiment 4. 
Egocentric test 
The egocentric test trials were the same as those described in Experiment 4. This includes 
the test environment for the egocentric-p test, meaning that participants were tested in a hex grid 
maze environment even though they were not trained on one. The hex maze structure was 
preserved to avoid participants solving the test trivially using knowledge of the fact that in the 
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training maze the target location could be approximated to within two locations simply by 
knowing that it was located at the end of the path. The egocentric test environments can be seen 
in Figure 17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Schematic survey views of the egocentric plank (a) and no-plank (b) test environments used in 
Experiment 5. (a) Black boundary delineates the extent and position of the training environment maze. 
 
Conflict test 
In order to put the two strategy types in conflict a new test environment was constructed 
that followed the same basic principles as a T-maze. The training maze was mirrored so that 
participants now started on the opposite side of the environment and the two main branches of 
the maze could be used to delineate a participant’s preferred strategy. Looking at Figure 18 and 
comparing the conflict test maze to that shown in Figure 16 it can be seen that following the 
correct sequence of turns from the start to the target learned during training now takes a 
participant to the opposite arm to that suggested by the allocentric cues.   
a) b) 
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As the probable target location, which would likely be the end of either maze branch, is 
more clearly delineated than in Experiment 4 the conflict test protocol was modified to remove 
the four minute time limit allowing participants to continue on the test trial until they had 
reached a termination location. Four such locations were defined, with two on either branch 
positioned on the two branches of the final choice point (see Figure 18). Once one of these 
termination locations was reached the trial was ended. 
 
Figure 18. Schematic survey view of the conflict test environment used in Experiment 5. Conflict test 
trial was started at the test start location. Ego targets represent the pair of locations in the maze 
participants utilising an optimal egocentric strategy would be expected to believe the target to be 
positioned. Allo targets represent the locations in the maze participants utilising an optimal allocentric 
strategy would be expected to believe the target to be positioned. 
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Statistics 
Training 
The dependent variables recorded and the analyses employed were the same as those 
described for Experiment 1. 
Test 
For the conflict test strategy choice was indexed by the arm in which the termination 
point a participant reached was located. While there were four termination points programmed 
into the test trial only two were ever reached, one for each arm, and therefore only arm choice 
was analysed. A chi-square test was used to compare the frequency with which each arm was 
chosen. The expected value used here was set based on the expectation that simplifying the 
training environment would produce an equal distribution of allocentric and egocentric choices. 
It was therefore expected that all participants would make the allocentric choice and the chi-
square test was designed to reflect this. The distance travelled from the start to the termination 
point was also recorded. An independent samples t-test was used to compare the average path 
length of allocentric against egocentric choice participants. 
For the allocentric and egocentric test trials, due to the use of only one test time a One 
Way Within-Subjects ANOVA was used to compare distance scores between pool quadrants. 
For this experiment, contrasts only tested preference for the target location against the combined 
average for the remaining three dummy quadrants due to the removal of test time as a variable. 
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These contrasts were tested for each test type. A One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA was also 
used to compare target location distance scores between the two egocentric tests. 
Results 
Training 
Over the course of training participants, as shown in Figure 19a, decreased the distance of 
the paths they took through the environment. A One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA found this 
relationship between training and travel distance to be significant, F(14, 238) = 17.68, p < .001. 
As can be seen in Figure 19b, participants also became faster to find the target as a result 
of more training. This relationship was found, using a One-Way Within Subjects ANOVA, to be 
significant, F(14, 210) = 27.30, p < .001. 
Figure 19c-d shows that participants developed a preference for making repeated use of 
particular unique intersections from the start (trials 1-5) to the end (trials 11-15) of training.  
Looking at the change in the number of unvisited intersections using a paired-samples t-test 
found a significant, t(17) = -6.68, p < .001, decrease when comparing the last training block to 
the first. Analysing the percentage scores using a 2 (training block) x 5 (unique visits) Within-
Subjects ANOVA revealed a significant, F(4, 68) = 84.04, p < .001, main effect of unique visits 
and a significant, F(4, 68) = 46.62, p < .001, interaction. The data visualised in Figure 19d 
suggests these effects are a result of the increase in the number of intersections visited five times 
by the last training block. 
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Figure 19. Training data collected from participants during Experiment 5. (a-b) Relationship 
between number of training trials completed and average distance travelled (a) or time spent (b) 
searching for the target location. (c) Number of trials, divided into frequency bins of 0-5, each 
intersection in the plank maze was visited during the first (trials 1-5) and last (trials 11-15) 
blocks of training trials. (d) To calculate percentage scores the frequency counts for each non-
zero bin (1-5) were divided by the total number of intersections visited at least once in a block. 
Percentage scores were calculated for the first and last training blocks. All error bars are ± SEM. 
 
Allocentric tests 
As can be seen in Figure 20a, participants on the allocentric-n test preferentially 
approximated the target near its training location. A One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA with 
a) b) 
c) 
d) c) 
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pool quadrant as the independent variable supported this observation, finding a significant, F(3, 
51) = 52.99, p < .001, effect of quadrant. Planned contrasts comparing target location preference 
to the combined preference for the remaining quadrants revealed a significant, F(1, 17) = 134.34, 
p < .001, preference for the target location. 
Egocentric tests 
The distance scores for the egocentric-p test, visualised in Figure 20a, appear to show that 
participants failed to develop an egocentric representation of the target location by the end of 
training. This observation was supported by a One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA which found 
no effect of quadrant on distance scores (p > .05). Similarly, planned contrasts comparing the 
target location distance scores to the combined scores for the other three quadrants found no 
preference for the target quadrant (p > .05). 
Figure 20a also shows that participants did appear to be preferentially approximating the 
target near its actual location on the egocentric-np test. A One-Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
supported this, finding a significant, F(3, 51) = 14.21, p < .001, effect of quadrant. This 
interpretation was further supported by a planned contrast comparing target quadrant preference 
to the averaged distance scores of the other three quadrants which a revealed a significant, F(1, 
17) = 5.49, p = .031, preference for the target location. 
The target location distance scores for the different egocentric tests, as can be seen in 
Figure 20a, appear quite similar, suggesting no difference in participants’ ability to correctly 
locate the target on one test compared to the other. A One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
comparing the two tests on their target location distance scores supports this observation, finding 
no effect of test type on the distance scores (p > .05). 
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Conflict test 
It can be seen in Figure 20b that participants appeared to prefer to navigate with reference 
to the allocentric features on the conflict test. Those participants who did make the egocentric 
choice, however, look to have taken much shorter paths to their terminations (see Figure 20c). 
Comparing the frequency of arm choice using a chi-square test, however, found there was no 
significant difference in the strategy participants preferred to employ (p = .059). An independent 
samples t-test comparing path lengths as a function of conflict choice found that egocentric 
choice participants took significantly, t(16) = 2.71, p = .015, shorter paths to their termination 
point. 
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Figure 20. Test data collected from participants during Experiment 5. (a) Average distance of 
participants’ approximations of the target location from the actual target location (Target) and the centres 
of the remaining pool quadrants (NW, SW, SE) on the egocentric plank (egocentric-p), egocentric no-
plank (egocentric-np) and allocentric (allocentric) test trials, calculated using the distance formula. (b) 
Number of participants that employed an egocentric (egocentric) or allocentric (allocentric) navigation 
strategy on the conflict test trial. (c) The length of the paths taken on the conflict test by participants 
separated by whether an egocentric or allocentric choice was made on the conflict test. All error bars are 
± SEM. 
 
General Discussion 
The aim of these experiments was to answer the question of how participants behave 
when the two distinct navigation strategies they have acquired the ability to separably employ are 
put in to conflict. Together they suggest that, for the environment and training process used here, 
a) b) 
c) 
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the degree to which participants preferentially employ one strategy or the other depends on the 
complexity of the environment they are required to navigate. Training data from both 
experiments clearly showed that participants acquired the ability to navigate through the 
environment more accurately as they became more familiar with it. Both experiments also 
demonstrated that participants were capable of acquiring information about the distal features of 
the environment that could facilitate relatively successful allocentric navigation. In Experiment 4 
participants revealed an overwhelming preference for allocentric navigation following the 
training and testing protocol established by Experiments 1-3. Participants also all demonstrated 
great confidence in their chosen strategy, persevering in their search of the quadrant delineated 
by the distal environmental cues despite the conflict test been run under extinction conditions. 
Experiment 5 found that simplifying the process of constructing a reliable egocentric strategy 
produced a shift towards an equal distribution of strategy preference on the conflict test. 
Consistent with the idea that these participants had learned the correct route through the maze 
those that made the egocentric choice took much shorter paths to their predicted target location 
than did the allocentric navigators who made more errors. Taken together these results suggest 
that people can have their preferential strategies affected by the complexity of the environment 
they are navigating. 
One possible explanation for the results of Experiment 4 ruled out by the data from 
Experiment 5 was that the completely different view of the distal landmarks participants were 
presented with at the start of the trial immediately alerted them to their new position. If this were 
the case participants, if they held the implicit assumption that the position of the target was fixed 
relative to the landmarks and not the maze, they would therefore proceed to navigate 
allocentrically and indeed never even think to check the quadrant suggested by an egocentric 
123 
 
strategy. That some participants in Experiment 5 exposed to a similar, starkly different view of 
the environment still preferentially employed an egocentric strategy on the conflict test suggests 
that people are capable of ignoring the change in their position. For Experiment 4 this suggests 
that participants were likely still attending to the arrangement of the landmarks at the beginning 
of each training trial. The conflict test can therefore be said to show that participants, at least in 
the early stages of a training trial, were selectively attending to the distal cues of the environment 
when determining how and where they should navigate. 
The results of Experiment 5 also appear to provide information about how participants 
who preferentially utilise different strategies when navigating are acquiring knowledge during 
training. Egocentric-choice participants made far fewer errors, on average, navigating the path to 
their chosen location than did allocentric navigators. As the paths to both the egocentric and 
allocentric target locations both during training and the conflict test were identical from start to 
finish, with the exception of the turn on to one arm or the other, these shorter paths suggest that 
allocentric navigators had acquired less information about the correct route. This relative lack of 
learning may be a possible explanation for their preferred navigation strategy, although it might 
also be the case that these participants resolved to navigate allocentrically and therefore attended 
less to learning an accurate route. 
Of concern regarding the data from Experiment 5 is that the results of the egocentric tests 
appear to suggest that participants were not acquiring egocentric knowledge that could reliably 
guide them to the target location. This result does not fit well with the idea that at least some 
participants were acquiring highly accurate routes through the environment. However, it may be 
the case that this result, at least for the egocentric-p test, is a consequence of the design of the 
test environment. Prior to the start of this experiment there was concern about the structure of the 
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egocentric-p test. Running it using the training environment maze with the distal cues removed 
would allow for the straightforward assessment of successful route learning. However, it would 
have also made the maze trivially easy to solve by any participant who realised that the end of 
the path was reached once they arrived at a pair of dead end choices. Provided they chose the 
correct arm at the main path intersection, a savvy participant could therefore be accurate to 
within one intersection choice in their approximation of the target without any route knowledge. 
Several possible ways to address this concern were considered, the most straightforward of 
which, and the one that would help make the results from Experiment 5 more comparable to 
those from earlier experiments, was to test participants in the full hex grid maze in the 
egocentric-p test. However, this change carried the implicit assumption that participants would 
have acquired some form of knowledge about how to navigate the non-choice point regions of 
the maze. Without this knowledge participants would likely be unable to navigate successfully at 
intersections they had not previously experienced as requiring a choice. One possible way to 
structure the egocentric-p test in the future that could avoid these concerns would be to measure 
the number of errors participants made navigating a test environment that contained the training 
maze. Those who were using a non-spatial strategy but had not learned a route would be 
expected to make more choice point errors than those who had followed a correctly learned route 
even though they appeared to guess the target location correctly. 
The egocentric-np test environment does not suffer from the same problem. That may be 
the explanation for why participants appeared to be capable of approximating the target in the 
correct quadrant on this test. This observation, combined with the lack of an observable 
difference in the average accuracy of target approximations between the two egocentric tests 
suggests that participants were likely making use of learned directional information but did not 
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have accurate information about the distance between the start and target locations. If this were 
the case it would suggest that unlike with earlier experiments participants were not solving both 
these tasks using the same information, with participants on the egocentric-p test likely 
attempting to navigate via a learned route that contained no idiothetic information. Initial 
attempts to navigate with reference to such a strategy would likely lead participants astray and, 
separated from the starting location as the initial reference point for any dead reckoning based 
strategy, where the target was eventually approximated would be essentially random, which is 
what was observed.  
Taken together these results appear to show that in the virtual environments used here 
there is a relationship between the complexity of the training maze and the navigation strategy 
that is preferentially employed on a conflict test. There is also evidence to suggest that some 
participants are capable of acquiring a route-based strategy on the simpler training environment 
of Experiment 5. These results also suggest that people can, in some cases, come to completely 
ignore distal environmental cues, even while navigating a long route. 
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General Discussion 
Taken altogether these results can be seen to advance our understanding of how it is that 
people come to acquire and make preferential use of allocentric and egocentric navigation 
strategies. The results of Experiments 1-3 revealed that participants were capable of acquiring 
information that could drive relatively successful navigation that used only entirely allocentric or 
entirely egocentric information. Allocentric knowledge was seen to be landmark-dependent and 
appeared to be related to the complexity of training, with more difficulty producing an array-
based strategy while less difficulty produced a single landmark strategy. Egocentric knowledge 
was observed to be independent of the structure of the maze and was instead based entirely on 
internal information. Experiments 4 and 5 followed up on these observations and found that 
participants, when both types of strategy were available, showed a preference for navigating 
allocentrically, the strength of which was dependent upon the complexity of the environment 
they were required to navigate. The more complex training environment of Experiment 4 
produced a universal allocentric preference, while a preference in some participants for 
egocentric navigation emerged from the simpler environment of Experiment 5. 
The observed pattern of results on the standard allocentric test was remarkably consistent 
across all five experiments. In each experiment participants showed the ability to quickly acquire 
a representation of the target’s location relative to the distal cues of the environment that was 
never observed to improve with training. Research in both humans and rodents (Andersen et al., 
2012; Iaria et al., 2003; Packard & McGaugh, 1996) has tended to show that there is a general 
preference for navigators to navigate allocentrically during the early stages of training. While 
participants in the experiments described here were not tested on their early strategy preferences 
it can be seen that their rapid development of a relatively accurate allocentric representation is a 
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result that would be consistent with a preference for allocentric navigation. That participants 
could acquire this relatively accurate representation within five training trials further suggests 
that the development of this representation was not overly difficult. Research in both rodents and 
humans has suggested that, rather than place information, what navigators are developing on the 
MWM is a directional strategy (Hamilton, Johnson, et al., 2009). While the separation of 
direction from place navigation was not a focus of the research here a key component of the 
theorised direction strategy in the MWM is the presence of the pool wall which serves as an 
important source of distance information. However, the unique design of the environments used 
here meant no walls were available to be used in this way. In order to remove the possibility that 
the boundary of the pool may have served a similar purpose in Experiment 1 the edges of the 
pool were extended beyond the visible horizon from Experiment 2 onwards with no observable 
effect on allocentric test performance. Therefore, while the distinction between direction and 
place navigation was not explicitly tested here it appears to be the case that a directional strategy, 
at least as they are typically observed to be employed on more traditional MWM experiments, 
was not acquired here. Returning to the considerations of difficulty raised earlier, directional 
strategy use is generally observed to be the simpler strategy for navigators to use on the MWM 
(Hamilton et al., 2008; Skinner et al., 2003). Some researchers have even observed that, at least 
in rodents, place learning can be too difficult to observe at all (Skinner et al., 2003), while 
requiring that people use a place strategy on the vMWM results in generally poorer navigation 
(Hamilton, Johnson, et al., 2009). As a directional strategy does not appear to be the likely 
explanation for the allocentric test results observed here, however, it may also be the case that 
the difficulty of place learning is related to the availability of distal cues in the environment. The 
sixteen landmarks used here may have provided more information to navigators than the four 
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distal cues, one for each wall, that are commonly used in more traditional MWM experiments 
(Hamilton, Johnson, et al., 2009). This could be seen to fit with the observation that people are 
more likely to utilise landmarks to navigate when more of them are present in the environment 
(Andersen et al., 2012). 
The results from the allocentric-r tests revealed that participants’ allocentric strategies 
were based entirely on knowledge acquired about the identities and the arrangement of the 
landmarks surrounding the maze. As a result of this preferential landmark learning participants 
were unable to accurately approximate the target location when the positions of the landmarks 
were randomised. This was despite the presence of the skybox which, if its arrangement had 
been attended to, would have likely allowed participants to solve the test as accurately as they 
had the non-randomised variant. A similar result has been observed in rats, where randomisation 
of the landmark array surrounding a RAM produced degraded performance, an observation the 
authors interpret as indicating that the rats were making use of the topographical relationships 
between the surrounding cues  (Suzuki, Augerinos, & Black, 1980).The lack of learning about 
the arrangement of the sky as an orienting cue could be taken to suggest that it had a relatively 
low level of salience, either as a result of its own intrinsic properties or as a consequence of the 
greater salience of the many landmarks in the environment. As the allocentric-r test was 
administered twice per participant the lack of any improvement on the test with training suggests 
that the uncertainty induced by the first test, which can be seen in the essentially random 
distribution of participants’ target approximations, did not motivate any re-evaluation of the 
allocentric knowledge acquired. If therefore participants were not attending to the sky as a result 
of the greater salience of the landmarks it may be said that poor allocentric-r performance was a 
result of overshadowing.  Overshadowing, as discussed previously, can be observed in a variety 
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of different ways in spatial learning across many different species, with cues closer to the target 
location generally able to reduce learning about more distal cues (Chamizo, Manteiga, et al., 
2006; March et al., 1992; Roberts & Pearce, 1999). This overshadowing has been observed to 
interact with feature salience, with Kosaki et al. (2015) finding that extramaze cues on the MWM 
are still learned about even when intramaze cues are perfectly predictive of the target location 
provided the extramaze cues are made sufficiently salient. This would suggest that, despite 
participants showing the ability to acquire multiple types of spatial knowledge about the 
environment, at least some of the learning observed in these experiments was subject to the 
principles of associative learning. 
However, the finding that participants developed a preference for a single landmark 
strategy does not explain why participants appeared to, on average, come to preferentially favour 
navigating with reference to the Christ the Redeemer landmark. It may have been the case that 
the perceptual salience of the landmark, which refers to how much a feature captures the 
navigator’s attention (Caduff & Timpf, 2008), played a role as it was not a factor that was 
controlled for here. Of the landmarks surrounding the target quadrant it may therefore have been 
that the statue was the most salient to participants. Therefore if the landmarks had been 
deliberately chosen according to the evaluations of participants to be of equal salience within the 
context of the training environment, and it is important to stress the context here as salience is 
also seen to be related to a feature’s contrast with the environment (Chan et al., 2012), it may be 
the case that the single landmark strategy would no longer develop, or that it would develop 
without the uniform preference for any one particular feature. 
The difference in patterns of performance on the allocentric-r test between Experiments 2 
and 3 was suggested to be a consequence of the differences in the complexity of the training 
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trials between the two experiments. Participants in Experiment 3 showed a shift to a single 
landmark strategy with training. As Experiments 3 and 4 shared the same training environment it 
seems likely then that participants in the latter experiment made the same shift to the simpler, but 
no more accurate, strategy. This would therefore suggest that participants on the Experiment 4 
conflict test were likely making use of this simple, single landmark strategy. This conclusion can 
be considered in relation to findings that people, in situations where the optimal strategy is 
ambiguous, default to employing the least demanding, relatively reliable strategy they know 
(Condappa & Wiener, 2014; Wiener et al., 2013). If a similar approach to strategy selection was 
followed here that would suggest that in Experiments 1, 3 and 4, the single landmark strategy 
was the easiest participants could reliably employ. This allocentric preference at the end of the 
training period is contrary to the results observed by Wiener et al. (2013) where participants 
showed a preference for egocentric spatial reasoning. As people tend to show a shift from place 
to response strategies with training (Andersen et al., 2012; Iaria et al., 2003; Schmitzer-Torbert, 
2007) it may also be the case that the pattern of behaviour observed here is a consequence of the 
limited training time afforded to participants. If this were the case it would be expected that 
extending the training period might have resulted in the development of a simpler egocentric 
strategy and a preference for egocentric navigation. Results from Experiment 1 not published 
here provide tentative support for the possibility that a simpler egocentric strategy could be 
developed by participants with more training. For participants who were able to complete 
Experiment 1’s standard training and testing trials well within the set time limit another ten 
training trials, and four test trials, were administered. This was done to provide a general idea of 
how the observed learning trends might extend beyond the amount of training that could be 
provided for the average participant. The few participants who completed the extra trials were 
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observed to develop perfect accuracy on the egocentric test and no variability in the paths they 
took to the target during training, a pair of results that in combination strongly suggest that a 
complete route from the start to the target had been learned. However, the constraints of these 
data, which include the small number of participants, the selection bias that results from only 
being able to test the best performing students and the limitation that these extra trials could only 
be administered during Experiment 1, need to be kept in mind when attempting to draw 
conclusions. Therefore, all that can be said is that there exists tentative evidence to suggest that, 
with more training, participants may be able to acquire a highly accurate route strategy. The 
conflict test results from Experiment 5 also show that some participants trained in a simpler 
version of the mazes used in Experiments 1-4 can come to prefer to navigate egocentrically. 
However, it is also the case that the difference in complexity between Experiment 5 and 
Experiment 4 may play a key role in why a complete preference for allocentric navigation was 
observed in the latter experiment. Rats, for example, have been observed to preferentially 
navigate with reference to place information even after extensive training and reaching 
asymptotic test performance when required to navigate a complex variant of the open-field maze 
(Ruprecht et al., 2014). 
Considering the allocentric-r test results from a different perspective it might also have 
been the case that in randomising the distal cues by changing their positions but not their 
identities a sub-optimal navigation strategy was encouraged. How this might happen in theory 
can be seen in a paper by Newman et al. (2007). They observed that people navigating a city 
environment are capable of using pure layout information, which includes the arrangement of 
streets and positions of buildings but not their identities, to navigate between locations when the 
identities of all the features that compose that environment have changed. However, when the 
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identities of only a select few key buildings were changed participants’ navigation performance 
degraded (Newman et al., 2007). This suggests that, when available, the identities of these salient 
features may be preferentially relied upon to the extent that they are utilised even under 
circumstances where the navigator is in possession of knowledge that would allow her to solve 
the task optimally. A preference for learning about and utilising a particular type of navigation 
cue, even under circumstances where it is suboptimal to do so, has also been observed in rats. 
When trained to find a platform on the MWM that was a long distance from the starting location 
rats preferentially make use of landmark information regardless of whether it is predictive of the 
platform and despite their possessing the ability to find the platform using an egocentric strategy 
when forced to do so (Tamara et al., 2010). Rats will also preferentially learn about and navigate 
with reference to a salient light cue on the MWM regardless of whether it is predictive of the 
platform location (Martin et al., 2003) and, more generally, have also been observed to make 
preferential use of ambiguous geometric cues despite the presence of more predictive feature 
information (Cheng, 1986). It has also been observed that some people will inflexibly persevere 
with a preferred strategy in cases where it is sub-optimal to do so (Etchamendy & Bohbot, 2007). 
While it needs to be kept in mind that Newman et al. (2007) used an environmental scale space 
and therefore were likely to have been assessing different facets of navigation, if the potential 
conclusions from their research are generalizable to the environments used here it may have been 
the case that a preferential use of landmark identities on the allocentric-r test adversely affected 
how participants navigated. As has been pointed out previously, if participants had attended to 
the arrangement of the skybox during training they would have been able to correctly identify the 
target quadrant in the allocentric-r test and, like the use of layout information observed by 
Newman et al. (2007), might have been more willing to attend to, or make use of, this source of 
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information in a completely randomised environment. Random performance even under these 
circumstances would further strengthen the hypothesis that the presence of landmarks was 
strongly overshadowing the acquisition of any other allocentric information. This consideration 
of sub-optimal strategies relates to both the multi and single landmark strategies used to solve the 
allocentric-r test as both fail to locate the correct quadrant in circumstances under which it is 
possible to do so. It may have also been the case that participants interpreted the allocentric-r 
environment as an entirely new space, separate from the other environments they had been 
trained and tested in. In this scenario the randomised performance would be a consequence of 
participants not transferring any knowledge they had acquired during training to the new 
environment. However, this is unlikely to have been the case here. No participant was ever 
recorded as questioning whether they were present in a new space on the allocentric-r test. 
Participants treating the allocentric-r environment as a new space would also not explain why the 
systematic preference to approximate the target near the Christ the Redeemer landmark was 
observed in Experiment 3.  
The results observed on the egocentric tests were less consistent between experiments 
than the allocentric test results. However, it can be reasonably concluded that participants were, 
at least in Experiments 1-4, acquiring angular direction and time-based distance information 
about the spatial relationship between the start and target locations. Experiment 5 revealed that 
by simplifying the training process participants were capable of acquiring a route-based strategy 
that they could come to preferentially employ over an allocentric strategy. Of particular interest 
in the egocentric strategies of Experiments 1-4 is the preference for participants to develop a 
strategy that was entirely dependent upon idiothetic information. The distance component of 
idiothetic information in particular is generally thought of as been strongly related to the 
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podokinetic information provided by locomotion (Chrastil & Warren, 2012; A. R. Richardson & 
Waller, 2007). The absence of this source of idiothetic information does not preclude the 
acquisition of distance information; however, it is interesting to note that participants developed, 
whether deliberately or otherwise, this entirely self-referential egocentric strategy despite the 
presence of the plank maze. Due to their uniform length the planks of the maze could 
theoretically have served as integer based approximations of travel distance that might have been 
easier to keep track of than an internal approximation of time. As participants were acquiring and 
making use of distance information in these experiments it might be interesting to look at the 
effect of locomotion as the method for controlling movement on the knowledge that they 
develop. Differences in egocentric test performance, or lack thereof, could potentially be 
informative as to whether the travel time-based approximations of distance used here were a 
suboptimal proxy adopted out of necessity or an ideal way to measure distance in environments 
like the ones used here. As has been discussed previously the allocentric preference that 
participants displayed in Experiment 4, and by extension were likely to have developed in 
Experiments 1-3, was likely the result of the relative ease with which the strategy could be 
acquired and reliably employed. Therefore if locomotion was observed to improve participants’ 
ability to acquire distance information it might also be seen to have a knock-on effect on how 
people preferentially navigate. 
There are multiple possible explanations for the appearance of preferential egocentric 
navigators in Experiment 5. One explanation suggested by research into egocentric strategy use 
in rodents is that the egocentric-choice navigators were simply executing a habitual behavioural 
response they had acquired with training. While this is a possibility it is worth noting that it 
would suggest people are capable of following a habitual behaviour for the, on average, two 
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minutes of travel time necessary to move from the start to the target location while ignoring the 
entirely novel views of the environment to which they were exposed. A similar degree of 
exclusion of external information while executing a habitual navigation response has been 
observed in rats, where they have been seen to run in to walls or past food when traversing 
familiar paths that have been shortened or had their target locations moved (Leising & Blaisdell, 
2009). However, whether people can develop habitual navigation responses that extreme is not 
yet known as it does not appear that much research has looked in to it. That egocentric-choice 
navigators appear to have been unaffected by the entirely new views of the environment 
presented to them is a point that needs to be stressed. This is because unlike with the training 
environments of Experiments 1-4, due to the constrained and simplified maze used in 
Experiment 5, participants would have had no experience navigating within, to, or from most of 
the quadrant in which the conflict test trial was started. These results also contradict the idea that 
allocentric navigation strategies are employed in situations where the navigators are started from 
an unfamiliar place in the environment (Tamara & Timberlake, 2011); however, this finding may 
relate only to rats. People have been shown to be capable of developing route based strategies 
that are entirely independent of environmental information; however, it is a cognitively effortful 
process typically seen when distinguishing features of the navigated world are removed (Tlauka 
& Wilson, 1994). If route navigators were found to be navigating without any awareness of the 
change in their position this strategy would necessarily have developed in a way that excluded 
external information. 
The observation that all participants preferred to not only make the initial choice to 
follow an allocentric strategy but to never shift in their quadrant of search for the entirety of the 
conflict test appears to strongly suggest that participants in Experiments 1-4 were of the belief 
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that the target location was fixed relative to the distal features of the environment. If participants 
conceptualised the target as relative to the external environment it would not be expected that 
they would ever think to search the quadrant suggested by their egocentric knowledge as such a 
possibility would not make sense in the context of an allocentric reference frame. However, 
Experiment 5, and the appearance of some participants who preferentially employed an 
egocentric strategy, suggests that this preference to localise the target relative to the distal 
environmental cues is one that may, under certain circumstances, be affected by the nature of the 
environment in which people are trained. There is precedence for this idea, with people trained to 
navigate in a vMWM equivalent that selectively biased them towards one strategy or the other 
observed to preferentially navigate using the method promoted by their training environment 
when tested in a maze in which both were equally efficient (Livingstone-Lee, Zeman, 
Gillingham, & Skelton, 2014). However, in that experiment participants were trained in the bias 
environments to localise the target relative to distal or proximal environmental cues 
(Livingstone-Lee et al., 2014) and were therefore in either case of the belief that the target was 
fixed relative to some landmark feature. It may have been that a similar biasing effect occurred 
in Experiment 5 as a result of the constrained number of possible ways that the target location 
could be reached. Unlike Experiments 1-4 where the target location could be approached from 
three different directions the target in Experiment 5 was always only ever experienced as coming 
at the end of the plank at the end of the maze. This variation between the two maze types might 
have had the effect of biasing some participants towards the belief that the target was fixed to a 
particular plank in the maze. In turn this conceptualisation of the target location might have 
promoted the acquisition of a maze-dependent strategy during training which resulted in the 
more accurate route knowledge seen in the egocentric-choice navigators. 
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More generally, it can be seen that the results observed across all five experiments show 
clearly that people were able to, and did, acquire different types of information across training. 
This acquisition appeared to occur across different timescales for allocentric and egocentric 
information; however, the early acquisition of relatively accurate allocentric knowledge was not 
found to block participants from later developing a separately employable and reliable egocentric 
strategy. This development appeared to be in spite of the fact that early accuracy on the 
allocentric test trials suggests acquisition of another, separate strategy would be unnecessary. 
The allocentric-r results of Experiment 3 further show that participants may have also been 
refining their allocentric knowledge into a simpler navigation strategy in parallel with their 
acquisition of egocentric knowledge. However, while both allocentric and egocentric information 
was seen to develop here the results observed also, as expected, contradict those of Igloi et al. 
(2009) that were interpreted as showing the simultaneous acquisition of allocentric and 
sequential egocentric information. Here it can be seen that with a more complex task sequential 
egocentric knowledge is only observed to develop in some participants under particular 
environmental conditions and is, more typically, not observed at all. Relatively accurate 
allocentric knowledge, however, was observed to consistently develop within five training trials. 
The differences in the results between the experiments reported here and those of Igloi et al. 
(2009) can be seen to help stress the importance of taking the complexity of the training 
environment into consideration when attempting to answer questions regarding the acquisition of 
spatial knowledge. These observations can be seen to be in contrast to the main principles of 
associative learning that would suggest that the later acquisition of information would not be 
expected to occur. However, the acquisition of information in parallel in the training 
environments used here does not mean that associative mechanisms were not affecting how 
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learning proceeded in ways that were not tested for. While the conflict tests looked at which 
strategy is preferentially employed, how the two strategies combined during training is an 
alternative avenue of possible interaction that was not looked at here. This interaction can be 
conceived of as proceeding in one of two ways; either the two systems are combined to produce 
one congruent output or they are separate producers of incongruent behaviours. Congruent 
behaviour can be seen in how the traditional MWM is observed to be solved, with navigation to 
the platform the result of information about the distal environmental cues and the perceived 
distance between the navigator and the pool boundary (Hamilton et al., 2008; Kosaki et al., 
2015). The plus maze demonstrates incongruent behaviour as the place and response strategies 
are independent and unrelated (Kosaki et al., 2015). As Kosaki et al. (2015) point out, the 
distinction between these two possibilities is important as they predict different interactions. If 
the two systems combine, it needs to be considered whether the presence of multiple strategies is 
affecting the strength of learning acquired for each separate component system, while 
incongruent behaviour would suggest that degrading the learning of one system should produce 
improved performance in the other (Kosaki et al., 2015). Therefore it may be fruitful in the 
future to look for differences in how learning proceeds in the same environment under 
circumstances where one type of knowledge or the other can no longer be acquired. Having 
participants perform concurrent distractor tasks that make the acquisition of a particular type of 
knowledge more difficult may be one possible way to achieve this inhibition of a navigation 
system temporarily. Improved performance on the unimpaired system would be consistent with 
the findings of Packard and Goodman (2013), who observed that rats could acquire distinct place 
and response strategies in a given environment but also had their learning affected by the 
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selective inhibition of the neural correlates of one system or the other, such that lesioning 
improved the performance of the undamaged system.  
Another aspect that might be important to consider is the potential leeway granted to 
participants by the fixed time limit of the training trials, a factor that might have interacted with 
the accuracy of the knowledge developed. The timescale that the development of spatial 
knowledge followed might also have been affected. As participants were not informed of the 
number of trials they would need to complete any motivation to complete a given trial faster 
would have likely been almost entirely self-generated. Therefore while faster and more efficient 
navigation was an obvious consequence of training that is not to say that it was necessarily an 
intentional goal in all cases. This might have interacted specifically with how participants 
developed allocentric knowledge. As was observed across Experiments 1-4, participants were 
able to localise the target to the correct pool quadrant within five training trials using only the 
landmarks in the environment. However, lacking any external motivation to better approximate 
the target location, participants would not be expected to exert any, or extra, effort to improve on 
how accurate this localisation was. This hypothesis that participants navigated with the aim of 
minimising the effort exerted fits with prior observations about how people preferentially employ 
navigation strategies (Condappa & Wiener, 2014; Wiener et al., 2013). It is also consistent with 
the gradual shift towards simpler, habitual strategies with training that is observed in both 
humans and rodents (Iaria et al., 2003; Packard & McGaugh, 1996; Schmitzer-Torbert, 2007). 
Taken altogether this suggests that a simple, relatively accurate strategy of navigating to, and 
searching within, the pool quadrant delineated by the landmark array was likely the first 
developed. With more training this strategy would likely lead to the repeated execution of similar 
behavioural responses. The turn from the starting position to face the target quadrant would be a 
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simple example of this. These behaviours would become more learned and familiar with 
repetition and, as they would be necessarily fixed relative to a constant starting position, likely 
formed the basis of the egocentric navigation strategy observed at the end of training. 
Participants could also simplify their allocentric strategy further still by learning to attend to only 
a single landmark as the quadrant delineator. If learning were to proceed in broadly this fashion 
it might be expected that the level of accuracy on the allocentric tests demonstrated here would 
not be reflective of the accuracy that participants could develop with sufficient motivation to do 
so. Providing this motivation would also move future experiments more in line with the 
navigation that is undertaken by people in the real world, where there are typically outcomes 
valued by the individual that result from their finding more efficient ways to navigate through an 
environment. A simple way this could be implemented under the current experimental protocol 
would be to reduce the time limit available to participants as they became better able to find the 
target location. This would remove the motivation gap in the current methodology where 
participants have reached a level of performance that means they are unlikely to feel pressured 
by the possibility of failure but lack any reason to attempt to solve a given trial faster. 
Another aspect of navigation during training that might be informative to look at is how 
search and the acquisition of spatial knowledge interact with how deliberate navigation is 
required to be. In both the experiments used here and the traditional MWM navigators are able to 
happen upon the goal of their navigation by chance or as a result of the exhaustive searching of 
some constrained area of the environment. This allows for the possibility that navigation can 
proceed, from moment to moment, relatively aimlessly and still result in a successful trial. In the 
MWM experimenters can require rodents’ search to be more deliberate by adding a timing 
element to the appearance of the platform such that it only appears after a certain amount of time 
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has been spent in the correct location (Buresova, Krekule, Zahalka, & Bures, 1985). Both the 
amount of time that needs to be spent in the correct location and the size of the target zone are 
variables that can be manipulated (Buresova et al., 1985). A similar timing element could be 
added to the appearance of the visual and audio cues that indicate the successful discovery of the 
target location to remove the ability of participants to simply happen across it during search. 
Such a change would be expected to shift how a person makes decisions about their navigation 
within a trial as an active commitment would need to be made to wait in any given location.  
While the multiple tests used here were informative as to how different strategies and 
sources of information operated independently, real world navigation typically allows for the 
combination of multiple different types of information either simultaneously or in stages. A clear 
example of the latter can be seen on the more traditional MWM where rats appear to find the 
platform by utilising first the distal room cues followed by their position relative to the pool wall 
as a gauge of distance (Hamilton et al., 2008; Kosaki et al., 2015). There are several ways this 
sort of dual process navigation could be tested for in humans. Eye-trackers included in a HMD 
can be used to observe where participants are directing their attention in real time during training 
trials, and how which features of the world are overtly attended to changes over time could be 
used as a proxy measure of strategy engagement. Hamilton, Johnson et al. (2009) looked at how 
people directed their attention during trials on their vMWM environment, finding a similar trend 
of behaviour to that seen in rats, with overt attention directed first to room cues and then to the 
pool wall. Andersen et al. (2012) also used eye tracking to measure the relationship between 
attention directed to landmarks in the environment and the number of them available. 
Programming of virtual environments also allows experimenters more control over how 
navigation might be tested during a training trial. Environmental features could be distorted, 
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removed, or repositioned within a trial to tease apart the effect that particular manipulations have 
on different stages of navigation. An experiment employing a similar idea in rodents on the 
MWM found that manipulation of the information cues in the environment at different times 
only impaired performance if it occurred when that information source was likely to be in use by 
the rat’s two-stage navigation system (Hamilton et al., 2004). 
The most consistent observation in the results described here was the ability of 
participants to acquire, unprompted, different types of spatial information that were able to 
support relatively accurate navigation independently. It can be seen in reviewing these results 
together that there are a great many possible factors that can and do influence the navigation 
behaviours that people display. Here these included the amount of training required and the 
motivation provided to participants to improve their performance, the number and relative 
salience of the distal environmental cues, the information provided by the tools used to control 
movement, the simplicity of the strategies the environment could support, the complexity of the 
environment and the frames of reference suggested by environmental design. These results can 
be seen to further explicate how these factors, many of which have been observed previously in 
human or rodent research, interact with navigation. This strong correspondence with navigation 
behaviours observed previously in combination with the new insights provided suggests that the 
experimental methodology developed here may be a promising tool for use in future navigation 
research.  
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Appendix 1.1.1: Distance travelled One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
trial Sphericity Assumed 1872553.767 14 133753.841 13.674 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1872553.767 5.900 317359.077 13.674 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 1872553.767 8.646 216573.196 13.674 .000 
Lower-bound 1872553.767 1.000 1872553.767 13.674 .001 
Error(trial) Sphericity Assumed 2738753.930 280 9781.264   
Greenhouse-Geisser 2738753.930 118.009 23208.103   
Huynh-Feldt 2738753.930 172.926 15837.748   
Lower-bound 2738753.930 20.000 136937.696   
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
250.250 17.303 214.158 286.343 
 
2. trial 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
trial Mean Std. Error 
1 471.574 15.257 
2 348.524 23.826 
3 299.852 25.229 
4 256.857 28.363 
5 283.238 25.492 
6 283.505 27.383 
7 241.767 28.182 
8 194.020 27.861 
9 180.501 26.852 
10 225.702 32.215 
11 203.860 28.647 
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12 216.247 31.697 
13 191.127 25.434 
14 182.031 28.569 
15 174.949 27.435 
 
 
Appendix 1.1.2: Latency to target One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
 
 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
trial Sphericity Assumed 181.203 14 12.943 13.107 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 181.203 5.147 35.207 13.107 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 181.203 7.142 25.371 13.107 .000 
Lower-bound 181.203 1.000 181.203 13.107 .002 
Error(trial) Sphericity Assumed 276.494 280 .987   
Greenhouse-Geisser 276.494 102.937 2.686   
Huynh-Feldt 276.494 142.844 1.936   
Lower-bound 276.494 20.000 13.825   
 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
2.423 .141 2.129 2.717 
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2. trial 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
trial Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 4.000 .000 4.000 4.000 
2 3.575 .191 3.177 3.972 
3 3.223 .251 2.699 3.747 
4 2.646 .278 2.066 3.226 
5 3.079 .272 2.511 3.647 
6 2.975 .263 2.427 3.524 
7 2.444 .296 1.827 3.060 
8 1.873 .275 1.300 2.446 
9 1.686 .235 1.196 2.175 
10 2.081 .286 1.485 2.676 
11 1.920 .265 1.367 2.473 
12 1.983 .288 1.383 2.584 
13 1.801 .264 1.251 2.351 
14 1.556 .237 1.061 2.051 
15 1.506 .242 1.002 2.010 
 
 
Appendix 1.2.1: Allocentric test 3 x 4 Within Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 582.931 2 291.466 1.245 .299 
Greenhouse-Geisser 582.931 1.439 405.147 1.245 .291 
Huynh-Feldt 582.931 1.520 383.479 1.245 .293 
Lower-bound 582.931 1.000 582.931 1.245 .278 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 9365.802 40 234.145   
Greenhouse-Geisser 9365.802 28.776 325.470   
Huynh-Feldt 9365.802 30.402 308.063   
Lower-bound 9365.802 20.000 468.290   
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quad Sphericity Assumed 111732.640 3 37244.213 90.939 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 111732.640 1.742 64140.375 90.939 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 111732.640 1.894 58990.582 90.939 .000 
Lower-bound 111732.640 1.000 111732.640 90.939 .000 
Error(quad) Sphericity Assumed 24572.983 60 409.550   
Greenhouse-Geisser 24572.983 34.840 705.309   
Huynh-Feldt 24572.983 37.882 648.680   
Lower-bound 24572.983 20.000 1228.649   
test * quad Sphericity Assumed 1128.305 6 188.051 .881 .511 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1128.305 3.340 337.832 .881 .465 
Huynh-Feldt 1128.305 4.090 275.883 .881 .481 
Lower-bound 1128.305 1.000 1128.305 .881 .359 
Error(test*quad) Sphericity Assumed 25604.874 120 213.374   
Greenhouse-Geisser 25604.874 66.797 383.325   
Huynh-Feldt 25604.874 81.796 313.034   
Lower-bound 25604.874 20.000 1280.244   
 
Appendix 1.2.2: Allocentric test planned contrasts 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source test quad 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad  Level 1 vs. 
Later 
41039.252 1 41039.252 122.346 .000 
Error(quad)  Level 1 vs. 
Later 
6708.720 20 335.436   
test * quad Level 1 vs. Later Level 1 vs. 
Later 
165.384 1 165.384 .205 .655 
Level 2 vs. Level 3 Level 1 vs. 
Later 
1402.969 1 1402.969 2.215 .152 
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Error(test*quad) Level 1 vs. Later Level 1 vs. 
Later 
16105.713 20 805.286   
Level 2 vs. Level 3 Level 1 vs. 
Later 
12667.926 20 633.396   
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
56.667 .959 54.667 58.667 
 
 
2. test 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 57.810 2.221 53.177 62.443 
2 57.673 1.528 54.485 60.861 
3 54.517 1.031 52.367 56.668 
 
 
3. quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 23.512 2.569 18.152 28.871 
2 61.644 2.202 57.050 66.237 
3 81.992 2.678 76.406 87.578 
4 59.520 2.135 55.067 63.973 
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4. test * quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 26.058 3.361 19.048 33.069 
2 64.277 3.462 57.056 71.499 
3 81.643 5.224 70.745 92.540 
4 59.263 3.413 52.143 66.383 
2 1 20.751 2.795 14.921 26.581 
2 64.668 3.219 57.953 71.382 
3 85.220 3.651 77.604 92.835 
4 60.053 2.452 54.938 65.168 
3 1 23.726 3.790 15.819 31.632 
2 55.986 3.784 48.094 63.879 
3 79.113 2.809 73.254 84.973 
4 59.244 4.060 50.774 67.714 
 
Appendix 1.2.3: Egocentric test 3 x 4 Within Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
test1_targ 57.3433 33.56404 21 
test1_NW 61.7187 30.61617 21 
test1_NE 64.7620 27.74645 21 
test1_SE 62.4810 30.33827 21 
test2_targ 51.2409 33.17380 21 
test2_NW 52.1783 16.94416 21 
test2_NE 68.8881 33.71750 21 
test2_SE 77.3668 23.37556 21 
test3_targ 27.4871 25.82779 21 
test3_NW 55.0716 16.13332 21 
test3_NE 85.7127 18.69781 21 
test3_SE 70.9808 22.78043 21 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 296.980 2 148.490 .406 .669 
Greenhouse-Geisser 296.980 1.926 154.218 .406 .662 
Huynh-Feldt 296.980 2.000 148.490 .406 .669 
Lower-bound 296.980 1.000 296.980 .406 .531 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 14639.917 40 365.998   
Greenhouse-Geisser 14639.917 38.514 380.115   
Huynh-Feldt 14639.917 40.000 365.998   
Lower-bound 14639.917 20.000 731.996   
quad Sphericity Assumed 31452.722 3 10484.241 8.509 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 31452.722 1.829 17192.187 8.509 .001 
Huynh-Feldt 31452.722 2.004 15692.685 8.509 .001 
Lower-bound 31452.722 1.000 31452.722 8.509 .009 
Error(quad) Sphericity Assumed 73925.051 60 1232.084   
Greenhouse-Geisser 73925.051 36.590 2020.387   
Huynh-Feldt 73925.051 40.086 1844.169   
Lower-bound 73925.051 20.000 3696.253   
test * quad Sphericity Assumed 18673.608 6 3112.268 4.966 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 18673.608 3.068 6085.975 4.966 .004 
Huynh-Feldt 18673.608 3.687 5064.134 4.966 .002 
Lower-bound 18673.608 1.000 18673.608 4.966 .037 
Error(test*quad) Sphericity Assumed 75198.839 120 626.657   
Greenhouse-Geisser 75198.839 61.366 1225.415   
Huynh-Feldt 75198.839 73.748 1019.666   
Lower-bound 75198.839 20.000 3759.942   
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Appendix 1.2.4: Egocentric test planned contrasts 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source test quad 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad  Level 1 vs. Later 9452.697 1 9452.697 11.015 .003 
Error(quad)  Level 1 vs. Later 17162.548 20 858.127   
test * quad Level 1 vs. Later Level 1 vs. Later 11457.907 1 11457.907 7.913 .011 
Level 2 vs. Level 
3 
Level 1 vs. Later 16697.379 1 16697.379 9.627 .006 
Error(test*quad) Level 1 vs. Later Level 1 vs. Later 28960.564 20 1448.028   
Level 2 vs. Level 
3 
Level 1 vs. Later 34689.532 20 1734.477   
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
61.269 1.310 58.536 64.003 
 
2. test 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 61.576 2.136 57.121 66.032 
2 62.419 2.131 57.974 66.863 
3 59.813 2.183 55.260 64.366 
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3. quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 45.357 5.381 34.133 56.581 
2 56.323 2.947 50.175 62.471 
3 73.121 3.863 65.062 81.180 
4 70.276 3.602 62.763 77.790 
 
4. test * quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 57.343 7.324 42.065 72.621 
2 61.719 6.681 47.782 75.655 
3 64.762 6.055 52.132 77.392 
4 62.481 6.620 48.671 76.291 
2 1 51.241 7.239 36.140 66.341 
2 52.178 3.698 44.465 59.891 
3 68.888 7.358 53.540 84.236 
4 77.367 5.101 66.726 88.007 
3 1 27.487 5.636 15.730 39.244 
2 55.072 3.521 47.728 62.415 
3 85.713 4.080 77.202 94.224 
4 70.981 4.971 60.611 81.350 
 
Appendix 1.2.5: Allocentric test One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
test1_targ 26.0583 15.40180 21 
test2_targ 20.7510 12.80754 21 
test3_targ 23.7258 17.36909 21 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 297.209 2 148.605 1.035 .364 
Greenhouse-Geisser 297.209 1.936 153.515 1.035 .363 
Huynh-Feldt 297.209 2.000 148.605 1.035 .364 
Lower-bound 297.209 1.000 297.209 1.035 .321 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 5741.913 40 143.548   
Greenhouse-Geisser 5741.913 38.721 148.291   
Huynh-Feldt 5741.913 40.000 143.548   
Lower-bound 5741.913 20.000 287.096   
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
23.512 2.569 18.152 28.871 
 
2. test 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 26.058 3.361 19.048 33.069 
2 20.751 2.795 14.921 26.581 
3 23.726 3.790 15.819 31.632 
 
Appendix 1.2.6: Egocentric Test One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
test1_targ 57.3433 33.56404 21 
test2_targ 51.2409 33.17380 21 
test3_targ 27.4871 25.82779 21 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 10450.069 2 5225.035 9.766 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 10450.069 1.496 6986.975 9.766 .001 
Huynh-Feldt 10450.069 1.589 6575.335 9.766 .001 
Lower-bound 10450.069 1.000 10450.069 9.766 .005 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 21400.275 40 535.007   
Greenhouse-Geisser 21400.275 29.913 715.417   
Huynh-Feldt 21400.275 31.786 673.268   
Lower-bound 21400.275 20.000 1070.014   
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
45.357 5.381 34.133 56.581 
 
2. test 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 57.343 7.324 42.065 72.621 
2 51.241 7.239 36.140 66.341 
3 27.487 5.636 15.730 39.244 
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Appendix 1.3.1: Paired samples t-test comparing bin 0 frequency 
 
T-Test 
 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 block1_bin0 71.7619 21 12.58930 2.74721 
block3_bin0 116.2381 21 23.47319 5.12227 
 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired Differences 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 block1_bin0 - 
block3_bin0 
-44.47619 25.91065 5.65417 -56.27058 -32.68180 -7.866 20 .000 
 
Appendix 1.3.2: Bin percentage 2 x 5 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
block1_pbin1 71.1766 7.82209 21 
block1_pbin2 18.4790 8.36266 21 
block1_pbin3 7.6276 4.41562 21 
block1_pbin4 2.1744 2.71527 21 
block1_pbin5 .5425 1.58158 21 
block3_pbin1 36.4230 22.71708 21 
block3_pbin2 16.8558 14.42572 21 
block3_pbin3 10.8982 11.68272 21 
block3_pbin4 9.4463 11.66878 21 
block3_pbin5 26.3767 37.86867 21 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
block Sphericity Assumed .000 1 .000 . . 
Greenhouse-Geisser .000 . . . . 
Huynh-Feldt .000 . . . . 
Lower-bound .000 1.000 .000 . . 
Error(block) Sphericity Assumed .000 20 .000   
Greenhouse-Geisser .000 . .   
Huynh-Feldt .000 . .   
Lower-bound .000 20.000 .000   
bin Sphericity Assumed 63305.724 4 15826.431 46.979 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 63305.724 1.776 35655.036 46.979 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 63305.724 1.936 32696.456 46.979 .000 
Lower-bound 63305.724 1.000 63305.724 46.979 .000 
Error(bin) Sphericity Assumed 26950.617 80 336.883   
Greenhouse-Geisser 26950.617 35.510 758.956   
Huynh-Feldt 26950.617 38.723 695.979   
Lower-bound 26950.617 20.000 1347.531   
block * bin Sphericity Assumed 20385.072 4 5096.268 16.389 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 20385.072 1.518 13431.042 16.389 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 20385.072 1.616 12612.153 16.389 .000 
Lower-bound 20385.072 1.000 20385.072 16.389 .001 
Error(block*bin) Sphericity Assumed 24876.197 80 310.952   
Greenhouse-Geisser 24876.197 30.355 819.505   
Huynh-Feldt 24876.197 32.326 769.540   
Lower-bound 24876.197 20.000 1243.810   
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
20.000 .000 20.000 20.000 
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3. bin 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
bin Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 53.800 2.823 47.912 59.688 
2 17.667 1.994 13.507 21.828 
3 9.263 1.375 6.395 12.131 
4 5.810 1.216 3.275 8.346 
5 13.460 4.095 4.917 22.002 
 
 
4. block * bin 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
block bin Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 71.177 1.707 67.616 74.737 
2 18.479 1.825 14.672 22.286 
3 7.628 .964 5.618 9.638 
4 2.174 .593 .938 3.410 
5 .542 .345 -.177 1.262 
2 1 36.423 4.957 26.082 46.764 
2 16.856 3.148 10.289 23.422 
3 10.898 2.549 5.580 16.216 
4 9.446 2.546 4.135 14.758 
5 26.377 8.264 9.139 43.614 
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Appendix 2.1.1: Distance travelled One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
trial Sphericity Assumed 830325.147 14 59308.939 4.215 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 830325.147 6.295 131909.262 4.215 .001 
Huynh-Feldt 830325.147 12.844 64645.355 4.215 .000 
Lower-bound 830325.147 1.000 830325.147 4.215 .061 
Error(trial) Sphericity Assumed 2560973.420 182 14071.283   
Greenhouse-Geisser 2560973.420 81.831 31295.999   
Huynh-Feldt 2560973.420 166.976 15337.369   
Lower-bound 2560973.420 13.000 196997.955   
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
324.098 13.664 294.578 353.619 
 
2. trial 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
trial Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 472.579 20.154 429.040 516.119 
2 404.556 25.483 349.504 459.609 
3 376.228 31.265 308.684 443.772 
4 371.811 27.813 311.724 431.898 
5 369.235 35.112 293.379 445.091 
6 296.319 29.177 233.286 359.352 
7 351.741 36.548 272.785 430.698 
8 285.502 33.093 214.009 356.995 
9 245.139 30.982 178.207 312.071 
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10 280.610 42.293 189.241 371.979 
11 294.515 40.105 207.874 381.156 
12 305.947 37.141 225.708 386.186 
13 288.516 38.824 204.641 372.391 
14 289.057 39.307 204.139 373.974 
15 229.719 27.596 170.102 289.336 
 
Appendix 2.1.2: Latency to target One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
trial Sphericity Assumed 71.364 14 5.097 5.284 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 71.364 6.103 11.694 5.284 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 71.364 12.097 5.899 5.284 .000 
Lower-bound 71.364 1.000 71.364 5.284 .039 
Error(trial) Sphericity Assumed 175.588 182 .965   
Greenhouse-Geisser 175.588 79.336 2.213   
Huynh-Feldt 175.588 157.266 1.117   
Lower-bound 175.588 13.000 13.507   
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
2.861 .131 2.578 3.145 
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2. trial 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
trial Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 3.791 .158 3.449 4.132 
2 3.769 .158 3.428 4.110 
3 3.606 .268 3.026 4.185 
4 3.495 .237 2.984 4.006 
5 3.313 .280 2.709 3.917 
6 2.780 .294 2.144 3.415 
7 3.096 .287 2.477 3.715 
8 2.572 .302 1.920 3.224 
9 2.152 .276 1.556 2.749 
10 2.393 .363 1.609 3.177 
11 2.510 .340 1.776 3.245 
12 2.601 .309 1.934 3.268 
13 2.466 .330 1.752 3.180 
14 2.442 .337 1.715 3.169 
15 1.934 .257 1.380 2.489 
 
 
Appendix 2.2.1: Allocentric-n test 2 x 4 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
test1_targ 25.2883 13.62127 14 
test1_NW 68.6751 14.21056 14 
test1_NE 88.4604 20.84184 14 
test1_SE 61.3708 19.96757 14 
test2_targ 22.7194 10.46145 14 
test2_NW 71.5954 16.40477 14 
test2_NE 97.5564 19.42674 14 
test2_SE 69.6622 16.63221 14 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 550.676 1 550.676 .799 .388 
Greenhouse-Geisser 550.676 1.000 550.676 .799 .388 
Huynh-Feldt 550.676 1.000 550.676 .799 .388 
Lower-bound 550.676 1.000 550.676 .799 .388 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 8956.943 13 688.996   
Greenhouse-Geisser 8956.943 13.000 688.996   
Huynh-Feldt 8956.943 13.000 688.996   
Lower-bound 8956.943 13.000 688.996   
quad Sphericity Assumed 69393.491 3 23131.164 104.022 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 69393.491 1.659 41828.119 104.022 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 69393.491 1.872 37076.347 104.022 .000 
Lower-bound 69393.491 1.000 69393.491 104.022 .000 
Error(quad) Sphericity Assumed 8672.391 39 222.369   
Greenhouse-Geisser 8672.391 21.567 402.110   
Huynh-Feldt 8672.391 24.331 356.430   
Lower-bound 8672.391 13.000 667.107   
test * quad Sphericity Assumed 615.617 3 205.206 1.549 .217 
Greenhouse-Geisser 615.617 1.393 441.836 1.549 .237 
Huynh-Feldt 615.617 1.508 408.152 1.549 .236 
Lower-bound 615.617 1.000 615.617 1.549 .235 
Error(test*quad) Sphericity Assumed 5165.470 39 132.448   
Greenhouse-Geisser 5165.470 18.113 285.179   
Huynh-Feldt 5165.470 19.608 263.438   
Lower-bound 5165.470 13.000 397.344   
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Appendix 2.2.2: Allocentric-n planned contrasts 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source test quad 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad  Level 1 vs. Later 38171.450 1 38171.450 212.627 .000 
Error(quad)  Level 1 vs. Later 2333.794 13 179.523   
test * quad Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 1220.802 1 1220.802 1.724 .212 
Error(test*quad
) 
Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 9204.501 13 708.039   
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
63.166 2.112 58.603 67.729 
 
2. test 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 60.949 2.854 54.783 67.114 
2 65.383 3.617 57.569 73.197 
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3. quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 24.004 2.964 17.600 30.408 
2 70.135 3.222 63.175 77.095 
3 93.008 3.155 86.191 99.825 
4 65.516 3.543 57.863 73.170 
 
4. test * quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 25.288 3.640 17.424 33.153 
2 68.675 3.798 60.470 76.880 
3 88.460 5.570 76.427 100.494 
4 61.371 5.337 49.842 72.900 
2 1 22.719 2.796 16.679 28.760 
2 71.595 4.384 62.124 81.067 
3 97.556 5.192 86.340 108.773 
4 69.662 4.445 60.059 79.265 
 
 
Appendix 2.2.3: Allocentric-r test 2 x 4 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
test1_targ 60.4516 27.07287 14 
test1_NW 65.9498 24.46107 14 
test1_NE 65.2813 34.84299 14 
test1_SE 59.7125 36.73969 14 
test2_targ 75.0855 45.44000 14 
test2_NW 93.0454 32.55254 14 
test2_NE 86.9881 31.34515 14 
test2_SE 71.9953 36.09305 14 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 10033.411 1 10033.411 30.781 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 10033.411 1.000 10033.411 30.781 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 10033.411 1.000 10033.411 30.781 .000 
Lower-bound 10033.411 1.000 10033.411 30.781 .000 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 4237.509 13 325.962   
Greenhouse-Geisser 4237.509 13.000 325.962   
Huynh-Feldt 4237.509 13.000 325.962   
Lower-bound 4237.509 13.000 325.962   
quad Sphericity Assumed 3600.698 3 1200.233 1.114 .355 
Greenhouse-Geisser 3600.698 1.715 2099.720 1.114 .338 
Huynh-Feldt 3600.698 1.950 1846.360 1.114 .343 
Lower-bound 3600.698 1.000 3600.698 1.114 .311 
Error(quad) Sphericity Assumed 42035.689 39 1077.838   
Greenhouse-Geisser 42035.689 22.293 1885.600   
Huynh-Feldt 42035.689 25.352 1658.077   
Lower-bound 42035.689 13.000 3233.515   
test * quad Sphericity Assumed 959.201 3 319.734 .288 .834 
Greenhouse-Geisser 959.201 1.520 631.205 .288 .693 
Huynh-Feldt 959.201 1.679 571.312 .288 .715 
Lower-bound 959.201 1.000 959.201 .288 .601 
Error(test*quad) Sphericity Assumed 43355.323 39 1111.675   
Greenhouse-Geisser 43355.323 19.755 2194.624   
Huynh-Feldt 43355.323 21.826 1986.385   
Lower-bound 43355.323 13.000 3335.025   
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Appendix 2.2.4: Allocentric-r planned contrasts (target vs. rest) 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source test quad 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad  Level 1 vs. Later 514.163 1 514.163 .562 .467 
Error(quad)  Level 1 vs. Later 11885.983 13 914.306   
test * quad Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 459.315 1 459.315 .139 .715 
Error(test*quad
) 
Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 42961.844 13 3304.757   
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
72.314 4.639 62.292 82.336 
 
 
2. test 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 62.849 3.839 54.555 71.143 
2 81.779 5.841 69.159 94.398 
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3. quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 67.769 7.857 50.794 84.743 
2 79.498 5.549 67.510 91.485 
3 76.135 7.200 60.580 91.689 
4 65.854 7.563 49.516 82.192 
 
4. test * quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 60.452 7.236 44.820 76.083 
2 65.950 6.537 51.826 80.073 
3 65.281 9.312 45.164 85.399 
4 59.712 9.819 38.500 80.925 
2 1 75.085 12.144 48.849 101.322 
2 93.045 8.700 74.250 111.841 
3 86.988 8.377 68.890 105.086 
4 71.995 9.646 51.156 92.835 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
184 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2.2.5: Allocentric-r test planned contrast: SE vs. rest 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source test quad 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad  Level 1 vs. Later 1038.589 1 1038.589 1.769 .206 
Error(quad)  Level 1 vs. Later 7631.162 13 587.012   
test * quad Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 1099.633 1 1099.633 .327 .577 
Error(test*quad
) 
Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 43721.954 13 3363.227   
 
Appendix 2.2.6: Allocentric-n test One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 46.192 1 46.192 .943 .349 
Greenhouse-Geisser 46.192 1.000 46.192 .943 .349 
Huynh-Feldt 46.192 1.000 46.192 .943 .349 
Lower-bound 46.192 1.000 46.192 .943 .349 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 636.485 13 48.960   
Greenhouse-Geisser 636.485 13.000 48.960   
Huynh-Feldt 636.485 13.000 48.960   
Lower-bound 636.485 13.000 48.960   
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Appendix 2.2.7: Allocentric-r One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 1499.054 1 1499.054 1.402 .258 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1499.054 1.000 1499.054 1.402 .258 
Huynh-Feldt 1499.054 1.000 1499.054 1.402 .258 
Lower-bound 1499.054 1.000 1499.054 1.402 .258 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 13897.461 13 1069.035   
Greenhouse-Geisser 13897.461 13.000 1069.035   
Huynh-Feldt 13897.461 13.000 1069.035   
Lower-bound 13897.461 13.000 1069.035   
 
Appendix 2.2.8: Allocentric-n vs. Allocentric-r 2 x 2 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
 
 
General Linear Model 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 26814.877 1 26814.877 32.822 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 26814.877 1.000 26814.877 32.822 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 26814.877 1.000 26814.877 32.822 .000 
Lower-bound 26814.877 1.000 26814.877 32.822 .000 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 10620.783 13 816.983   
Greenhouse-Geisser 10620.783 13.000 816.983   
Huynh-Feldt 10620.783 13.000 816.983   
Lower-bound 10620.783 13.000 816.983   
time Sphericity Assumed 509.479 1 509.479 .967 .343 
Greenhouse-Geisser 509.479 1.000 509.479 .967 .343 
Huynh-Feldt 509.479 1.000 509.479 .967 .343 
Lower-bound 509.479 1.000 509.479 .967 .343 
Error(time) Sphericity Assumed 6848.602 13 526.816   
Greenhouse-Geisser 6848.602 13.000 526.816   
Huynh-Feldt 6848.602 13.000 526.816   
Lower-bound 6848.602 13.000 526.816   
test * time Sphericity Assumed 1035.766 1 1035.766 1.752 .208 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1035.766 1.000 1035.766 1.752 .208 
Huynh-Feldt 1035.766 1.000 1035.766 1.752 .208 
Lower-bound 1035.766 1.000 1035.766 1.752 .208 
Error(test*time) Sphericity Assumed 7685.344 13 591.180   
Greenhouse-Geisser 7685.344 13.000 591.180   
Huynh-Feldt 7685.344 13.000 591.180   
Lower-bound 7685.344 13.000 591.180   
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Appendix 2.3.1: Egocentric-p test 2 x 2 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
General Linear Model 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
tloc_time1 94.4090 73.40311 14 
tloc_time2 74.9976 24.25174 14 
ploc_time1 152.4058 87.42194 14 
ploc_time2 120.2400 44.82236 14 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
loc Sphericity Assumed 37304.221 1 37304.221 37.544 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 37304.221 1.000 37304.221 37.544 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 37304.221 1.000 37304.221 37.544 .000 
Lower-bound 37304.221 1.000 37304.221 37.544 .000 
Error(loc) Sphericity Assumed 12917.027 13 993.617   
Greenhouse-Geisser 12917.027 13.000 993.617   
Huynh-Feldt 12917.027 13.000 993.617   
Lower-bound 12917.027 13.000 993.617   
time Sphericity Assumed 9310.725 1 9310.725 1.683 .217 
Greenhouse-Geisser 9310.725 1.000 9310.725 1.683 .217 
Huynh-Feldt 9310.725 1.000 9310.725 1.683 .217 
Lower-bound 9310.725 1.000 9310.725 1.683 .217 
Error(time) Sphericity Assumed 71914.018 13 5531.848   
Greenhouse-Geisser 71914.018 13.000 5531.848   
Huynh-Feldt 71914.018 13.000 5531.848   
Lower-bound 71914.018 13.000 5531.848   
loc * time Sphericity Assumed 569.367 1 569.367 .661 .431 
Greenhouse-Geisser 569.367 1.000 569.367 .661 .431 
Huynh-Feldt 569.367 1.000 569.367 .661 .431 
Lower-bound 569.367 1.000 569.367 .661 .431 
Error(loc*time) Sphericity Assumed 11198.768 13 861.444   
Greenhouse-Geisser 11198.768 13.000 861.444   
Huynh-Feldt 11198.768 13.000 861.444   
188 
 
Lower-bound 11198.768 13.000 861.444   
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
110.513 12.131 84.306 136.720 
 
2. time 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
time Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 123.407 20.912 78.231 168.584 
2 97.619 7.389 81.657 113.581 
 
Appendix 2.3.2: Egocentric-np test 2 x 4 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
test1_targ 83.9745 45.17150 14 
test1_NW 60.1412 32.39268 14 
test1_NE 95.4191 32.20588 14 
test1_SE 115.4601 34.29331 14 
test2_targ 62.4386 36.63008 14 
test2_NW 64.6432 25.01153 14 
test2_NE 89.0900 41.30964 14 
test2_SE 93.4828 35.45775 14 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 3597.545 1 3597.545 1.151 .303 
Greenhouse-Geisser 3597.545 1.000 3597.545 1.151 .303 
Huynh-Feldt 3597.545 1.000 3597.545 1.151 .303 
Lower-bound 3597.545 1.000 3597.545 1.151 .303 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 40619.315 13 3124.563   
Greenhouse-Geisser 40619.315 13.000 3124.563   
Huynh-Feldt 40619.315 13.000 3124.563   
Lower-bound 40619.315 13.000 3124.563   
quad Sphericity Assumed 29882.618 3 9960.873 9.807 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 29882.618 1.557 19197.462 9.807 .002 
Huynh-Feldt 29882.618 1.730 17277.384 9.807 .001 
Lower-bound 29882.618 1.000 29882.618 9.807 .008 
Error(quad) Sphericity Assumed 39610.989 39 1015.666   
Greenhouse-Geisser 39610.989 20.236 1957.481   
Huynh-Feldt 39610.989 22.485 1761.699   
Lower-bound 39610.989 13.000 3046.999   
test * quad Sphericity Assumed 3452.335 3 1150.778 1.613 .202 
Greenhouse-Geisser 3452.335 1.858 1858.089 1.613 .221 
Huynh-Feldt 3452.335 2.155 1601.942 1.613 .216 
Lower-bound 3452.335 1.000 3452.335 1.613 .226 
Error(test*quad) Sphericity Assumed 27819.491 39 713.320   
Greenhouse-Geisser 27819.491 24.154 1151.753   
Huynh-Feldt 27819.491 28.016 992.978   
Lower-bound 27819.491 13.000 2139.961   
 
 
 
 
 
190 
 
Appendix 2.3.3: Egocentric-np test planned contrasts 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source test quad 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad  Level 1 vs. Later 2426.876 1 2426.876 2.197 .162 
Error(quad)  Level 1 vs. Later 14359.678 13 1104.591   
test * quad Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 2589.899 1 2589.899 1.202 .293 
Error(test*quad
) 
Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 28012.575 13 2154.813   
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
83.081 4.143 74.130 92.032 
 
 
2. test 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 88.749 7.481 72.586 104.911 
2 77.414 5.844 64.788 90.040 
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3. quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 73.207 8.968 53.833 92.580 
2 62.392 6.518 48.311 76.473 
3 92.255 5.763 79.805 104.704 
4 104.471 4.623 94.484 114.459 
 
4. test * quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 83.975 12.073 57.893 110.056 
2 60.141 8.657 41.438 78.844 
3 95.419 8.607 76.824 114.014 
4 115.460 9.165 95.660 135.260 
2 1 62.439 9.790 41.289 83.588 
2 64.643 6.685 50.202 79.084 
3 89.090 11.040 65.239 112.942 
4 93.483 9.476 73.010 113.956 
 
Appendix 2.3.4: Egocentric-np test One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 3246.587 1 3246.587 2.872 .114 
Greenhouse-Geisser 3246.587 1.000 3246.587 2.872 .114 
Huynh-Feldt 3246.587 1.000 3246.587 2.872 .114 
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Lower-bound 3246.587 1.000 3246.587 2.872 .114 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 14695.101 13 1130.392   
Greenhouse-Geisser 14695.101 13.000 1130.392   
Huynh-Feldt 14695.101 13.000 1130.392   
Lower-bound 14695.101 13.000 1130.392   
Appendix 2.3.5: Egocentric-p vs. Egocentric-np 2 x 2 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 1850.439 1 1850.439 .608 .450 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1850.439 1.000 1850.439 .608 .450 
Huynh-Feldt 1850.439 1.000 1850.439 .608 .450 
Lower-bound 1850.439 1.000 1850.439 .608 .450 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 39572.724 13 3044.056   
Greenhouse-Geisser 39572.724 13.000 3044.056   
Huynh-Feldt 39572.724 13.000 3044.056   
Lower-bound 39572.724 13.000 3044.056   
time Sphericity Assumed 5868.396 1 5868.396 4.339 .058 
Greenhouse-Geisser 5868.396 1.000 5868.396 4.339 .058 
Huynh-Feldt 5868.396 1.000 5868.396 4.339 .058 
Lower-bound 5868.396 1.000 5868.396 4.339 .058 
Error(time) Sphericity Assumed 17581.022 13 1352.386   
Greenhouse-Geisser 17581.022 13.000 1352.386   
Huynh-Feldt 17581.022 13.000 1352.386   
Lower-bound 17581.022 13.000 1352.386   
test * time Sphericity Assumed 15.799 1 15.799 .009 .928 
Greenhouse-Geisser 15.799 1.000 15.799 .009 .928 
Huynh-Feldt 15.799 1.000 15.799 .009 .928 
Lower-bound 15.799 1.000 15.799 .009 .928 
Error(test*time) Sphericity Assumed 23867.115 13 1835.932   
Greenhouse-Geisser 23867.115 13.000 1835.932   
Huynh-Feldt 23867.115 13.000 1835.932   
Lower-bound 23867.115 13.000 1835.932   
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Appendix 2.4.1: Paired samples t-test comparing bin 0 frequency 
 
T-Test 
 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 block1_bin0 64.5000 14 17.02826 4.55099 
block3_bin0 105.7143 14 19.26507 5.14881 
 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired Differences 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 block1_bin0 - 
block3_bin0 
-41.21429 20.08129 5.36695 -52.80888 -29.61969 -7.679 13 .000 
 
 
Appendix 2.4.2: Bin percentage 2 x 5 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
block1_pbin1 58.5571 12.73348 14 
block1_pbin2 27.1428 10.56792 14 
block1_pbin3 10.1702 8.15485 14 
block1_pbin4 2.2101 3.60438 14 
block1_pbin5 1.9198 1.13965 14 
block3_pbin1 38.7720 17.40314 14 
block3_pbin2 22.9684 18.58581 14 
block3_pbin3 13.4414 10.74321 14 
block3_pbin4 8.4041 10.33227 14 
block3_pbin5 16.4142 27.28757 14 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
block Sphericity Assumed .000 1 .000 . . 
Greenhouse-Geisser .000 . . . . 
Huynh-Feldt .000 . . . . 
Lower-bound .000 1.000 .000 . . 
Error(block) Sphericity Assumed .000 13 .000   
Greenhouse-Geisser .000 . .   
Huynh-Feldt .000 . .   
Lower-bound .000 13.000 .000   
bin Sphericity Assumed 34932.625 4 8733.156 36.212 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 34932.625 2.236 15623.668 36.212 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 34932.625 2.722 12832.405 36.212 .000 
Lower-bound 34932.625 1.000 34932.625 36.212 .000 
Error(bin) Sphericity Assumed 12540.740 52 241.168   
Greenhouse-Geisser 12540.740 29.066 431.451   
Huynh-Feldt 12540.740 35.389 354.370   
Lower-bound 12540.740 13.000 964.672   
block * bin Sphericity Assumed 4676.211 4 1169.053 4.653 .003 
Greenhouse-Geisser 4676.211 2.536 1844.111 4.653 .011 
Huynh-Feldt 4676.211 3.201 1460.663 4.653 .006 
Lower-bound 4676.211 1.000 4676.211 4.653 .050 
Error(block*bin) Sphericity Assumed 13065.356 52 251.257   
Greenhouse-Geisser 13065.356 32.965 396.343   
Huynh-Feldt 13065.356 41.619 313.931   
Lower-bound 13065.356 13.000 1005.027   
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
20.000 .000 20.000 20.000 
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2. block 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
block Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 20.000 .000 20.000 20.000 
2 20.000 .000 20.000 20.000 
 
 
3. bin 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
bin Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 48.665 2.887 42.427 54.902 
2 25.056 2.683 19.259 30.852 
3 11.806 1.663 8.214 15.397 
4 5.307 1.436 2.204 8.410 
5 9.167 3.754 1.057 17.277 
 
 
4. block * bin 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
block bin Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 58.557 3.403 51.205 65.909 
2 27.143 2.824 21.041 33.245 
3 10.170 2.179 5.462 14.879 
4 2.210 .963 .129 4.291 
5 1.920 .305 1.262 2.578 
2 1 38.772 4.651 28.724 48.820 
2 22.968 4.967 12.237 33.699 
3 13.441 2.871 7.238 19.644 
4 8.404 2.761 2.438 14.370 
5 16.414 7.293 .659 32.170 
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Appendix 3.1.1: Distance travelled One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
trial Sphericity Assumed 1115845.460 14 79703.247 4.573 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1115845.460 6.361 175424.476 4.573 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 1115845.460 14.000 79703.247 4.573 .000 
Lower-bound 1115845.460 1.000 1115845.460 4.573 .054 
Error(trial) Sphericity Assumed 2927846.728 168 17427.659   
Greenhouse-Geisser 2927846.728 76.330 38357.759   
Huynh-Feldt 2927846.728 168.000 17427.659   
Lower-bound 2927846.728 12.000 243987.227   
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
263.189 17.234 225.639 300.738 
 
2. trial 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
trial Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 439.289 38.621 355.141 523.437 
2 347.987 46.056 247.641 448.333 
3 312.620 43.267 218.349 406.891 
4 334.582 34.030 260.436 408.728 
5 315.353 34.945 239.213 391.492 
6 282.569 42.957 188.973 376.164 
7 289.118 45.814 189.298 388.938 
8 257.422 42.380 165.085 349.760 
9 199.785 35.964 121.425 278.144 
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10 218.930 42.252 126.870 310.990 
11 170.472 32.498 99.664 241.280 
12 154.053 28.415 92.142 215.964 
13 203.851 39.042 118.785 288.917 
14 190.722 34.436 115.693 265.752 
15 231.076 44.347 134.453 327.699 
 
Appendix 3.1.2: Latency to target One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
trial Sphericity Assumed 85.591 14 6.114 4.615 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 85.591 6.562 13.044 4.615 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 85.591 14.000 6.114 4.615 .000 
Lower-bound 85.591 1.000 85.591 4.615 .053 
Error(trial) Sphericity Assumed 222.543 168 1.325   
Greenhouse-Geisser 222.543 78.743 2.826   
Huynh-Feldt 222.543 168.000 1.325   
Lower-bound 222.543 12.000 18.545   
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
2.432 .161 2.082 2.782 
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2. trial 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
trial Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 3.580 .275 2.981 4.179 
2 3.162 .368 2.360 3.965 
3 3.002 .381 2.173 3.831 
4 3.266 .338 2.530 4.001 
5 3.087 .329 2.371 3.803 
6 2.703 .369 1.900 3.506 
7 2.701 .384 1.864 3.537 
8 2.381 .370 1.575 3.187 
9 1.911 .360 1.126 2.696 
10 2.050 .362 1.261 2.839 
11 1.658 .332 .936 2.381 
12 1.382 .266 .803 1.961 
13 1.846 .350 1.083 2.609 
14 1.708 .302 1.050 2.366 
15 2.045 .400 1.174 2.917 
 
 
Appendix 3.2.1: Allocentric-n test 2 x 4 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
test1_targ 29.6720 20.19950 13 
test1_NW 62.5799 29.88680 13 
test1_NE 92.4644 28.20773 13 
test1_SE 73.4964 20.78322 13 
test2_targ 35.7918 20.98129 13 
test2_NW 72.6568 24.92168 13 
test2_NE 94.4634 29.83483 13 
test2_SE 70.6598 25.22283 13 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 383.346 1 383.346 .351 .565 
Greenhouse-Geisser 383.346 1.000 383.346 .351 .565 
Huynh-Feldt 383.346 1.000 383.346 .351 .565 
Lower-bound 383.346 1.000 383.346 .351 .565 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 13122.930 12 1093.577   
Greenhouse-Geisser 13122.930 12.000 1093.577   
Huynh-Feldt 13122.930 12.000 1093.577   
Lower-bound 13122.930 12.000 1093.577   
quad Sphericity Assumed 49392.266 3 16464.089 36.918 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 49392.266 1.943 25425.872 36.918 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 49392.266 2.312 21362.453 36.918 .000 
Lower-bound 49392.266 1.000 49392.266 36.918 .000 
Error(quad) Sphericity Assumed 16054.892 36 445.969   
Greenhouse-Geisser 16054.892 23.311 688.721   
Huynh-Feldt 16054.892 27.745 578.653   
Lower-bound 16054.892 12.000 1337.908   
test * quad Sphericity Assumed 598.413 3 199.471 .530 .665 
Greenhouse-Geisser 598.413 1.441 415.154 .530 .541 
Huynh-Feldt 598.413 1.585 377.476 .530 .556 
Lower-bound 598.413 1.000 598.413 .530 .481 
Error(test*quad) Sphericity Assumed 13558.480 36 376.624   
Greenhouse-Geisser 13558.480 17.297 783.859   
Huynh-Feldt 13558.480 19.024 712.719   
Lower-bound 13558.480 12.000 1129.873   
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Appendix 3.2.2: Allocentric-n planned contrasts 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source test quad 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad  Level 1 vs. Later 26311.261 1 26311.261 83.877 .000 
Error(quad)  Level 1 vs. Later 3764.276 12 313.690   
test * quad Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 120.144 1 120.144 .061 .809 
Error(test*quad
) 
Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 23602.748 12 1966.896   
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
66.473 3.867 58.048 74.898 
 
2. test 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 64.553 5.431 52.720 76.386 
2 68.393 4.631 58.304 78.482 
 
 
 
3. quad 
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Measure:   MEASURE_1   
quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 32.732 4.075 23.854 41.610 
2 67.618 6.742 52.929 82.308 
3 93.464 5.504 81.472 105.456 
4 72.078 4.349 62.602 81.554 
 
4. test * quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 29.672 5.602 17.466 41.878 
2 62.580 8.289 44.519 80.640 
3 92.464 7.823 75.419 109.510 
4 73.496 5.764 60.937 86.056 
2 1 35.792 5.819 23.113 48.471 
2 72.657 6.912 57.597 87.717 
3 94.463 8.275 76.434 112.492 
4 70.660 6.996 55.418 85.902 
 
Appendix 3.2.3: Allocentric-n One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
General Linear Model 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 243.440 1 243.440 .584 .459 
Greenhouse-Geisser 243.440 1.000 243.440 .584 .459 
Huynh-Feldt 243.440 1.000 243.440 .584 .459 
Lower-bound 243.440 1.000 243.440 .584 .459 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 4998.269 12 416.522   
Greenhouse-Geisser 4998.269 12.000 416.522   
Huynh-Feldt 4998.269 12.000 416.522   
Lower-bound 4998.269 12.000 416.522   
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Appendix 3.2.4: Allocentric-r 2 x 4 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
General Linear Model 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
test1_targ 54.4490 29.45902 13 
test1_NW 50.3134 25.79142 13 
test1_NE 60.0606 17.45600 13 
test1_SE 61.4029 28.28582 13 
test2_targ 76.6517 36.02591 13 
test2_NW 90.7023 29.62231 13 
test2_NE 58.6137 22.76419 13 
test2_SE 40.4271 18.50749 13 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 2622.005 1 2622.005 2.688 .127 
Greenhouse-Geisser 2622.005 1.000 2622.005 2.688 .127 
Huynh-Feldt 2622.005 1.000 2622.005 2.688 .127 
Lower-bound 2622.005 1.000 2622.005 2.688 .127 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 11705.046 12 975.421   
Greenhouse-Geisser 11705.046 12.000 975.421   
Huynh-Feldt 11705.046 12.000 975.421   
Lower-bound 11705.046 12.000 975.421   
quad Sphericity Assumed 5570.348 3 1856.783 3.418 .027 
Greenhouse-Geisser 5570.348 1.645 3386.674 3.418 .061 
Huynh-Feldt 5570.348 1.872 2976.039 3.418 .053 
Lower-bound 5570.348 1.000 5570.348 3.418 .089 
Error(quad) Sphericity Assumed 19559.364 36 543.316   
Greenhouse-Geisser 19559.364 19.737 990.979   
Huynh-Feldt 19559.364 22.461 870.823   
Lower-bound 19559.364 12.000 1629.947   
test * quad Sphericity Assumed 14058.937 3 4686.312 7.681 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 14058.937 1.818 7732.008 7.681 .004 
Huynh-Feldt 14058.937 2.125 6615.527 7.681 .002 
Lower-bound 14058.937 1.000 14058.937 7.681 .017 
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Error(test*quad) Sphericity Assumed 21964.466 36 610.124   
Greenhouse-Geisser 21964.466 21.819 1006.652   
Huynh-Feldt 21964.466 25.502 861.294   
Lower-bound 21964.466 12.000 1830.372   
 
Appendix 3.2.5: Allocentric-r planned contrasts (target vs. rest) 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source test quad 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad  Level 1 vs. Later 364.762 1 364.762 .699 .420 
Error(quad)  Level 1 vs. Later 6266.486 12 522.207   
test * quad Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 3417.573 1 3417.573 2.551 .136 
Error(test*quad
) 
Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 16074.974 12 1339.581   
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
61.578 3.450 54.060 69.095 
 
2. test 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 56.556 4.006 47.828 65.285 
2 66.599 5.150 55.378 77.819 
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3. quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 65.550 7.195 49.874 81.227 
2 70.508 4.744 60.171 80.845 
3 59.337 4.178 50.235 68.440 
4 50.915 4.311 41.522 60.308 
 
4. test * quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 54.449 8.170 36.647 72.251 
2 50.313 7.153 34.728 65.899 
3 60.061 4.841 49.512 70.609 
4 61.403 7.845 44.310 78.496 
2 1 76.652 9.992 54.881 98.422 
2 90.702 8.216 72.802 108.603 
3 58.614 6.314 44.857 72.370 
4 40.427 5.133 29.243 51.611 
Appendix 3.2.6: Allocentric-r planned contrasts (SE vs. rest) 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source test quad 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad  Level 1 vs. Later 2627.536 1 2627.536 13.450 .003 
Error(quad)  Level 1 vs. Later 2344.202 12 195.350   
test * quad Level 1 vs. Level 2 Level 1 vs. Later 22235.583 1 22235.583 10.955 .006 
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Error(test*quad Level 1 vs. Level 2 Level 1 vs. Later 24356.159 12 2029.680   
 
Appendix 3.2.7: Allocentric-r One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 3204.224 1 3204.224 3.909 .071 
Greenhouse-Geisser 3204.224 1.000 3204.224 3.909 .071 
Huynh-Feldt 3204.224 1.000 3204.224 3.909 .071 
Lower-bound 3204.224 1.000 3204.224 3.909 .071 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 9837.430 12 819.786   
Greenhouse-Geisser 9837.430 12.000 819.786   
Huynh-Feldt 9837.430 12.000 819.786   
Lower-bound 9837.430 12.000 819.786   
 
Appendix 3.2.8: Allocentric-n vs. Allocentric-r 2 x 2 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 14001.690 1 14001.690 20.201 .001 
Greenhouse-Geisser 14001.690 1.000 14001.690 20.201 .001 
Huynh-Feldt 14001.690 1.000 14001.690 20.201 .001 
Lower-bound 14001.690 1.000 14001.690 20.201 .001 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 8317.291 12 693.108   
Greenhouse-Geisser 8317.291 12.000 693.108   
Huynh-Feldt 8317.291 12.000 693.108   
Lower-bound 8317.291 12.000 693.108   
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time Sphericity Assumed 2607.028 1 2607.028 3.299 .094 
Greenhouse-Geisser 2607.028 1.000 2607.028 3.299 .094 
Huynh-Feldt 2607.028 1.000 2607.028 3.299 .094 
Lower-bound 2607.028 1.000 2607.028 3.299 .094 
Error(time) Sphericity Assumed 9481.629 12 790.136   
Greenhouse-Geisser 9481.629 12.000 790.136   
Huynh-Feldt 9481.629 12.000 790.136   
Lower-bound 9481.629 12.000 790.136   
test * time Sphericity Assumed 840.635 1 840.635 1.884 .195 
Greenhouse-Geisser 840.635 1.000 840.635 1.884 .195 
Huynh-Feldt 840.635 1.000 840.635 1.884 .195 
Lower-bound 840.635 1.000 840.635 1.884 .195 
Error(test*time) Sphericity Assumed 5354.070 12 446.172   
Greenhouse-Geisser 5354.070 12.000 446.172   
Huynh-Feldt 5354.070 12.000 446.172   
Lower-bound 5354.070 12.000 446.172   
 
Appendix 3.3.1: Egocentric-p test 2 x 4 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
test1_targ 88.9533 40.64157 13 
test1_NW 65.2518 30.26210 13 
test1_NE 88.8245 46.56153 13 
test1_SE 112.0086 46.01753 13 
test2_targ 47.0434 42.82571 13 
test2_NW 64.1134 25.68021 13 
test2_NE 101.6828 39.35333 13 
test2_SE 94.0766 47.75717 13 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 3763.049 1 3763.049 .814 .385 
Greenhouse-Geisser 3763.049 1.000 3763.049 .814 .385 
Huynh-Feldt 3763.049 1.000 3763.049 .814 .385 
Lower-bound 3763.049 1.000 3763.049 .814 .385 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 55461.456 12 4621.788   
Greenhouse-Geisser 55461.456 12.000 4621.788   
Huynh-Feldt 55461.456 12.000 4621.788   
Lower-bound 55461.456 12.000 4621.788   
quad Sphericity Assumed 28916.513 3 9638.838 16.244 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 28916.513 2.026 14269.212 16.244 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 28916.513 2.441 11846.595 16.244 .000 
Lower-bound 28916.513 1.000 28916.513 16.244 .002 
Error(quad) Sphericity Assumed 21361.093 36 593.364   
Greenhouse-Geisser 21361.093 24.318 878.408   
Huynh-Feldt 21361.093 29.291 729.273   
Lower-bound 21361.093 12.000 1780.091   
test * quad Sphericity Assumed 10827.059 3 3609.020 4.045 .014 
Greenhouse-Geisser 10827.059 1.969 5497.533 4.045 .031 
Huynh-Feldt 10827.059 2.353 4601.228 4.045 .023 
Lower-bound 10827.059 1.000 10827.059 4.045 .067 
Error(test*quad) Sphericity Assumed 32123.281 36 892.313   
Greenhouse-Geisser 32123.281 23.633 1359.240   
Huynh-Feldt 32123.281 28.237 1137.632   
Lower-bound 32123.281 12.000 2676.940   
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Appendix 3.3.2: Egocentric-p test planned contrasts 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source test quad 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad  Level 1 vs. Later 5025.344 1 5025.344 12.290 .004 
Error(quad)  Level 1 vs. Later 4906.962 12 408.913   
test * quad Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 20633.168 1 20633.168 7.881 .016 
Error(test*quad
) 
Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 31416.183 12 2618.015   
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
82.744 6.277 69.069 96.420 
 
 
2. test 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 88.760 8.870 69.434 108.085 
2 76.729 9.434 56.174 97.284 
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3. quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 67.998 7.922 50.738 85.259 
2 64.683 6.771 49.931 79.435 
3 95.254 7.190 79.588 110.920 
4 103.043 8.109 85.375 120.711 
 
4. test * quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 88.953 11.272 64.394 113.513 
2 65.252 8.393 46.965 83.539 
3 88.824 12.914 60.688 116.961 
4 112.009 12.763 84.201 139.817 
2 1 47.043 11.878 21.164 72.923 
2 64.113 7.122 48.595 79.632 
3 101.683 10.915 77.902 125.464 
4 94.077 13.245 65.217 122.936 
 
Appendix 3.3.3: Egocentric-p test One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
 
 
 
General Linear Model 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 11416.877 1 11416.877 6.158 .029 
Greenhouse-Geisser 11416.877 1.000 11416.877 6.158 .029 
Huynh-Feldt 11416.877 1.000 11416.877 6.158 .029 
Lower-bound 11416.877 1.000 11416.877 6.158 .029 
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Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 22249.636 12 1854.136   
Greenhouse-Geisser 22249.636 12.000 1854.136   
Huynh-Feldt 22249.636 12.000 1854.136   
Lower-bound 22249.636 12.000 1854.136   
 
Appendix 3.3.4: Egocentric-np test 2 x 4 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
test1_targ 73.1265 45.37617 13 
test1_NW 55.3574 34.52964 13 
test1_NE 102.9203 40.12555 13 
test1_SE 114.4308 47.32598 13 
test2_targ 42.7403 18.92424 13 
test2_NW 53.6470 28.28886 13 
test2_NE 92.0213 28.41332 13 
test2_SE 84.6312 25.30972 13 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 8611.125 1 8611.125 4.366 .059 
Greenhouse-Geisser 8611.125 1.000 8611.125 4.366 .059 
Huynh-Feldt 8611.125 1.000 8611.125 4.366 .059 
Lower-bound 8611.125 1.000 8611.125 4.366 .059 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 23668.519 12 1972.377   
Greenhouse-Geisser 23668.519 12.000 1972.377   
Huynh-Feldt 23668.519 12.000 1972.377   
Lower-bound 23668.519 12.000 1972.377   
quad Sphericity Assumed 46692.562 3 15564.187 23.750 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 46692.562 1.639 28495.890 23.750 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 46692.562 1.863 25065.580 23.750 .000 
Lower-bound 46692.562 1.000 46692.562 23.750 .000 
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Error(quad) Sphericity Assumed 23592.118 36 655.337   
Greenhouse-Geisser 23592.118 19.663 1199.831   
Huynh-Feldt 23592.118 22.354 1055.397   
Lower-bound 23592.118 12.000 1966.010   
test * quad Sphericity Assumed 3953.721 3 1317.907 4.189 .012 
Greenhouse-Geisser 3953.721 1.867 2118.089 4.189 .031 
Huynh-Feldt 3953.721 2.197 1799.324 4.189 .023 
Lower-bound 3953.721 1.000 3953.721 4.189 .063 
Error(test*quad) Sphericity Assumed 11326.333 36 314.620   
Greenhouse-Geisser 11326.333 22.400 505.646   
Huynh-Feldt 11326.333 26.368 429.548   
Lower-bound 11326.333 12.000 943.861   
 
Appendix 3.3.5: Egocentric-np test planned contrasts 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source test quad 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad  Level 1 vs. Later 8721.360 1 8721.360 15.471 .002 
Error(quad)  Level 1 vs. Later 6764.668 12 563.722   
test * quad Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 3432.746 1 3432.746 3.848 .073 
Error(test*quad
) 
Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 10704.710 12 892.059   
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
77.359 6.811 62.519 92.200 
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2. test 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 86.459 10.474 63.638 109.280 
2 68.260 4.584 58.272 78.248 
 
3. quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 57.933 7.945 40.623 75.244 
2 54.502 7.263 38.677 70.327 
3 97.471 8.393 79.184 115.758 
4 99.531 8.653 80.677 118.385 
 
4. test * quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 73.127 12.585 45.706 100.547 
2 55.357 9.577 34.491 76.223 
3 102.920 11.129 78.673 127.168 
4 114.431 13.126 85.832 143.030 
2 1 42.740 5.249 31.305 54.176 
2 53.647 7.846 36.552 70.742 
3 92.021 7.880 74.851 109.191 
4 84.631 7.020 69.337 99.926 
 
Appendix 3.3.6: Egocentric-np One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 6001.589 1 6001.589 7.734 .017 
Greenhouse-Geisser 6001.589 1.000 6001.589 7.734 .017 
Huynh-Feldt 6001.589 1.000 6001.589 7.734 .017 
Lower-bound 6001.589 1.000 6001.589 7.734 .017 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 9311.520 12 775.960   
Greenhouse-Geisser 9311.520 12.000 775.960   
Huynh-Feldt 9311.520 12.000 775.960   
Lower-bound 9311.520 12.000 775.960   
 
Appendix 3.3.7: Egocentric-p vs. Egocentric-np 2 x 2 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 1316.943 1 1316.943 2.018 .181 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1316.943 1.000 1316.943 2.018 .181 
Huynh-Feldt 1316.943 1.000 1316.943 2.018 .181 
Lower-bound 1316.943 1.000 1316.943 2.018 .181 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 7831.130 12 652.594   
Greenhouse-Geisser 7831.130 12.000 652.594   
Huynh-Feldt 7831.130 12.000 652.594   
Lower-bound 7831.130 12.000 652.594   
time Sphericity Assumed 16986.878 1 16986.878 17.503 .001 
Greenhouse-Geisser 16986.878 1.000 16986.878 17.503 .001 
Huynh-Feldt 16986.878 1.000 16986.878 17.503 .001 
Lower-bound 16986.878 1.000 16986.878 17.503 .001 
Error(time) Sphericity Assumed 11645.905 12 970.492   
Greenhouse-Geisser 11645.905 12.000 970.492   
Huynh-Feldt 11645.905 12.000 970.492   
Lower-bound 11645.905 12.000 970.492   
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test * time Sphericity Assumed 431.588 1 431.588 .260 .619 
Greenhouse-Geisser 431.588 1.000 431.588 .260 .619 
Huynh-Feldt 431.588 1.000 431.588 .260 .619 
Lower-bound 431.588 1.000 431.588 .260 .619 
Error(test*time) Sphericity Assumed 19915.251 12 1659.604   
Greenhouse-Geisser 19915.251 12.000 1659.604   
Huynh-Feldt 19915.251 12.000 1659.604   
Lower-bound 19915.251 12.000 1659.604   
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Appendix 3.4.1: Paired samples t-test comparing bin 0 frequency 
 
T-Test 
 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 block1_bin0 73.8462 13 20.61491 5.71755 
block3_bin0 119.6923 13 13.21858 3.66617 
 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired Differences 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 block1_bin0 - 
block3_bin0 
-45.84615 25.20531 6.99070 -61.07757 -30.61474 -6.558 12 .000 
 
Appendix 3.4.2: Bin percentage 2 x 5 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
block1_pbin1 63.4327 9.39107 13 
block1_pbin2 22.3570 10.53980 13 
block1_pbin3 8.3918 4.50909 13 
block1_pbin4 3.6662 4.36002 13 
block1_pbin5 2.1523 2.30110 13 
block3_pbin1 30.7164 20.32310 13 
block3_pbin2 17.2990 14.81364 13 
block3_pbin3 12.1978 11.99932 13 
block3_pbin4 9.7415 8.79216 13 
block3_pbin5 30.0452 35.30852 13 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
block Sphericity Assumed .000 1 .000 . . 
Greenhouse-Geisser .000 . . . . 
Huynh-Feldt .000 . . . . 
Lower-bound .000 1.000 .000 . . 
Error(block) Sphericity Assumed .000 12 .000   
Greenhouse-Geisser .000 . .   
Huynh-Feldt .000 . .   
Lower-bound .000 12.000 .000   
bin Sphericity Assumed 26500.770 4 6625.193 25.254 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 26500.770 1.605 16514.997 25.254 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 26500.770 1.814 14606.493 25.254 .000 
Lower-bound 26500.770 1.000 26500.770 25.254 .000 
Error(bin) Sphericity Assumed 12592.580 48 262.345   
Greenhouse-Geisser 12592.580 19.256 653.963   
Huynh-Feldt 12592.580 21.772 578.390   
Lower-bound 12592.580 12.000 1049.382   
block * bin Sphericity Assumed 12514.764 4 3128.691 9.664 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 12514.764 1.874 6678.065 9.664 .001 
Huynh-Feldt 12514.764 2.208 5666.917 9.664 .001 
Lower-bound 12514.764 1.000 12514.764 9.664 .009 
Error(block*bin) Sphericity Assumed 15539.813 48 323.746   
Greenhouse-Geisser 15539.813 22.488 691.023   
Huynh-Feldt 15539.813 26.501 586.393   
Lower-bound 15539.813 12.000 1294.984   
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
20.000 .000 20.000 20.000 
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2. block 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
block Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 20.000 .000 20.000 20.000 
2 20.000 .000 20.000 20.000 
 
 
3. bin 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
bin Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 47.075 2.474 41.684 52.465 
2 19.828 2.456 14.477 25.179 
3 10.295 1.666 6.665 13.925 
4 6.704 1.382 3.694 9.714 
5 16.099 4.850 5.531 26.666 
 
 
4. block * bin 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
block bin Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 63.433 2.605 57.758 69.108 
2 22.357 2.923 15.988 28.726 
3 8.392 1.251 5.667 11.117 
4 3.666 1.209 1.031 6.301 
5 2.152 .638 .762 3.543 
2 1 30.716 5.637 18.435 42.998 
2 17.299 4.109 8.347 26.251 
3 12.198 3.328 4.947 19.449 
4 9.742 2.439 4.428 15.055 
5 30.045 9.793 8.708 51.382 
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Appendix 4 
 
 
SPSS Data Output – Experiment 4 
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Appendix 4.1.1: Distance travelled One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
dist_trial1 431.0346 84.08468 19 
dist_trial2 359.7877 93.30491 19 
dist_trial3 317.9739 119.32190 19 
dist_trial4 310.2958 118.29132 19 
dist_trial5 228.7161 103.20946 19 
dist_trial6 301.6083 103.77610 19 
dist_trial7 231.6008 136.44379 19 
dist_trial8 268.6776 122.11605 19 
dist_trial9 293.6671 111.90805 19 
dist_trial10 296.9845 132.17122 19 
dist_trial11 247.7753 115.37776 19 
dist_trial12 239.5488 123.58074 19 
dist_trial13 193.4977 116.01957 19 
dist_trial14 209.5032 120.35750 19 
dist_trial15 222.5283 139.83297 19 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
trial Sphericity Assumed 1061423.881 14 75815.991 6.357 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1061423.881 6.551 162034.599 6.357 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 1061423.881 10.696 99236.706 6.357 .000 
Lower-bound 1061423.881 1.000 1061423.881 6.357 .021 
Error(trial) Sphericity Assumed 3005669.304 252 11927.259   
Greenhouse-Geisser 3005669.304 117.911 25491.042   
Huynh-Feldt 3005669.304 192.526 15611.771   
Lower-bound 3005669.304 18.000 166981.628   
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
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1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
276.880 11.555 252.604 301.156 
 
Appendix 4.1.2: Latency to target One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
General Linear Model 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
time_trial1 3.8251 .58270 19 
time_trial2 3.7678 .68272 19 
time_trial3 3.4422 .99003 19 
time_trial4 3.4010 1.10840 19 
time_trial5 2.5749 1.14611 19 
time_trial6 3.2607 1.03605 19 
time_trial7 2.4512 1.29283 19 
time_trial8 2.8739 1.38566 19 
time_trial9 3.2650 1.10909 19 
time_trial10 3.0785 1.16417 19 
time_trial11 2.6541 1.32294 19 
time_trial12 2.5053 1.32233 19 
time_trial13 1.9493 1.26055 19 
time_trial14 2.2291 1.43233 19 
time_trial15 2.2313 1.37481 19 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
trial Sphericity Assumed 90.710 14 6.479 5.374 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 90.710 6.298 14.403 5.374 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 90.710 10.055 9.021 5.374 .000 
Lower-bound 90.710 1.000 90.710 5.374 .032 
Error(trial) Sphericity Assumed 303.819 252 1.206   
Greenhouse-Geisser 303.819 113.366 2.680   
Huynh-Feldt 303.819 180.993 1.679   
Lower-bound 303.819 18.000 16.879   
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Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
2.901 .114 2.660 3.141 
 
Appendix 4.2.1: Allocentric test 2 x 4 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
test1_targ 27.5070 13.48939 19 
test1_NW 69.3972 14.34474 19 
test1_NE 100.1237 23.16445 19 
test1_SE 76.3389 25.65561 19 
test2_targ 21.0890 10.93510 19 
test2_NW 70.4416 14.09516 19 
test2_NE 97.7797 18.16509 19 
test2_SE 70.6320 17.56789 19 
 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 428.017 1 428.017 .788 .387 
Greenhouse-Geisser 428.017 1.000 428.017 .788 .387 
Huynh-Feldt 428.017 1.000 428.017 .788 .387 
Lower-bound 428.017 1.000 428.017 .788 .387 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 9781.122 18 543.396   
Greenhouse-Geisser 9781.122 18.000 543.396   
Huynh-Feldt 9781.122 18.000 543.396   
Lower-bound 9781.122 18.000 543.396   
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quad Sphericity Assumed 109991.001 3 36663.667 237.403 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 109991.001 1.689 65121.677 237.403 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 109991.001 1.845 59620.946 237.403 .000 
Lower-bound 109991.001 1.000 109991.001 237.403 .000 
Error(quad) Sphericity Assumed 8339.562 54 154.436   
Greenhouse-Geisser 8339.562 30.402 274.308   
Huynh-Feldt 8339.562 33.207 251.138   
Lower-bound 8339.562 18.000 463.309   
test * quad Sphericity Assumed 335.261 3 111.754 .718 .545 
Greenhouse-Geisser 335.261 1.743 192.384 .718 .477 
Huynh-Feldt 335.261 1.914 175.196 .718 .489 
Lower-bound 335.261 1.000 335.261 .718 .408 
Error(test*quad) Sphericity Assumed 8402.938 54 155.610   
Greenhouse-Geisser 8402.938 31.368 267.883   
Huynh-Feldt 8402.938 34.445 243.950   
Lower-bound 8402.938 18.000 466.830   
 
Appendix 4.2.2: Allocentric test planned contrasts 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source test quad 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad  Level 1 vs. Later 60625.910 1 60625.910 374.273 .000 
Error(quad)  Level 1 vs. Later 2915.696 18 161.983   
test * quad Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 316.666 1 316.666 .764 .394 
Error(test*quad
) 
Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 7461.229 18 414.513   
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Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
66.664 2.648 61.100 72.227 
 
2. test 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 68.342 3.518 60.951 75.732 
2 64.986 2.966 58.754 71.218 
 
3. quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 24.298 2.049 19.992 28.604 
2 69.919 2.449 64.775 75.064 
3 98.952 3.902 90.753 107.150 
4 73.485 3.849 65.398 81.573 
 
4. test * quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 27.507 3.095 21.005 34.009 
2 69.397 3.291 62.483 76.311 
3 100.124 5.314 88.959 111.289 
4 76.339 5.886 63.973 88.705 
2 1 21.089 2.509 15.818 26.360 
2 70.442 3.234 63.648 77.235 
3 97.780 4.167 89.024 106.535 
4 70.632 4.030 62.165 79.099 
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Appendix 4.2.3: Allocentric test One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 391.310 1 391.310 2.757 .114 
Greenhouse-Geisser 391.310 1.000 391.310 2.757 .114 
Huynh-Feldt 391.310 1.000 391.310 2.757 .114 
Lower-bound 391.310 1.000 391.310 2.757 .114 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 2554.633 18 141.924   
Greenhouse-Geisser 2554.633 18.000 141.924   
Huynh-Feldt 2554.633 18.000 141.924   
Lower-bound 2554.633 18.000 141.924   
 
 
Appendix 4.3.1: Egocentric-p 2 x 4 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
test1_targ 80.1641 32.80158 19 
test1_NW 58.4810 30.50798 19 
test1_NE 104.0700 35.92176 19 
test1_SE 116.0231 33.70593 19 
test2_targ 52.8711 34.10542 19 
test2_NW 61.9877 28.63745 19 
test2_NE 95.6519 33.63043 19 
test2_SE 89.3357 39.43363 19 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 8237.123 1 8237.123 5.085 .037 
Greenhouse-Geisser 8237.123 1.000 8237.123 5.085 .037 
Huynh-Feldt 8237.123 1.000 8237.123 5.085 .037 
Lower-bound 8237.123 1.000 8237.123 5.085 .037 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 29156.991 18 1619.833   
Greenhouse-Geisser 29156.991 18.000 1619.833   
Huynh-Feldt 29156.991 18.000 1619.833   
Lower-bound 29156.991 18.000 1619.833   
quad Sphericity Assumed 55467.846 3 18489.282 29.474 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 55467.846 1.984 27955.261 29.474 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 55467.846 2.229 24884.748 29.474 .000 
Lower-bound 55467.846 1.000 55467.846 29.474 .000 
Error(quad) Sphericity Assumed 33875.106 54 627.317   
Greenhouse-Geisser 33875.106 35.715 948.485   
Huynh-Feldt 33875.106 40.122 844.306   
Lower-bound 33875.106 18.000 1881.950   
test * quad Sphericity Assumed 6395.654 3 2131.885 3.783 .015 
Greenhouse-Geisser 6395.654 1.977 3235.673 3.783 .033 
Huynh-Feldt 6395.654 2.219 2882.254 3.783 .027 
Lower-bound 6395.654 1.000 6395.654 3.783 .068 
Error(test*quad) Sphericity Assumed 30431.257 54 563.542   
Greenhouse-Geisser 30431.257 35.579 855.317   
Huynh-Feldt 30431.257 39.942 761.894   
Lower-bound 30431.257 18.000 1690.625   
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Appendix 4.3.2: Egocentric-p planned contrasts 
‘ 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source test quad 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad  Level 1 vs. Later 8438.142 1 8438.142 13.654 .002 
Error(quad)  Level 1 vs. Later 11123.939 18 617.997   
test * quad Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 5337.111 1 5337.111 3.762 .068 
Error(test*quad
) 
Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 25537.548 18 1418.753   
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
82.323 5.072 71.667 92.979 
 
 
 
2. test 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 89.685 6.172 76.718 102.651 
2 74.962 5.888 62.591 87.332 
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3. quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 66.518 5.890 54.143 78.892 
2 60.234 4.938 49.860 70.609 
3 99.861 6.773 85.632 114.090 
4 102.679 6.890 88.204 117.155 
 
4. test * quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 80.164 7.525 64.354 95.974 
2 58.481 6.999 43.777 73.185 
3 104.070 8.241 86.756 121.384 
4 116.023 7.733 99.777 132.269 
2 1 52.871 7.824 36.433 69.309 
2 61.988 6.570 48.185 75.791 
3 95.652 7.715 79.443 111.861 
4 89.336 9.047 70.329 108.342 
 
Appendix 4.3.3: Egocentric-p test One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
 
 
General Linear Model 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 7076.653 1 7076.653 7.685 .013 
Greenhouse-Geisser 7076.653 1.000 7076.653 7.685 .013 
Huynh-Feldt 7076.653 1.000 7076.653 7.685 .013 
Lower-bound 7076.653 1.000 7076.653 7.685 .013 
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Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 16575.784 18 920.877   
Greenhouse-Geisser 16575.784 18.000 920.877   
Huynh-Feldt 16575.784 18.000 920.877   
Lower-bound 16575.784 18.000 920.877   
Appendix 4.3.4: Egocentric-np 2 x 4 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
test1_targ 70.6267 40.06090 19 
test1_NW 64.4300 58.71975 19 
test1_NE 93.3310 52.18860 19 
test1_SE 112.2388 49.36120 19 
test2_targ 45.8779 23.02274 19 
test2_NW 49.4772 29.11654 19 
test2_NE 84.4317 27.31684 19 
test2_SE 79.6932 29.78455 19 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 15638.767 1 15638.767 5.979 .025 
Greenhouse-Geisser 15638.767 1.000 15638.767 5.979 .025 
Huynh-Feldt 15638.767 1.000 15638.767 5.979 .025 
Lower-bound 15638.767 1.000 15638.767 5.979 .025 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 47083.326 18 2615.740   
Greenhouse-Geisser 47083.326 18.000 2615.740   
Huynh-Feldt 47083.326 18.000 2615.740   
Lower-bound 47083.326 18.000 2615.740   
quad Sphericity Assumed 47060.137 3 15686.712 15.957 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 47060.137 2.528 18612.477 15.957 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 47060.137 2.976 15814.410 15.957 .000 
Lower-bound 47060.137 1.000 47060.137 15.957 .001 
Error(quad) Sphericity Assumed 53083.767 54 983.033   
Greenhouse-Geisser 53083.767 45.512 1166.380   
Huynh-Feldt 53083.767 53.564 991.035   
Lower-bound 53083.767 18.000 2949.098   
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test * quad Sphericity Assumed 3118.976 3 1039.659 1.914 .138 
Greenhouse-Geisser 3118.976 2.713 1149.824 1.914 .145 
Huynh-Feldt 3118.976 3.000 1039.659 1.914 .138 
Lower-bound 3118.976 1.000 3118.976 1.914 .183 
Error(test*quad) Sphericity Assumed 29330.657 54 543.160   
Greenhouse-Geisser 29330.657 48.826 600.715   
Huynh-Feldt 29330.657 54.000 543.160   
Lower-bound 29330.657 18.000 1629.481   
 
Appendix 4.3.5: Egocentric-np planned contrasts 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source test quad 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad  Level 1 vs. Later 9489.253 1 9489.253 10.495 .005 
Error(quad)  Level 1 vs. Later 16274.691 18 904.150   
test * quad Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 672.533 1 672.533 .441 .515 
Error(test*quad
) 
Level 1 vs. Level 
2 
Level 1 vs. Later 27464.132 18 1525.785   
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
75.013 6.298 61.781 88.246 
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2. test 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 85.157 9.849 64.465 105.848 
2 64.870 4.094 56.268 73.472 
 
3. quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 58.252 5.684 46.312 70.193 
2 56.954 9.079 37.878 76.029 
3 88.881 8.331 71.379 106.384 
4 95.966 7.221 80.795 111.137 
 
4. test * quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 70.627 9.191 51.318 89.935 
2 64.430 13.471 36.128 92.732 
3 93.331 11.973 68.177 118.485 
4 112.239 11.324 88.447 136.030 
2 1 45.878 5.282 34.781 56.975 
2 49.477 6.680 35.443 63.511 
3 84.432 6.267 71.265 97.598 
4 79.693 6.833 65.338 94.049 
 
Appendix 4.3.6: Egocentric-np One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
General Linear Model 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 5818.747 1 5818.747 6.412 .021 
Greenhouse-Geisser 5818.747 1.000 5818.747 6.412 .021 
Huynh-Feldt 5818.747 1.000 5818.747 6.412 .021 
Lower-bound 5818.747 1.000 5818.747 6.412 .021 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 16333.488 18 907.416   
Greenhouse-Geisser 16333.488 18.000 907.416   
Huynh-Feldt 16333.488 18.000 907.416   
Lower-bound 16333.488 18.000 907.416   
 
Appendix 4.3.7: Egocentric-p vs. Egocentric-np 2 x 2 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 1297.989 1 1297.989 .785 .387 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1297.989 1.000 1297.989 .785 .387 
Huynh-Feldt 1297.989 1.000 1297.989 .785 .387 
Lower-bound 1297.989 1.000 1297.989 .785 .387 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 29773.709 18 1654.095   
Greenhouse-Geisser 29773.709 18.000 1654.095   
Huynh-Feldt 29773.709 18.000 1654.095   
Lower-bound 29773.709 18.000 1654.095   
time Sphericity Assumed 12864.650 1 12864.650 15.598 .001 
Greenhouse-Geisser 12864.650 1.000 12864.650 15.598 .001 
Huynh-Feldt 12864.650 1.000 12864.650 15.598 .001 
Lower-bound 12864.650 1.000 12864.650 15.598 .001 
Error(time) Sphericity Assumed 14846.095 18 824.783   
Greenhouse-Geisser 14846.095 18.000 824.783   
Huynh-Feldt 14846.095 18.000 824.783   
Lower-bound 14846.095 18.000 824.783   
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test * time Sphericity Assumed 30.750 1 30.750 .031 .863 
Greenhouse-Geisser 30.750 1.000 30.750 .031 .863 
Huynh-Feldt 30.750 1.000 30.750 .031 .863 
Lower-bound 30.750 1.000 30.750 .031 .863 
Error(test*time) Sphericity Assumed 18063.177 18 1003.510   
Greenhouse-Geisser 18063.177 18.000 1003.510   
Huynh-Feldt 18063.177 18.000 1003.510   
Lower-bound 18063.177 18.000 1003.510   
 
Appendix 4.4.1: Binomial test of choice frequency 
 
NPar Tests 
 
Binomial Test 
 Category N Observed Prop. Test Prop. 
Exact Sig. (2-
tailed) 
conf_choice Group 1 allo 19 1.00 .50 .000 
Total  19 1.00   
 
 
Appendix 4.4.2: Conflict test search time Paired samples t-test 
 
T-Test 
 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 allo_choice .7691 19 .14416 .03307 
ego_choice .0000 19 .00000 .00000 
 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 allo_choice - ego_choice .76914 .14416 .03307 .69966 .83863 23.256 18 .000 
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Appendix 4.5.1: Paired samples t-test comparing bin 0 frequency 
 
T-Test 
 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 block1_bin0 78.3684 19 16.74717 3.84207 
block3_bin0 110.8947 19 14.11026 3.23712 
 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired Differences 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 block1_bin0 - 
block3_bin0 
-32.52632 22.51263 5.16475 -43.37706 -21.67557 -6.298 18 .000 
 
Appendix 4.5.2: Bin percentage 2 x 5 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
block1_pbin1 64.9157 10.18693 19 
block1_pbin2 21.2103 7.72164 19 
block1_pbin3 9.3707 7.97527 19 
block1_pbin4 3.7599 4.87868 19 
block1_pbin5 .7434 1.36234 19 
block3_pbin1 46.4762 13.43620 19 
block3_pbin2 23.2834 10.98662 19 
block3_pbin3 14.8967 8.98383 19 
block3_pbin4 8.4965 10.05166 19 
block3_pbin5 6.8472 8.00306 19 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
block Sphericity Assumed .000 1 .000 . . 
Greenhouse-Geisser .000 . . . . 
Huynh-Feldt .000 . . . . 
Lower-bound .000 1.000 .000 . . 
Error(block) Sphericity Assumed .000 18 .000   
Greenhouse-Geisser .000 . .   
Huynh-Feldt .000 . .   
Lower-bound .000 18.000 .000   
bin Sphericity Assumed 68253.534 4 17063.383 158.549 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 68253.534 2.453 27821.044 158.549 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 68253.534 2.870 23785.023 158.549 .000 
Lower-bound 68253.534 1.000 68253.534 158.549 .000 
Error(bin) Sphericity Assumed 7748.791 72 107.622   
Greenhouse-Geisser 7748.791 44.160 175.473   
Huynh-Feldt 7748.791 51.653 150.017   
Lower-bound 7748.791 18.000 430.488   
block * bin Sphericity Assumed 4128.139 4 1032.035 11.181 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 4128.139 2.460 1678.109 11.181 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 4128.139 2.879 1433.872 11.181 .000 
Lower-bound 4128.139 1.000 4128.139 11.181 .004 
Error(block*bin) Sphericity Assumed 6645.646 72 92.301   
Greenhouse-Geisser 6645.646 44.280 150.083   
Huynh-Feldt 6645.646 51.822 128.239   
Lower-bound 6645.646 18.000 369.203   
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
20.000 .000 20.000 20.000 
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2. block 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
block Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 20.000 .000 20.000 20.000 
2 20.000 .000 20.000 20.000 
 
3. bin 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
bin Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 55.696 2.132 51.216 60.175 
2 22.247 1.491 19.115 25.379 
3 12.134 1.440 9.109 15.158 
4 6.128 1.272 3.455 8.801 
5 3.795 .932 1.837 5.754 
 
4. block * bin 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
block bin Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 64.916 2.337 60.006 69.826 
2 21.210 1.771 17.489 24.932 
3 9.371 1.830 5.527 13.215 
4 3.760 1.119 1.408 6.111 
5 .743 .313 .087 1.400 
2 1 46.476 3.082 40.000 52.952 
2 23.283 2.521 17.988 28.579 
3 14.897 2.061 10.567 19.227 
4 8.496 2.306 3.652 13.341 
5 6.847 1.836 2.990 10.705 
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Appendix 5.1.1: Distance travelled One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
dist_trial1 437.6108 59.42357 18 
dist_trial2 442.9519 63.31236 18 
dist_trial3 383.2908 77.05155 18 
dist_trial4 379.8233 93.49714 18 
dist_trial5 343.9539 82.59060 18 
dist_trial6 355.8634 97.26806 18 
dist_trial7 320.8459 95.68783 18 
dist_trial8 318.3997 102.98199 18 
dist_trial9 292.3267 54.73534 18 
dist_trial10 301.0863 80.77946 18 
dist_trial11 294.8067 68.27650 18 
dist_trial12 266.9773 43.48880 18 
dist_trial13 271.9488 60.24933 18 
dist_trial14 272.9341 59.81468 18 
dist_trial15 251.8264 24.74052 18 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
trial Sphericity Assumed 916740.733 14 65481.481 17.680 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 916740.733 4.043 226734.822 17.680 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 916740.733 5.463 167820.234 17.680 .000 
Lower-bound 916740.733 1.000 916740.733 17.680 .001 
Error(trial) Sphericity Assumed 881477.617 238 3703.687   
Greenhouse-Geisser 881477.617 68.735 12824.312   
Huynh-Feldt 881477.617 92.865 9492.053   
Lower-bound 881477.617 17.000 51851.625   
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
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1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
328.976 10.594 306.624 351.328 
 
Appendix 5.1.2: Latency to target One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
time_trial1 3.8437 .39657 18 
time_trial2 3.8440 .39342 18 
time_trial3 3.3837 .68400 18 
time_trial4 3.2143 .83567 18 
time_trial5 2.9464 .73574 18 
time_trial6 2.9074 .88041 18 
time_trial7 2.6309 .82889 18 
time_trial8 2.6305 .86339 18 
time_trial9 2.3110 .52400 18 
time_trial10 2.4050 .67724 18 
time_trial11 2.4014 .68346 18 
time_trial12 2.1047 .41527 18 
time_trial13 2.1204 .52730 18 
time_trial14 2.1603 .53492 18 
time_trial15 1.9504 .27214 18 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
trial Sphericity Assumed 95.848 14 6.846 27.302 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 95.848 4.052 23.655 27.302 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 95.848 5.478 17.495 27.302 .000 
Lower-bound 95.848 1.000 95.848 27.302 .000 
Error(trial) Sphericity Assumed 59.681 238 .251   
Greenhouse-Geisser 59.681 68.883 .866   
Huynh-Feldt 59.681 93.133 .641   
Lower-bound 59.681 17.000 3.511   
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
2.724 .101 2.512 2.936 
 
 
Appendix 5.2.1: Allocentric test One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
test1_targ 33.7927 14.81304 18 
test1_NW 72.9820 22.11970 18 
test1_SW 110.7468 24.58236 18 
test1_SE 87.6567 27.45927 18 
 
 
241 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad Sphericity Assumed 56401.951 3 18800.650 52.987 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 56401.951 1.851 30463.429 52.987 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 56401.951 2.068 27274.380 52.987 .000 
Lower-bound 56401.951 1.000 56401.951 52.987 .000 
Error(quad) Sphericity Assumed 18095.495 51 354.814   
Greenhouse-Geisser 18095.495 31.475 574.918   
Huynh-Feldt 18095.495 35.155 514.733   
Lower-bound 18095.495 17.000 1064.441   
Appendix 5.2.2: Allocentric test planned contrasts 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source quad 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad Level 1 vs. Later 57805.124 1 57805.124 134.336 .000 
Error(quad) Level 1 vs. Later 7315.163 17 430.304   
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
76.295 3.732 68.422 84.167 
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2. quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 33.793 3.491 26.426 41.159 
2 72.982 5.214 61.982 83.982 
3 110.747 5.794 98.522 122.971 
4 87.657 6.472 74.002 101.312 
 
Appendix 5.3.1: Egocentric-p test One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
test1_targ 73.6192 41.14250 18 
test1_NW 63.8310 35.54887 18 
test1_SW 78.7398 39.06506 18 
test1_SE 91.9866 31.22465 18 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad Sphericity Assumed 7424.446 3 2474.815 1.997 .126 
Greenhouse-Geisser 7424.446 1.709 4343.286 1.997 .159 
Huynh-Feldt 7424.446 1.882 3946.013 1.997 .155 
Lower-bound 7424.446 1.000 7424.446 1.997 .176 
Error(quad) Sphericity Assumed 63204.637 51 1239.307   
Greenhouse-Geisser 63204.637 29.060 2174.976   
Huynh-Feldt 63204.637 31.986 1976.034   
Lower-bound 63204.637 17.000 3717.920   
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Appendix 5.3.2: Egocentric-p test planned contrasts 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source quad 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad Level 1 vs. Later 375.374 1 375.374 .177 .680 
Error(quad) Level 1 vs. Later 36125.636 17 2125.037   
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
77.044 4.915 66.674 87.415 
 
2. quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 73.619 9.697 53.159 94.079 
2 63.831 8.379 46.153 81.509 
3 78.740 9.208 59.313 98.166 
4 91.987 7.360 76.459 107.514 
 
Appendix 5.3.3: Egocentric-np One Way Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
 
General Linear Model 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
test1_targ 76.9087 48.81714 18 
test1_NW 66.5097 40.84278 18 
test1_SW 114.9575 35.25702 18 
test1_SE 123.2030 38.04324 18 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad Sphericity Assumed 41977.381 3 13992.460 14.211 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 41977.381 1.627 25797.993 14.211 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 41977.381 1.775 23647.473 14.211 .000 
Lower-bound 41977.381 1.000 41977.381 14.211 .002 
Error(quad) Sphericity Assumed 50217.269 51 984.652   
Greenhouse-Geisser 50217.269 27.662 1815.410   
Huynh-Feldt 50217.269 30.177 1664.078   
Lower-bound 50217.269 17.000 2953.957   
 
Appendix 5.3.4: Egocentric-np test planned contrasts 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source quad 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
quad Level 1 vs. Later 10935.436 1 10935.436 5.494 .031 
Error(quad) Level 1 vs. Later 33840.063 17 1990.592   
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Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
95.395 7.253 80.092 110.697 
 
2. quad 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
quad Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 76.909 11.506 52.633 101.185 
2 66.510 9.627 46.199 86.820 
3 114.957 8.310 97.425 132.490 
4 123.203 8.967 104.285 142.121 
 
Appendix 5.3.5: Egocentric-p vs. Egocentric-np One Way Within-Subjects 
ANOVA 
General Linear Model 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
type1_time1 73.6192 41.14250 18 
type2_time1 76.9087 48.81714 18 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
test Sphericity Assumed 97.390 1 97.390 .058 .813 
Greenhouse-Geisser 97.390 1.000 97.390 .058 .813 
Huynh-Feldt 97.390 1.000 97.390 .058 .813 
Lower-bound 97.390 1.000 97.390 .058 .813 
Error(test) Sphericity Assumed 28573.019 17 1680.766   
Greenhouse-Geisser 28573.019 17.000 1680.766   
Huynh-Feldt 28573.019 17.000 1680.766   
Lower-bound 28573.019 17.000 1680.766   
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Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
75.264 8.157 58.055 92.473 
 
2. test 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
test Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 73.619 9.697 53.159 94.079 
2 76.909 11.506 52.633 101.185 
 
Appendix 5.4.1: Conflict test Chi-Square test 
 
NPar Tests 
 
Chi-Square Test 
 
Frequencies 
conf_choice 
 Observed N Expected N Residual 
ego 5 9.0 -4.0 
allo 13 9.0 4.0 
Total 18   
 
Test Statistics 
 conf_choice 
Chi-Square 3.556
a
 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. .059 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected 
frequencies less than 5. The 
minimum expected cell 
frequency is 9.0. 
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Appendix 5.4.2: Distance travelled on conflict test Independent samples t-test 
 
T-Test 
 
Group Statistics 
 
conf_choice N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
conflict_dist ego 5 265.2268 35.66802 15.95122 
allo 13 387.8831 97.19574 26.95725 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
conflict_d
ist 
Equal variances 
assumed 
5.079 .039 -2.709 16 .015 
-
122.65627 
45.27855 
-
218.64251 
-26.67002 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  -3.916 15.993 .001 
-
122.65627 
31.32307 
-
189.06072 
-56.25181 
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Appendix 5.5.1: Paired samples t-test comparing bin 0 frequency 
 
T-Test 
 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 block1_bin0 6.3333 18 4.47214 1.05409 
block3_bin0 15.2222 18 4.46629 1.05271 
 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired Differences 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 block1_bin0 - 
block3_bin0 
-8.88889 5.64529 1.33061 -11.69622 -6.08155 -6.680 17 .000 
 
Appendix 5.5.2: Bin percentage 2 x 5 Within-Subjects ANOVA 
 
General Linear Model 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
block1_pbin1 19.2054 12.58442 18 
block1_pbin2 15.5537 11.49526 18 
block1_pbin3 12.7427 6.69136 18 
block1_pbin4 12.5889 12.49342 18 
block1_pbin5 39.9093 16.64381 18 
block3_pbin1 8.9296 11.03103 18 
block3_pbin2 4.6741 4.43066 18 
block3_pbin3 4.7512 6.82468 18 
block3_pbin4 4.1261 3.83897 18 
block3_pbin5 77.5189 13.51774 18 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
block Sphericity Assumed .000 1 .000 . . 
Greenhouse-Geisser .000 . . . . 
Huynh-Feldt .000 . . . . 
Lower-bound .000 1.000 .000 . . 
Error(block) Sphericity Assumed .000 17 .000   
Greenhouse-Geisser .000 . .   
Huynh-Feldt .000 . .   
Lower-bound .000 17.000 .000   
bin Sphericity Assumed 68180.091 4 17045.023 84.042 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 68180.091 2.207 30891.933 84.042 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 68180.091 2.550 26733.810 84.042 .000 
Lower-bound 68180.091 1.000 68180.091 84.042 .000 
Error(bin) Sphericity Assumed 13791.502 68 202.816   
Greenhouse-Geisser 13791.502 37.520 367.579   
Huynh-Feldt 13791.502 43.356 318.102   
Lower-bound 13791.502 17.000 811.265   
block * bin Sphericity Assumed 15965.330 4 3991.333 46.617 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 15965.330 2.933 5443.809 46.617 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 15965.330 3.610 4421.943 46.617 .000 
Lower-bound 15965.330 1.000 15965.330 46.617 .000 
Error(block*bin) Sphericity Assumed 5822.123 68 85.619   
Greenhouse-Geisser 5822.123 49.857 116.777   
Huynh-Feldt 5822.123 61.378 94.857   
Lower-bound 5822.123 17.000 342.478   
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
20.000 .000 20.000 20.000 
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2. block 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
block Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 20.000 .000 20.000 20.000 
2 20.000 .000 20.000 20.000 
 
3. bin 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
bin Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 14.068 2.440 8.919 19.216 
2 10.114 1.470 7.012 13.215 
3 8.747 1.361 5.875 11.619 
4 8.358 1.825 4.507 12.208 
5 58.714 3.039 52.302 65.126 
 
4. block * bin 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
block bin Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 19.205 2.966 12.947 25.463 
2 15.554 2.709 9.837 21.270 
3 12.743 1.577 9.415 16.070 
4 12.589 2.945 6.376 18.802 
5 39.909 3.923 31.633 48.186 
2 1 8.930 2.600 3.444 14.415 
2 4.674 1.044 2.471 6.877 
3 4.751 1.609 1.357 8.145 
4 4.126 .905 2.217 6.035 
5 77.519 3.186 70.797 84.241 
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HREC Approval Letter 
 Research Integrity 
Research Portfolio 
Level 6, Jane Foss Russell 
The University of Sydney  
NSW 2006 Australia 
T +61 2 8627 8111 
F +61 2 8627 8177 
E ro.humanethics@sydney.edu.au 
sydney.edu.au 
ABN 15 211 513 464 
CRICOS 00026A 
 
 
Research Integrity 
Human Research Ethics Committee 
 
 
 
Friday, 22 May 2015 
 
 
Dr Ian Johnston 
Psychology; Faculty of Science 
Email: i.johnston@sydney.edu.au  
 
 
 
Dear Ian 
 
I am pleased to inform you that the University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) 
has approved your project entitled “Neuropsychological applications of virtual reality”.  
 
Details of the approval are as follows: 
 
Project No.:  2015/347 
 
Approval Date:  22 May 2015  
 
First Annual Report Due: 22 May 2016  
 
Authorised Personnel: Johnston Ian; Segula Blake; Verstraten Frans (Franciscus); 
 
Documents Approved:  
 
Date  Type  Document  
18/05/2015 Participant Info Statement Participant information sheet v.2 
18/05/2015 Other Type Debrief sheet 
17/04/2015 Participant Consent Form Participant consent form 
17/04/2015 Study Protocol Procedural instructions and script 
 
 
HREC approval is valid for four (4) years from the approval date stated in this letter and is granted 
pending the following conditions being met: 
 
Condition/s of Approval 
 
 Continuing compliance with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving 
Humans.  
 
 Provision of an annual report on this research to the Human Research Ethics Committee from 
the approval date and at the completion of the study. Failure to submit reports will result in 
withdrawal of ethics approval for the project.  
 
 All serious and unexpected adverse events should be reported to the HREC within 72 hours. 
 
 All unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project should be 
reported to the HREC as soon as possible. 
 
 Page 2 of 2 
 
 Any changes to the project including changes to research personnel must be approved by the 
HREC before the research project can proceed.  
 
 Note that for student research projects, a copy of this letter must be included in the 
candidate’s thesis. 
 
Chief Investigator / Supervisor’s responsibilities: 
 
1. You must retain copies of all signed Consent Forms (if applicable) and provide these to the HREC 
on request. 
 
2. It is your responsibility to provide a copy of this letter to any internal/external granting agencies if 
requested. 
 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact Research Integrity (Human Ethics) should you require further 
information or clarification. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Associate Professor Rita Shackel 
Chair 
Human Research Ethics Committee 
 
 
 
This HREC is constituted and operates in accordance with the National Health and Medical 
Research Council’s (NHMRC) National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research 
(2007), NHMRC and Universities Australia Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of 
Research (2007) and the CPMP/ICH Note for Guidance on Good Clinical Practice. 
 
